



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
BUDAPEST

T E L E F A X

Sid 1 (7)

2000-01-03

R 18

Bil 1 Björn Renberg RK

aap

INK. UTRIKESDEP. D.Nr. 2000 -01- 03		
AVD. <i>P</i>	GR. <i>2</i>	MÅL <i>Eu</i>

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET, nr 2

Till: UD-EC/Lundvik

Raoul Wallenberg

(1 bilaga)

Från Szita Szabolcs vid den ungerska Auschwitz-stiftelsen har vi erhållit bifogade brev och dokumentation. Originalet insänds med nästa lägenhet (13 januari).

CARLSSON

cc Sören Lundvall, Bp

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
Budapest, 1999. december 13.

Jan Lundwik nagykövet úrnak
Svéd Királyi Nagykövetség
Budapest
1146 Ajtósi Dürer sor 27/a.

Tisztelt Nagykövet úr,

küldök - megbeszélésünk alapján - két utalást a történelmi események
szereplőire /Kóla Mici és Raoul Wallenberg/.

Szívélyes köszöntéssel


/Dr. habil. Szita Szabolcs/
tudományos vezető



HETÉNYI VARGA KÁROLY

AKIKET ÜLDÖZTEK AZ IGAZSÁGÉRT

Papi sorsok
a horogkereszt és nyilaskereszt
árnyékában

Dr. Szita Szabolcs vezér
szerepeltél és barátságod
Erdőben, 1990. július 8.

Hetényi Varg. Károly



ECCLESIA * BUDAPEST

ISBN 963 363 419 9

Felolvas kiadó az Ecclesia Szövetség elnöke * Budapest, V. Károlyi M. u. 4-8. * 1985
85-4715 Pécsi Székely Nyomda - Felelős vezető: Farkas Gábor igazgató

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nővére gondolt.) Pintér testvér hozdátte: nem azért két díszkrétit, mert fél a vértanúságtól, de ok nélkül nem akarja keresni a veszélyt.

Vajon hol van most Pintér testvér, eljut-e hozzá köszönő szavam?

Dr. Egyed András piarista szerzetes, a HEV-állomás ügyelése, Prucser Lajos és Pfleger Albert marista szerzetesek, az ismeretlen mentő-„orvos”, Pintér testvér, a Jézus Szíve Néplányai rendjének tagjai: valamennyien vállalták, hogy a Gondviselés eszközeivé válnak egy család életének megmentésére. Ez a visszaemlékezés legyen annak bizonyossága, hogy az embertelenség korában bátran, sőt önfeláldozóan követték lelkiismeretük szavát.
(Dr. V. O.)

Tiszelt Hetényi Varga Károly Úr!

Budapest, 1983. máj. 13.
Kétségtelenül későn reflektálók a Vigilia 1982/11. sz.-ban közölt „Egyed András O. S. P.” című cikkére, de csak a Látóhatár márciusi számában olvastam részleteket a Jeni beszélgetésből. Azért ragadtok tovább, mert én is laktam a Sacré Coeur zárdában 1944. október 16-tól december 8-ig. Velem volt bigom, majd később édesanyám is. Tudom, ki lehetett a bölgy, aki Langletné társaságában fogadta a pátert, a két Kola nővér egyike, Mici vagy Margit. Mindketten a Svéd Vöröskereszt gyermekosztályán dolgoztak. Arra sajnos nem tudok visszaemlékezni, őrizte-e a zárdát bármikor is rendőr, de arra sajnos igen, hogy hogyan törték be a nyílások december első napjaiban, és hogyan burcoltak el nyolc vagy tíz lányt. Ez után az incidens után a nővérek már nem indták értünk a felelősséget vállalni, így mindnyájunknak el kellett mennünk. 1944-ben 13 éves voltam, a naplómát megsemmisítették, amit a zárdában írtam, így csak két név maradt meg az emlékezetemben, Barkóczy anyád, aki közvetlenül foglalkozott velünk, és Lengyel anyád – a későbbiekben Magyarországról eltávozott begelíműbész, Lengyel Gabriella nagynénjé –, aki éneket tanított nekünk, és derűs kedélyével egy kis vidámságot vitt erősen zaklatott életünkbe...

Nem éreztem magam jól a zárdában, de báliával gondolkodok arra a két hónapra, amit védett körülmények között töltöttem.

Még csak annyit, hogy ez alatt az idő alatt édesapám, Kun Imre, a Koncert

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De hogyan tudom erről értesíteni szüleimet? A Margit-bid aznap robbant fel, amikor mi visszajutottunk Pestre. A bidról a Dunába zuhant zsfolt vil-tamostokocik, autók, mit sem sejtő járókelők tragédiája túlságosan közel volt: nem akadt senki, aki – bármi árért – át mert volna menni az egyik hídon, hogy elvige bizalmas és sürgős leveletem, amelyikben szüleimet értesítenem volna a tehetőségről. Ekkor valaki azt tanácsolta, hogy kériék meg egy mentőt, hiszen a mentőautók igris átjárnak Budára.

Szüleimnek megírtam egy bevenyészett levélben, hogy Albert testvéreknél menedéket találhatnak. Sirva szorongattam a levelet, amely az életüket ment-beti meg –, ha eljui borzjúk. Az első mentőautó „orvosa” (később annyit tudtam meg róla, hogy harmadéves orvostanhallgató) elgondolkozott, amikor kérésmei megballotta: számára nagy kockázatot jelent, ha olyan helyre megy, ahová nem irányították. Mivel azonban állította, hogy életmentésről van szó, átvette leveletem, sőt azt is vállalta – teljesen önzetlenül, minden ellenszolgáltatás nélkül –, hogy szüleimet a mentőautón Albert testvérekhez szállítja. Ha sikerült: értesít a sürgősségi kórház portájának telefonján. Éjjeli felé, amikor remény és kétség között hánnyódtam, egyszerre a telefonhoz szálítottak: az ismeretlen mentőorvos közölte: átszállította szüleimet Albert testvérekhez. Ez talán november 8-án lehetett. Egy nap múlva magam is csatlakoztam hozzájuk.

Albert testvéreknél november végéig maradtunk. Ekkor igen forróvá vált a talaj: a szomszédos zárdából, a Knézych utcából előltek az ott rejtőzőket (legalábbis ez a hír járta). Magunknak is célszerű volt más menedék után nézni. (Ismeretes – és ezért nem térek ki erre –, hogy nem sokkal ezután a maristákat mind, s a menekültek nagy részét elburcolták a németek. Egyed András dr. is a fogszázkba került.)

A bizonytalanság e napjaiban – valamikor decemberben – találkoztam a Mikszáth Kálmán téri „Korlá” könyvkereskedésbeli egyik nővérel, a Jézus Szíve Néplányai rendjébe tartozó Pintér testvérről. Csak mint vásárlót ismert. Amikor megduda, hogy az üldözöttek közé tartozom, nagyon egyszerűen ajánlotta segítségét. Hozdátte: ha elkerülhető, ne legyen ez nyilvánossá. Az egyik testvért – mint mondta – az előtte való napon tartóztatták le a nyílások. (Nem tudom, hogy az ő rendjékből-e, vagy talán Salzkabádi Sára vagy más

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Hangversenyvendező Vállalat igazgatója a Horánszky utcai jezsuita rendházban nyert védelmet.

Emmyvel szerettem volna beszélni a katolikus egyház szerepének tisztázásáról a magyarországi német megszállás alatti időkhöz.

Tisztelettel:

Kun Agnes
Budapest.
Szannely u. 58.

NOTRE DAME DES VICTOIRES INTEZET

03 St. Pourcain-sur-Sionde

1972. augusztus 10.

C. C. P. Lyon 2078-74

TANÜSÍTVÁNY

Aláírott Pfleger Albert, a budapesti, IX. ker. Högyes Emléke utca 3. sz. alatti „CHAMPAGNAT” francia-magyar iskola egykori igazgatója becsületre tanúsítom a következőket:

Az 1939-1945-ös bátori alatti iskolám mindenféle menekültet befogadott. Ezenkívül központja volt a Németországból megszökött francia foglyok és a német hadseregéből dezertált elszármazott katonák ellenállásának.

Ebben a veszedelemes akcióban EGYED András úr aktív részt vett. Hála összeköttetéseknek, az iskola szimpatizáns rendőrt kapott az épület őrzésére azonnal a parancsot, hogy használja géppisztolyát a nyilasok ellen, békésen.

A nyilas francia tanár és védekezőknek a Gestapo által történt letartóztatásakor EGYED András úr is letartóztatódott az ellenállásban való tevékenysége miatt.

Aláírva:

Albert Pfleger

P. H.

a „NEUHAUSER Hálózat” ellenállás tagja,

a Becsületrend Lovagja,

a Szabad Franciaország érdem,

az Önkéntes Harcos Kereszt és az Akadémia Pálmág birtokosa.

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Láttam és legalizálom:

M. Albert PFLEGER úr fenti aláírását.

St-Pourcain-sur-Sionde. 1972. augusztus 29.

A polgármester helyettese J. BAIZET

P. H.

HADTÖRTENETI INTEZET ÉS MÚZEUM

Budapest I. Kapistváni tér 2.

Szám: 919/1972

IGAZOLÁS

A Hadtörténelmi Intézet és Múzeum Parancsnoksága igazolja, hogy dr. EGYED ANDRÁS (sz.: 1913. november 30. Édelény, an.: Bobács Erzsébet) 1944-ben a német megszállás és a nyilas uralom idején, mint piarista tanár, a Svéd Vöröskereszt különböző intézményeinél tevékenykedett. Őnként és életveszélyt vállalva részt vett a Svéd Vöröskereszt embermentési akcióiban, tevékeny közreműködésével üldözött magyarokat és Magyarországra menekült francia állampolgárokat mentettek meg, menekülteknek és gyermekeknek belyeket váltott meg a fasiszta gyilkosságoktól, betörésektől. 1944. december 19-én után dr. Eged András - több szerzetessel, paptanárral együtt - a Gestapo elhurcolta, és társaitól együtt Budapest felszabadításakor szabaddá vált a Gestapo börtönéből.

Az igazolást a levéltárunkban őrzött eredeti dokumentumok alapján állítottuk ki.

Budapest, 1972. október 12.

P. H.

Aláírás:

(Dr. Papp Tibor alez.)

levéltárvezető

A Svéd Vöröskereszt magyar és orosz nyelvű igazolása
Eged András embermentő tevékenységéről. Ld.: 174. old.-on

Albert Pfleger bízatosan tanúsítja Eged András részvételét
a „veszedelemes akcióban”. Ld. 173. old.-on

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Moszkva ismeretlen kulcsembere

fejt ki halálzati-operatív tevékenységet, 4. osztály: Munkaterületi és mezőgazdasági termelési, termelőkapcsolati, állattenyésztési, földművelési minisztérium gazdaságok, földművelési minisztérium, 5. osztály: munkaterületi és közlekedési minisztérium, a vasúti és országutak kiépítése (gépkocsizás), 6. osztály: kiépítés és a polgári repülés fejlesztése. A halátszáz és a polgári repülés fejlesztés objektumait fogja át halálzati-operatív munkával.

A halátszáz osztálya.

Halálzati-operatív munkát végző kül- földön Magyarországgal ellen tevékenykedő külföldi halátszáz szervek ellen, a nyugat emigráció és annak szervei ellen, politikai és gazdasági hírszerzési feladatok.

[illegible]

— Moszkva izámára Beikín srec-
melye 44 jevkenyecsége vidoznón-
nút a „védett férfiak” künde tano-
zók.

– Ugyanazt, amit tavallendítottunk és más publikációiban a magyar állampolgári szervek vezető munkatársai már megfogalmaztak a legfontosabb szándékainak, hiszen mi is emelt szövegeket



fontosabb, tevékenységük „legkiválóbb eredménye” is nup-
 erkedőben váltakozottan képzéses
 fiktál képeztek... Visszakérve Bel-
 ture: 1943-ban Szilárd, aki akkor a
 honvédelmi népbiznosz fukoldját is
 betöltötte, kívánta az NKVD (U-
 gyi Népbiznosz) tudaskutatói n-
 karmal kényszerűségi fa annak előre
 V. Sz. Alkotmányváltástól együt-

szavazat kapott, egy hirtelenlét volt SZMIERSZ tanácsmestere mekkorából, tovább a szervezett, "célja" "hatalm" zése magyarnak felfutva: "Hatalm a kémeke", "A második világháború utolsó szakaszában Itelkén mdr Abakunov helyettese volt. A labo- rálónál 1966-ban bekövetkezett a szerv-

Rákos Milyás és Farkas Mihály a Széchenyi tér felől, az akadémia parancsnoka, János Zérőnég, az akadémia parancsnoka, János katonai főtanácsadó. A kép jobb szélén levő

fejt ki haláloztal-operatív tevékenységét.
4. osztály: Munkaterrátele a megszáz-
dasági temetkezési: temetkezéssopok, dila-
ni gazdaságok, földművelési miniszteri-
um. 5. osztály: Munkaterrátele a kőbte-
kedési minisztérium, a wazuli és ország-
nyi kőbtelek (gépalkozási), 6. osztá-
sok. A kőbtelek egy noldati wazuli, waz-
sok.

A hadereng körébe tartozó valamennyi egység és intézmény, valamint a csapatok közötti haladati munkát végző. Az osztályhoz 4 osztályt tartozik. 1. osztály: a hovárdolnál minisztérium és vezérkari. 2. osztály: a csapatok és a haladati körzetek hivatalai. 3. osztály: a haladati körzetek hivatalai. 4. osztály: a haladati körzetek hivatalai. A haladati körzetek hivatalai, valamint a haladati körzetek hivatalai, valamint a haladati körzetek hivatalai.

[illegible]

A black and white photograph showing a dense, textured surface, possibly a wall or a large piece of fabric. A vertical line runs down the center of the image, dividing it into two halves. The texture is highly irregular and granular, with many small, dark spots and lines. The lighting is somewhat uneven, with the right side appearing slightly brighter than the left.

Akkor Mátyás és Farkas Mihály a Széchenyi Tudomány-Társulat Akadémiáján 1952 tavaszán, az akadémia parancsnoka, Zsigmond Zoltán vezetésével, a tudományok területén.

...elbe vétele és házkulcs terén. Ilyen megfigyzást vidéki szervezetről is vállalt az ország.

IV. osztály (Katonai elhárítás jogi osztály).

[illegible][illegible]

ANKAS 33 ANTONIA ANCHILLOVICH



Rothszl Máttyás és Farkas Mihály a Szállm Politikai-Társi Akadémián 1952 tavaszán. A hátterben (balról): Otto István vezérőrnagy, az akadémia parancsnoka. Miel János ezredes, politikai főcsoportfőnök-helyettes és Bujko Mihailovics, az első katonai főtanácsadó. A kép jobb szélén levő személy ismeretlen.

csatlakozik az ÁVH épületeinek és intézményeinek, a börtönök, internálótáborok segítségével, az államvédelmi beosztásoknak személyi fegyverrel és egyenlővel való felállítását. Tízszázharminzok a belső fogda.

A *Hatóság Tízszázharminzok* a Hatóság letelepedésének nyilvánvalóságával, feltehetőleg, megőrzésével és széklettelével

[illegible]

ÁVII vidéket országra.
 Alulnasságban vezeli és ellenőrizi
 a ÁVII vidéket szerveit. (Különleges
 vonalakon, így pl. kémelhárítás,
 belső reakciók elleni harc,

szabotázshatárát, a vidéki szervezet vezetési a liallóság megfellelő hálós-
zail osztrályukon keresztül valóslájta
meg. Az ÁVH1 állseregek megvalósítá-
sa után idnyet kell vonni az ÁVH1 vidéki szervezetek felépí-
tése, a megvesztésnek megfelle-
lően.

– Fogadhatnánk e úgy, hogy ezzel a javaslati visszavételével az ÁVH-t egyszerűen a szovjet MGB haszonbírósághoz fejeztük?

csalás állampolgár. 1945 után állampolgári (államhűzettségű) szervezeti tagként nem igazolta a Kirendeltől az utat vezető katonák szolgálata feladatkörét. Moszkva ez a szervezet – nem is igényelte. Számára a formai kérdések általában nem játszottak fontos szerepet. Munka a BMK ÁVH 1949. decemberi szabályozásaihoz – a tények ismeretén – nem igazodott egészen az állampolgári munkák szervezeti slukktárházhoz. Az nyilvánvaló, hogy minél inkább ismétlődő állampolgári munkák és beosztások voltak a hatáskörének gyakorlatilag korlátlan, az új szabályok alkalmazói, valamint a hatályos jogszabályok is semmibe vették a kirendelés követeléseit. Ez egyáltalán megengedte a hivatali vezetők és a házi helytartók huzalozási és kirendelési.



KRYPTOFAX

KRYPTOFAX

Sid. 1 (2)

REGERINGSKANSLIET

2000-01-07

(EC) P 2 Eu^T

Inkom Krypto

2000 -01- 07

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Moskva

Kopia: Kabs

Ambassaden Riga

Dnr 2 ✓ Exp. 00 01 07 / ME

Raoul Wallenberg

Ambassadören från Lundvik.

P

Härmed några synpunkter på RW-ärendets handläggning på ambassaden.

Från mötet på MID 1999-12-22 har insänts Susan Mesinais anteckningar på engelska, däremot ingen uppteckning från den ambassadtjänsteman som ledsagade henne. Så får det inte gå till. RW-ärendet är en viktig bilateral svensk-rysk angelägenhet, vars olika moment måste kunna beläggas med hjälp av svensk dokumentation återspeglade svenska bedömningar. Mesianis uppfattning av ett samtal på MID kan inte ersätta ambassadens egen rapportering om detta samtal.

En fråga där den ryska uppfattningen skiljer sig från vår gäller vilka personakter som Mesinais skall ges tillfälle att se. Vi har här hemma svårt att bilda oss någon egen uppfattning i saken, eftersom vi inte fått veta vilka akter det gäller. Inför föredragning för kabs den 13.1 får jag därför be om en förteckning över vilka akter som ryssarna tillhandahållit och vilka som alltså är utestående. Förteckningen bör sedan löpande hållas aktuell.

I ambassadens PM 1999-12-24 ges intryck av att beslut skulle ha fattats om att Susanne Berger skulle anförtros granskningen av det s k trofé-arkivmaterialet såväl nu i mars som i ett senare skede, då arbetsgruppen avslutat sin verksamhet. Detta stämmer inte. Mot bakgrund av att Berger numera enligt egen utsago arbetar för FBI kan hon svärigen fortsätta som "oberoende expert", och det finns ingen anledning att anta att en

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2000-01-07

första granskning inte skulle kunna genomföras med hjälp av svensk expertis. Vad den framtida uppföljningen av arbetsgruppens rapport beträffar kan vi idag inte binda oss vid den ena eller andra uppläggningsen.

Slutligen vill jag understryka vikten av att tidtabellen hålls så att arbetsgruppen rapport verkligen kan framläggas före årets slut.

Cabinet



REGERINGSKANSLIET

KRYPTOFAX

KRYPTOFAX
2000-01-10

Sid. 1 (1)

(EC) P2 EU¹

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Jan Lundvik
Telefon 08-405 3114

Inkom Krypto
2000 -01- 10

Ambassaden Riga

Dnr 2 ✓ Exp 00010/AN

Raoul Wallenberg

1 bil

Ambassadören från Lundvik

För Din kännedom och helst också kommentar översänder jag Mesinais senaste brev till mig. Det är inte lika hysteriskt men till sitt innehåll minst lika anmärkningsvärt som det föregående. Trots att hon faktiskt betecknar sig själv som konsult tycks hon tro att det är hon som leder arbetsgruppens verksamhet.

I ett handskrivet brev till kabs anmodar hon honom att engagera sig i ärendet eftersom risk finns – trots att hon gör sitt allra bästa – att vi kan "miss the mark if certain administrative and policy issues aren't resolved". Hon upplyser vidare med en hänvisning till kabs väntade utnämning till Washington att "new discoveries in the Russian archives have raised questions pointing that way". Vet Du vad hon avser med detta? Slutligen meddelar hon att hon har nyligen "launched a number of initiatives involving declassification of the remaining American documents" och hoppas få tillfälle att orientera kabs om dessa.

I sitt brev till mig demonstrerar hon som Du ser på nytt sin obenägenhet – eller oförmåga – att belägga sina påståenden. Det telegram från generalen Key som hon citerade i sin "Analysis of the initial Russian response ..." den 6.1.99 tycks idag inte existera. Key hade inte ens kommit till Debrecen i början av februari 1945, menar hon numera. I handbrev till Dig 1999.12.21 har jag påvisat en rad andra felaktigheter i hennes material, och hur vi överhuvudtaget skall kunna lita på de uppgifter hon tilhandahåller är mer än vad jag förstår.

Cabinet

December 26, 1999

LETTER TO: Ambassador Jan Lundvik - EC

FROM: Susan Ellen Mesinai in Moscow

Dear Jan:

Now that I have had my meeting with MID and done some archival work, I can take the time needed to reply to your letter regarding the Seminar on the Raoul Wallenberg case. I trust that Hans, in the meantime, has forwarded my reply to his letter to you so that you are aware of my general perspective.

I want first to say, not only did I welcome you as the new person in charge of the Investigation after Martin Halqvist, but in working with you I have found you to be an extremely intelligent man from whom I have learned a great deal. I have benefitted from your administrative support in the early days of your tenure and I have benefitted from your criticism. I had assumed therefore that we shared an open and cooperative working relationship.

Because of this and to further our mutual understanding of the sequence of events regarding the Americans' awareness of Wallenberg's arrest, I went back to Washington at my expense and spent three days studying the Harriman Moscow Papers in search of the document regarding General Key, which I mentioned in a footnote in my January 1999 report. The document is not there although it is clear from a letter from Dekanozow to Kennan that Key was free to go to Hungary as of February 8, 1945. The first report from the American side of the ACC was made March 1, 1945, after Key flew to Debrecen on February 21 (but it does not say from where -- whether Budapest or Italy.). Susanne Berger in turn has been searching among her papers in Hannover, to enable us to clarify as best possible the true chronological sequence in the early stage of Wallenberg's disappearance. This material will be forwarded to you shortly.

So much for historic facts, although again I would emphasize that historical research -- which I regard as related but secondary to the investigation -- is not my present scope of work. Now for the facts regarding your seminar, about which you complain to me. These are facts which you, or Lage or anyone from the UD, could have presented to us in a coherent fashion and spirit of friendly cooperation to assure good will. As I wrote to Hans, I had not the tools to directly check the reports which came to me -- that is, knowledge of Swedish, a relationship with the movers and shakers in the Stockholm community, or access to e mail at that time. I asked Marvin to inquire and he did read me the answer through Hans.

What reinforced the confusion regarding Per Anger's role in this seminar is the fact that for the past several months, documents have been circulating from you to which I

have not had access -- even though they involve research and responses related to prisoners on my list, e.g. Feller. (Some of this material was based on my own requests, the answers to which were never forwarded to me by your office -- nor were the Russians' answers to my questions to them forwarded in spite of my repeated requests. Others involved follow up to my research or questions I gave you to prepare for your forthcoming interviews)

Guy protested this to Hans. When I finally received these documents, not only am I off the distribution list (even though the prisoner file aspect directly involves my work) but Per Anger is on it -- along with another party whom I do not know at all, but have been informed that he is a historian. In short, what should be a Working Group distribution list related to the investigation has become, overnight, without any notice, any written briefing to any of us -- something else. The consequence of that is, they seemingly have full access to our work while we did not know that they existed. Nor are we in any way benefitting from their work, whatever that might be.

This, connected with your comments which began in March 1999 -- paraphrased: "You will have to prepare to make room for the historians!" has repeatedly caused dissension between us. And that is because it is my understanding that your job is to oversee the investigation from Stockholm, but the reality of your activities seems to be that your predominant interest is in a whole new venture which for the moment we will call the 'Historical.' Given the above-mentioned warnings, one has every right to assume that your directive -- whether as a result of orders or of your own initiative -- is to make the Raoul Wallenberg case a matter of history.

Which it is not yet. To turn this case over to the "Living History" group of Uppsala does not answer the need in question either. Nor do I understand, by the way -- having begun to read Paul Levine's Holocaust book -- why our work, if need be, in the future, could not be incorporated within the Living History project. That is, when it becomes history, for best results why not use the very persons who already did the work? Why rely on those thrice removed? The very fact that we -- while pursuing an important investigation -- should be 'threatened' with the historians by the person in charge of the 'investigation' in Stockholm, has raised real questions in my mind as to whether or not there isn't a conflict of interest here on your part. I think, as a man of conscience, you should think about that. Unless of course you are acting under orders, in which case we would all like to be informed of the Foreign Office's real intentions in regard to this investigation.

As for myself, I am committed to a "live search investigation." It is a term I have always used in my work as founder and director of the ARK Project and it continues to be my working method. Its goal is to locate live disappeared persons in the former Soviet GULAG, or those recently deceased, and in that respect we have succeeded in three different instances -- the only such finds to my knowledge. The reason that I created the method and have adhered to it is based on my understanding of the relation between perception and goal. You will achieve next to nothing if you look at the "disappeared" as history. Or, as pointed out by a former head of the American POW/MIA Task Force, "If you look for bones, you will get bones -- at best!" One will always get less than what one strives for, and must be prepared for that. But one

must strive for the best, which is to me -- not only the return of our 'best men' but the reunification of families.

The Raoul Wallenberg case, being the case of a very valued individual and international hero, is far more difficult than the others I have been able to follow to their conclusion. Because of his prominence and connection with a number of different nations, there is much more at stake and much more to hide on the part of governments. I would not presume to solve this on my own, although for reasons that are bigger than me, it has become my vocation -- i.e. calling. For many years, I have wanted to pursue this case working closely with the Swedish Government, precisely as I told you -- because you are the responsible party. He is not only your citizen, but he worked for you -- according to Russian documentation, in the capacity of 'diplomatic overseer' and not simply an 'observer.'

That is, you in Stockholm, as Hans in Riga, and all those whom I have not met who are or were involved in this case, carry the responsibility for Raoul's return, dead or alive. I am not a government official and I am not the next of kin, although I have worked with both -- not only on this case but several others. While my position as an independent afforded me a great deal of freedom of action, I saw that it's easy to stand off and be critical of those who bear responsibility. It's much more difficult but necessary to work from within.

I was therefore most appreciative to have the opportunity to work for the Swedish Government and considered it an honor. In my work, I have done my best to make this investment worthwhile -- that is, I have been working continuously and to the point of exhaustion to try and make up for lost time, gathering together information to which we never previously had access. As I have great faith in people, I have worked with a lot of trust -- shared everything, including information outside the scope of this work, reported quickly, fully and faithfully. In my conduct I have been very attentive to the needs and good name of the Swedish Government.

However, my generosity and trust should not be misconstrued. I am not a senseless pawn, 'for hire.' Marvin and I proposed a two part investigation which we each designed and are carrying out on behalf of the Swedish Government and the Working Group. And as an administrator and a person responsible for my own project, I know what works. I may be a freelance Consultant and an American, but I still expect those who carry this responsibility to do so with an eye on the investigation -- for which the funds have been committed. Such purity of intention and wholehearted support -- combined with meticulous hard work with the data for which we are dependent on the

Although I am a graduate magna cum laude, phi beta kappa from Columbia University, was Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the President's Commission of the Holocaust after Elie Wiesel, have pursued my M.A. in Jewish Philosophy with distinction and am the author of one book, I do not regard myself as a 'professional' per se. I am, in the words of a Pentagon official, a 'problem solver' and in the world a human rights activist with a track record for opening up seemingly impossible situations -- who understands the VALUE of keeping a low profile.

Russians -- is essential to producing the best possible results. I would expect no less for a man whose remarkable deeds have won Sweden many favours during the War, during the post War period and into the present day.

What I have experienced since the beginning of this year is something different. For you, this is a matter of history -- as expressed in your letter to Guy, read to me and translated to me by Mrs. von Dardel, where more than once you referred to different aspects of the forthcoming events in Stockholm as "in the memory of Raoul Wallenberg." As I am Jewish, I make a very strong distinction between "In Honor of" and "In the Memory of", the first being in praise of someone living's positive deeds, the second referring to those who are deceased to keep their memory alive.

The Swedish Government, in turn, has been very careful to keep the case open until, as I understand it, incontrovertible evidence has been produced that he is dead. As we are still within the life expectancy range of Raoul Wallenberg, and as recently in the Swedish court a decision was made to hold off on declaring Wallenberg dead, anything which contradicts this can only be considered as "premature."

"Premature" is the same word I would use for your seminar, for different but related reasons. It is not only that our work was not ready to be revealed yet -- and about this I fully agree -- but to run anything else to an important public as reflecting the "Raoul Wallenberg Case" is tantamount to burying the real investigation alive. The effect of this on those who already think that Raoul Wallenberg has been "buried alive" (and there are many; documentaries have been produced under this title which are still quite to the point) was to bring down a disaster.

"Upon whom?" and "for whose benefit" are questions which I prefer not to deliberate. Therefore, when I heard there was a possibility that the seminar might not happen at all, when I understand that this possibility was still under consideration, I wrote a letter to you urging you to postpone the seminar until a later time. Then, it would seem to me, everything which you wish to put forth could be presented side by side with our and other investigations. I shared this with Jan Eliasson and with Hans Magnusson because the very fact that you had been preparing this event for a long time without briefing us or including us in any way in the picture showed that our opinion, our work, and our years of expertise mattered not at all in face of your determination. Frankly though I was responding to a well calculated procedure at the time -- I think I saved you from a nightmare.

The question of malice is a very real question. It relates to all the sins or mistakes of the past which I have put out of my mind in order to do this work, but which those who have suffered them directly cannot. Suffice to say, from my side, while I have a deep and sincere desire to help the Swedish Government resolve this case, I will not work for those whom I find to be cruel. Nor do I think it correct on my part to continue to take money where there exist serious questions of trust.

When the nature of this seminar came to us in bits and pieces 'in the third-quarter' and very much by chance, clearly leaving Guy von Dardel out of the loop -- and us -- the central question became: "Was this well meaning but caused by a lack of coordination or was this done to conceal, pre-empt or control the effectiveness of the real investigation?" For indeed Guy von Dardel is the 'father' of all the investigative efforts in Russia launched since Perestroika.

With little time to spare, the shortest way to arrive at that answer, quite simply, was to determine: "What action will be taken in regard to this seminar, once another perspective was presented?" On the basis of this action or response, I would then know how to make my decision as to what was the correct thing for me to do. Fortunately the seminar was 'cancelled in its present form' -- for whatever reason -- and I can in good conscience finish my work. But the impression left by the blatant disregard for our efforts in the greater context is quite indelible.

This whole thing is a shame because we have had the potential all along for a splendid team. And I think, at least where we put our heads together intellectually regarding the history, even if we begin with different views -- we are capable of benefitting from each other. I am not afraid of different views of history, but I am afraid that yet one more time Raoul's needs will become secondary to the prestige and comfort of those who are safe and sound -- yes prospering -- in Sweden. I include Per Anger among these. I bear him no grudge but I note that, in the final analysis, alot of attention that should be directed to doing this work properly and reaching a real conclusion is being diverted to comforting him. Or to extending his credibility and credit. Why? He has had a good life.

This brings me to my ultimate questions and they are very practical ones, in an effort to stick to the goal:

1) What is your job description? I need to know so I can properly shape my expectations and demands. As we near the end, I fully expect there to be very difficult issues calling for important decisions generating intense demands, so I need to know who is on the other end empowered to do what. I ask this also because Lage has informed me that you are the administrative person in charge, while you informed me in Moscow that it was Lage. What are the facts?

2) What is your definition of the " Raoul Wallenberg case" -- if not investigation into his fate with the intent of restoring him, alive or dead, to his family and his homeland? If historical, or if dedicated to the Budapest period and the controversy surrounding Wallenberg's mission, this is very valid and I am certain you could make a contribution. But where is the excellent facilitator needed to make certain that the needs of the investigation are met in full?

3) When are you going to answer the questions I set forth in my extensive confidential memorandum of mid-November raising certain points about what must happen if we are to meet our April deadlines successfully? That is, the question about which reports to write, among other things.

4) When can we schedule my work in the kartotecha in Stockholm and will you please authorize my ticket? (I would prefer around the 1st of February for one week with the ticket going from London to Stockholm and back, unless you want me to come around Raoul's Disappearance Date. I assume that the Conference would make housing all but impossible, nor do I think it necessary for me to be there during that time.)

4A) If not Claes Ericsson (who has security clearance), who will translate for me in doing that work?

Last but not least, 5) What are we going to do about the very serious problem of gaining access to the remaining files and launching the medical investigation in short order? (See my recent memorandum to Hans regarding my work in the Archives and our meeting with MID.)

So: I have said my peace and, as far as I am concerned, we are still two sides of the same valuable coin. Is this accurate or must we take further steps to correct our working situation?

Let me take this opportunity to wish you and your family a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year/ "Millenium", Y2K. May we get things back on track and work together happily and successfully in the forthcoming year for an outstanding completion of our many related endeavors.

Sincerely yours,



Susan Ellen Mesinai



REGERINGSKANSLIET

KRYPTOFAX

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Sid. 1 (1)

2000-01-10


EC P 2 Eu¹

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114



Ambassaden Moskva

Kopia: Kabs

Ambassaden Riga ✓

✓
DNR 3 alp 000110/12

Raoul Wallenberg

Ambassadören från Lundvik

R
Susan Mesinai har i ett handskrivet brev till kabs meddelat att "as you may or may not be aware, new discoveries in the Russian archives have raised questions pointing that way" (sannolikt syftande på Washington). Vi är naturligtvis nyfikna på vad som kan avses med denna formulering, och jag vore därför tacksam om ni kunde ta reda på vilka nya fynd som menas.

Cabinet



REGERINGSKANSLIET

TELEFAX

2000-01-10

EC P2 Eu 1

Sid. 1 (1)

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Budapest

dnr 1 ✓

Raoul Wallenberg: Mária Embers bok

1 bil

Från Lundvik.

Tacksam närslutna kommentarer till hennes manuskript om Raoul Wallenberg i Budapest överlämnas till Mária Ember.

Cabinet

Exp. 2000-01-11/APP

Postadress
103 39 STOCKHOLM

Telefon
08 - 405 10 00

E-post: ud@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE

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ml

Author: Amelie (UD) Heinsjö at (Pk)UD-1

Date: 2000-01-10 15:32

Priority: Normal

TO: internet:lennart.h.eriksson@gamma.telenordia.se at INTERNET

CC: Peter (UD) Nilsson at (Pk)UD-5

Subject: Re Wallenbergdokument

PIK

P 2 tu
10/025

För Charlotta Eriksson

Jag har fått din e-post med frågor om Wallenbergdokument.

CD-ROM skrivorna (3 i antal) finns på samtliga universitetsbibliotek liksom på vårt eget bibliotek (bor du i Stockholm så måste du avtala tid med vårt bibliotek om att få komma tillträde). Du kan ringa UD:s bibliotek på 08-405 5318.

CD-ROM skrivorna finns också till försäljning men de kostar då 1000 kronor. Kontaktperson på UD för dessa är Berndt Fredriksson på 08-405 5444.

Vad beträffar Räddningen av ambassadör Per Anger är uppgifterna följande:

Titel: Räddningen Budapest 1944 : rapporter ur UD:s arkiv / inledning
Per Anger, [förord av Jan Eliasson].

Ort/Förlag: Stockholm : Fischer, 1997. - 246 s.

Utgivningsår: 1997

Anmärkning: Omslagets titel: Räddningen Budapest 1944 : judarna skall deporteras : de svenska hjälpinsatserna : rapporter ur UD:s arkiv.

ISBN/ISSN: 91-7054-856-0

Denna bör finnas på ditt bibliotek, om inte kan de säkert beställa den. Fischers Bokförlag
Norrländsgatan 15
111 43 Stockholm
Telefon 08-24 21 60
www.fischer-co.se

Mvh

Amelie Heinsjö

Informatör UD

2000-01-10

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Jan Lundvik
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Delges:
Mária Ember

Raoul Wallenberg-kézirat

Kedves Ember Mária,

Nagy érdeklődéssel olvastam és gratulálok. Itt néhány kommentár.


- 3 o. Svéd Királyi Külügyminisztérium. 25 év óta nem használjuk a "királyi" szót.
- 4 Bernadotte akkor a Svéd Vörös Kereszt alelnöke volt, l. 84
- 7 A kronológia nem stimmel. Úgy olvasom a naptárt hogy RW a 7-én 13.50 elutazott Berlinbe, a 8-án ebédelt Richerttel és 17.21 tovább utazott Bécsbe. Nem hiszem hogy Bécsben találkozott a házaspárral. A bűjegy zés inkább azt jelenti hogy az esküvőre 6 órakor került sor egy svédországi templomban (Värna ? Ka = kyrka), és oda alighanem RW-nek meghívója volt. Per Anger már Svédországban megismerkedett RW:gel. A felesége neve Elena.
- 10 A Király levelét átadták július 3-án, nem 1-én, de minden esetre, és az a lényeg, RW akkor még nem érkezett Budapestre. "A svéd parlamenti berendezkedés" ebben a kontextusban jelentéktelen.
- 12 Az Auschwitz-Protokoll: "maig nem tudható kinek a révén". Annyit tudunk, hogy Langleten keresztül a Zsidó Tanácstól. L. is Haraszi György beszámolója arról hogy milyen módon a Protokoll Budapestre került.
- 15 Nem a vlagyimiri hanem a lubjankai börtönben találták a naptárt.
- 21 Lauer melyik nyelven írt, ha nem magyarul ki fordította le?
- 34 Soós nem fordította németre, l. Haraszi.
- 36 Andrassy Stella, svéd származásu, szül. Kuylenstjerna.
- 39 Amit Ungváry Mikóról ír, Bondor könyvéből származik. Egy nem régen megjelent könyvben – Egyetemisták az ostromgyűrűben (az írója nevét most nem emlékszem) – Mikó és RW is

2000-01-10

szerepelnek. Gazsi József szerint Mikó felesége RW irodájában dolgozott.

- 40 112 sz. lábjegyzet: hjälten, nem hjölten
- 47 126 sz. lábjegyzet: hände, nem händle.
- 54 nem vlagyimiri, lubjankai
- 75 A néhány éve megjelent Tschuy könyvet "Carl Lutz und die Juden von Budapest" is kellene konzultálni
- 76 Az itteni dokumentumokból nem derül ki, hogy annyi figyelmet keltett a Kossuth Rádió híre, még kevésbé hogy Gyekanozov ígéretet tett volna annak kapcsán.
- 77 Szalai állítása hogy RW üzenetet küldött a Sz. Domonkos u. rendházból számomra új és érdekes. Ez az utca hol van?

Kényes kérdés a svéd nevek átírása egy oroszról való fordításban. Svédül Hägglöf, Håstad, Sjöborg vagy oroszul Hegglef, Hostad, Schöborg



Jan Lundvik.



2000-01-11

Utrikesdepartementet

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Jan Lundvik

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(EC)

P 2 Eu'

Ambassaden Budapest

dnr 2✓

RW: Mária Ember

Från Lundvik

f

Gårdagens fax med synpunkter på Mária Embers manuskript om RW i Budapest återopas. En punkt hade beklagligtvis bortfallit. Tacksam följande också översändes till Ember:

- 13 "Sv Leg" se svédül se németül a svájci követségre hivatkozhat (schweiziska/schweizerische). Szerintem csak a svéd követséget jelentheti. RW akkor éppen érkezett Budapestre és saját követséget még "svéd" nevezi.

Cabinet

Exp. 2000-01-11 / RP

M/P



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

KRYPTOFAX
K R Y P T O F A X

Sid 1 (2)

2000-01-12

R18W-berg

Handläggare: H Magnusson

KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000-01-12 11:05		
Avd. P	Grupp 2	Mål Eu'

Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
enl adressering/samt
UMK
BMK/ANW

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr 2

Till: EC (Jan Lundvik)
Kopia: kabs



Raoul Wallenberg

Kryfax 2U 2000-01-10 m m

Jag har följande kommentarer till Susan Mesinais olika utläggningar. Flertalet av dem tror jag dock Du kan bemöta utan min medverkan - några kanske lämpar sig bäst för muntligt bemötande.

1/ Mesinais brev av den 26 december 1999.

- General Keys brev. Jag har inte tillgång till alla amerikanska dokument här, men finns det inte ett brev/telegram från Key i maj 1945 (från Caserta)? Eller handlar det om något annat?

- Seminariet (det planerade men inställda); Mesinais bortser från att hon faktiskt blev informerad i oktober. Annars har vi självfallet rätt att göra vad vi vill utan att inhämta experternas godkännande, även om det är klokt att informera dem, när tiden är mogen. I övrigt är hennes argumentering vettlös.

- Delgivning av schweiziska papper: kommenterar jag ej.

- Guy von Dardel tog initiativ till den internationella kommissionen 1989-90 men senare har snarare UD tagit ledningen.

- Mesinais memorandum från mitten av november har jag kommenterat. Jag vet inte om du har några avvikande synpunkter.

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ANTAL SIDOR 001

AMBASSADEN RIGA

KRYPTOFAX NR 2 000112

Sid 2 (2)

-Det vore bra om Mesinai kunde få definitivt bemyndigande genomföra genomgången av UD:s kartotek.

2/ Susan Mesinais ofta yviga stil, brist på precision och ibland grundlösa påståenden har, som du framhåller med väl valda exempel, länge utgjort ett problem, och jag är säkert på att ryssarna är väl medvetna härom. Å andra sidan har jag under flera skeden av utredningen kunnat konstatera att en mer okonventionell, ihärdig och om man så vill fantasifull approach varit viktig för att föra arbetet framåt, detta p g a RW-ärendets unika karaktär och svårigheten påträffa de avgörande dokumenten. Ett drag av irrationalism är inte bara till skada. Mesinai har en intuitiv talang och en inte oäven begåvning och insikt när det gäller ryska "gulag-"förhållanden, för att använda en något oprecis term. Hennes undersökning sker också inom en överenskommen ram. Att hon ibland går väl långt resp slarvar med fakta är förvisso ett problem och något vi måste ta itu med kraftfullt när vi nu närmar oss det avslutande skedet. Man kan tillåta att hon svävar ut en del under utredningens gång men inte när det gäller att formulera en rapport. Slutligen tror jag det är en styrka (mer än en svaghet, men den aspekten finns också) att vi har amerikanska experter, som medverkar.

3/ Jag vet inte vad SM syftar på med uppgiften om "new discoveries in Russian archives have raised questions pointing that way."

4/ Jag hörde imorse på ekot om American Jewish Committee och dess krav på att den amerikanska regeringen trycker på. Det är viktigt att vi i anslutning till Holocaustforum utnyttjar såväl ACJ:s närvaro som amerikansk närvaro på hög officiell nivå för att avhemma de amerikanska dokument som ännu inte släppts i sin helhet (med utgångspunkt från Bergers och våra egna tidigare ansträngningar).

MAGNUSSON

ANTAL SIDOR001

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

KRYPTOFAX Sid. 1 (21)

2000-01-12

Dnr 8 ✓

Aambs Eva Tojzner Glückman

Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
enl adressering/samt
UMK
BMK/

KE

KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000 -01- 12		
Avd. P	Grupp 2	Mål Eu'

EC

BRÅDSKANDE

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC (Lundvik)

aa
H

Kopia: Amb Riga (Magnusson)

Raoul Wallenberg - utestående personakter mm

(K-fax 2U 00-01-07, k-fax 3U 00-01-10)
(2 bil.)

PRIMO

I enlighet med departementets önskemål översändes härmed en förteckning över de personakter vilka enligt Mesinai är nödvändiga att få ta del av för att färdigställa undersökningsarbetet. Förteckningen är en av Mesinai, i samarbete med Razboyev (FSB arkivisten), nu modifierad version av den förteckning som insändes till departementet med kryptofax nr 521 (99-10-27). För tydlighets skull medsändes även den förteckning på ryska som, med vissa förändringar i förhållande till den ursprungliga, överlämnades till den ryska sidan 99-11-04.

Wolfins personakt fordrar, enligt Mesinai, en särskild framställning som hon ämnar be Hans Magnusson göra. Personakten har således (trots att den finns med i förteckningen) ännu inte efterfrågats hos den ryska sidan.

Trots upprepade påstötningar från ambassadens sida (bl a mötet med arbetsgruppen 99-10-18, vid bilateralt samtal Hirdman-Titov 99-11-19, mötet med Tutjnin mfl 99-12-22, samt ett flertal samtal Foyer-Nikisjkin) är, som framgår av förteckningen, flertalet personakter dessvärre ännu utestående.

Ambassaden delar Mesinai's bedömning att Konstantin Nikisjin, MVD, utgör en nyckelfigur för det fortsatta arbetet. Under gårdagen nådde ambassaden en semestrande Nikisjkin i hemmet. Han återgår till arbetet först den 17 januari, men sade sig vara redo att i början av nästa vecka träffa Mesinai och inom kort avge de utlovade kommentarerna till förteckningen över återstående persondossierer.

SECUNDO

Enligt vad ambassaden kunnat utröna avser den citerade formuleringen i Mesinas brev till kabs en anteckning på Wallenbergs registreringskort i Lubjankafängelset, som Mesinai och hennes medarbetare nyligen upptäckt. Enligt Mesinai skulle det faktum att Wallenbergs uppdrag på registreringskortet betecknades med den i sammanhanget ovanliga ryska termen "nadsmotr" ("overseer"), snarare än med den långt vanligare "nadzor" ("observer") eller helt enkelt "diplomat" implicit kunna tyda på att han hade särskilda befogenheter och agerade på ett speciellt uppdrag från Washington.

Ambassaden uppfattning är att denna upptäckt noggrant måste utredas innan några slutsatser kan dras.

DAHL

LATEST REPORT ON THE COMPOSITE
PRISONER FILE LIST
Raoul Wallenberg Case. January 10, 2000

On December 22, 1999, prior to our meeting with the FSB and MVD representatives in the office of Mr. Tuchnin of MID as Chairman of the Russian Side of the Working Group, Yuri Michaelovitch Razboyev (FSB Archivist) and I, with the help of Andrey Allahkverdov, reviewed the Composite Prisoner File List of October 25, 1999 in an effort to ascertain what further contributions could be made by FSB toward the completion of our data gathering.

As the files of all prisoners who have been in camps, prisoners who were at Vladimir and significant others such as Istvan Bethlen fall under the jurisdiction of MVD, our goal was to try to find an alternative procedure in certain cases through the criminal files which remain in the hands of FSB. As it is our understanding through Mr. Tuchnin that Y.M. Razboyev is to serve as my counterpart, and as Mr. Razboyev only acts under orders, I will assume that this discussion -- which lasted for several hours -- was an authorized one. I emphasize this because the tone at the meeting with MID was slightly different, reflecting among other things the Russians' concern as to the public reaction to my report, even given its classified aspects, which seemed to impact on their willingness to turn over further materials.

On December 23, where I was shown one new file in the FSB Reading Room, Mr. Nikishkin informed me that the letter responding to our Prisoner File Requests (that is the list of October 25, 1999) would be sent to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow the following week. The same promise was offered by Mr. Nikishkin to Eva Tozjner-Gluckman. That letter never arrived so we are in the dark about the decision to have been made by Mr. Vinogradov, as FSB representative, Mr. Nikishkin as MVD representative on the basis of Mr. Razboyev's briefing of them.

My concern, as I have expressed both to Chairman Hans Magnusson, Mats Foyer and Eva Tozjner-Gluckman is that now -- because of difficulties that rest with the MVD in turning over files -- we will also lose momentum with the FSB, where indeed information from the criminal files could provide the data needed in certain cases. I have therefore given you the breakdown of our discussion as I remember it, since these lists are locked up at the Embassy in Moscow. Where there is uncertainty, I have left it blank.

It should be noted also that a number of names on the list have now been deleted.

ABAKUMOV, Victor. I have explained in fine detail why I need his interrogation schedule. As in such cases the schedule is usually already compiled and typed in the file, it is only a matter of allowing me to copy the pages. This seems hopeful and is truly important.

ALTER, Viktor. Delete from list. Y.M. Razboyev had already done thorough work on this criminal file for a scholarly book and it is agreed that my researcher will scan the book. If there is anything which is particularly relevant to Wallenberg, I will go back to them – but I am not expecting that.

ANGELIS, Maxmillan. The archivist will attempt to get the particulars. Do not know if FSB or MVD, but probably the latter.

ADELMANN, Rudiger. Deleted because answers were given to me in the Lefortovo Registry I was shown earlier that day.

ALAJANI, Pietro Stefan. File is now under review thanks to the MVD. One-third complete per December 23, 1999.

ASKHINIS, Antanas. MVD

BAJ, Boguslav. This file was promised us by Nikishkin who apologized to me on December 23, 1999 saying that he had confused it with another file. Baj's file cannot be shown because he was a 'Soviet citizen.' This will be a problem because his is the lead testimony of the Bratsk Polish witnesses. One of the files of one of the other Polish witnesses has at least provided us with the date of the transport when he says RW left. We need to see this file to verify Baj's statements and cross reference it with the other Poles who so far have proven accurate at least in relation to their own circumstances. Also, I think Baj would greatly protest being called a 'Soviet citizen.'

BAYER, Frederick. MVD. Important to verify his report and that of a highly significant witness. Simple facts required.

BECHER, Kurt. While it is understood that this file is not in Moscow because Becher was interrogated in Budapest, the fact that either Kartashov or one of his special investigators went to Budapest to carry out these interrogations gives us further means of tracking this down. We agreed to check the correspondence files and registries for that period from that particular department or others appropriate to these interrogations. Becher, it should be noted, stated that he was interrogated about RW. FSB

BENTIVEGNI, Franz. Have requested his interrogation schedule. Will be requesting his medical file.

BERGER, Lazar. Could be MVD as Vladimir was his prison or could be in the Ukraine.

BETHLEN, Istvan. MVD. Must have this to follow his movements and whereabouts and to verify counter-reports as to the place of Bethlen's death as these could have direct bearing on RW's whereabouts at that time. Have requested interrogation schedule through his criminal file.

5

BOGDANOS, Antonas. MVD for the early period. Medical. Will check the criminal file for information on his whereabouts, etc. as he was convicted as a Fascist.

BRAUN, Charles Clifford. (also known as Charles Clifford Brown). Fortunately this name was on the October 25, 1999 composite list because, in examining the Lefortovo registries on December 22, 1999 it was established that the order of interrogations by Kopelyansky on July 17, 1946 was as follows: Wallenberg, Langfelder, Braun, van der Waals. All four of these have Allied connections. Also Braun would seem to have been sent on the same route as Wallenberg, if there is any truth to the Verchne Uralsk reports. Not certain if MVD or FSB, but must get as much information on this case as we can.

DEMESCO, Michael. The FSB Archivist was under the impression that Demesco had claimed to have been with Wallenberg. This is not the case. He was an indirect witness to Wallenberg through another source, although he was held in Moscow prisons at about the same time. In addition to this, he was held in camps not only with Makinen but other witnesses who claim to have seen Wallenberg after Makinen's departure. Therefore, Demesco's file -- which covers five different incarcerations -- is vitally important to unraveling a number of the eyewitness reports. In addition to this he was sent to an asylum and this would be helpful for acquainting myself with those procedures for the Medical/Internat phase of work. (File exists in Kursk where it has been studied by a journalist).

FRIDMAN, Samuel. Will look among criminal files. Presume MVD. Otherwise file is missing.

GARCIA, Manuel. MVD. Prisoner of both Vladimir and camps whose story intertwines with several others from the early 70s.

GERRUM, Kurt. Believed to be Vladimir, therefore MVD. May have died there. FSB may provide interrogation schedule from criminal file.

GOTTLIEB, Roland. FSB to provide missing interrogation schedule from the criminal file.

HAMMERSCHMIDT, Franz. MVD and Medical. File is in Leningrad and should be forwarded to us. This request has been outstanding for over a year.

HJELD, Harold. MVD.

HORST MULLE, Theodor. Vladimir detention only part that is relevant. MVD.

KRAFFT, Ernst. As he was one of Langfelder's first cellmates, I am requesting his file. As he died in Vladimir, it should be there.

KRUMINSH, Zigurds E. Latvian Vladimir Prisoner. Originally they said it was in his homeland. Hans Magnusson has checked there, but the file is not to be found. This is a

very critical file and we are requesting it again. There is another route possible which will require real influence and trust, but could give us everything we want in relation to this case. It should be noted also that Dr. Makinen's file, which I understand has been requested through Kiev, is also to help us sort out Kruminsh's claim of direct knowledge of Wallenberg.

CUMISH, Wilfred. Vladimir. MVD.

KUPRIANOV, Gennadi. Soviet General. Will probably NOT see this file but have asked for very fine tuning of his whereabouts, transports, etc. For example what prisons was he in, where and when. In terms of Vladimir, we will need to check medical records which should be permissible.

LANDWEHR von PRAGENAU. Vladimir. MVD.

LEUVENHAUPT, Karl Moritz. Checking both FSB and MVD.

LIALIKOV, Nikolai. MVD has given over certain information as reported on the list. Have asked for medical and other forms of follow up, primarily as it relates to Katyn and there is some value in checking out to where Katyn witnesses disappeared.

LUKASZ, Bela. Camps. MVD. Repatriated early. Even if we get the details from Hungary, we need verification from Moscow.

JAKOBSON, Rafael S. MVD

KALINSKI, Abram. Have requested entire interrogation schedule and also breakdown of his movements. However, I think it is very important to see this file because Kalinski provided an entire network of reports which made press in the West, and – it would seem – had actual contact with some but not all of the witnesses he cites. It is very important to know exactly what part of his testimonies are valid, rather than 'throwing out the baby with the bathwater.' I have made the point also that a number of the files which are missing are those cited in Kalinski's open letter to Andropov. I consider it important to press for all these files, as they may be kept together with material that is of major value to us. They must be found.

KAPLAN, Jan. According to the archivist, the Russians turned over to the Swedish side – I believe in the late 80s – a statement by Jan Kaplan, witnessed, that he had never seen or been with Raoul Wallenberg. If the Swedish side has such material it would be helpful to include it in our overall study as this may indeed eliminate this witness.

KATONA, Alexander (Sandor). His file seems to have gone the way of that of Langfelder, that is missing. The Russians have given next to no information. However, it is possible to reconstruct his interrogations where it involves known registries and this should be done. Also, two or three Katonas were repatriated – one of them much later

than any of the others. All were held in camps. Therefore these files must be with the MVD.

KLEIST, Ewald. Interrogation schedule from FSB. Medical file needed. **This file should be at Vladimir as he died there. MVD.**

MAREK, Ferdinand. Interrogation schedule to be compiled from his criminal file. Otherwise, his file is MVD.

MARKUCZEWSKI, Josef. MVD.

MAYER, Josef. Vladimir. MVD

MELTZER, Menachem. MVD.

MENSHAGIN, Boris G. **I have stated that we must see this file, which should be filed at his place of death. In the meantime it is possible to reconstruct his interrogation schedule from his criminal file. (This is an important witness to Katyn who was held on Corpus II approximately the same time as the reported sightings of RW.)**

MERKIS, Anton and Natalie. Vladimir. MVD. Requesting in meantime interrogation schedule and chart of whereabouts in order to understand movement trends and sentencing of numbered prisoners.

MUNTERS, Vilhelm. **I have stated that we must see this file as it cross references with a number of different sightings of RW in a number of different places. Meanwhile am requesting his interrogation schedule and breakdown of whereabouts as in the case of Merkis above. Please note: Have also asked Hans Magnusson to try and get as much information as possible about Munters whereabouts at different stages in the Gulag so we may compare them.**

OKULICKI, Leopold. My requests here are very simple but they are generating a great deal of unnecessary discussion. I need to copy the typed sheet of his interrogation schedule because I didn't do it before, due to a time pressure. I also need to see if the Smoltsov document re Okulicki's suitability for labor IS or IS NOT in his personal file. If in his investigative file, it would be important to know what other kinds of information which should be in his personal file has been transferred there.

PANNWITZ, Heinz. Because of his role in overseeing networks in the Balkans and his overlap with a number of prisoners of interest – Rado, Bentivegni, Kalinski, Richter, Sanitzer, Gfrorener, Loyda, Hoffstetter and others – **I have asked to see this personal file.** Please note that I turned over to Mr. Vinogradov a volume of materials from the National Archives in Washington of Pannwitz' debriefing upon his return to Germany. This shows how closely he is linked with a number of our important, if not prime

witnesses. At the very minimum, I have requested his interrogation schedule as drawn from the personal file, but I think that the full file would be in order here.

PELKONEN, Eno. His interrogation schedule to be reconstructed from his criminal file. His medical records are of great importance, particularly dealing with those in Butyrka Medical Services.

RADO, Sandor. His interrogation schedule from this Criminal File. Outline of his whereabouts until release.

REHEKAMPF, Guenther. Vladimir. MVD.

RIVO, Zoltan. Interrogation schedule from his criminal file. Attempt to reconstruct with as much precision as possible his whereabouts in Moscow prisons. Ideally we should see his Moscow prison file as we saw only his file in exile. I have asked for his protocol of interrogation for July 22, 1947.

RODDE, Wilhelm. Because he also claims to have been interrogated about Wallenberg/Langfelder around July 22, 1947, I have asked to see this file.

RODE, Gunnar Oskarovich. MVD.

ROEDL, Willi. I have asked for his interrogation schedule to be reconstructed from the registries and from his criminal file, although I recall that Vinogradov commented he was never charged, which may mean 'technically' there is no criminal file on him.

SHTEINBERG, Matus O. Vladimir. MVD.

STEINBERG, Paul. - Gestapo. Prisoner at Vladimir. Ergo MVD. Will check for criminal file.

SHTEINBERGS, Voldemar Latvian. Vladimir. MVD.

SHIMKEVICH, Andre. I have asked to see this file. Minimally breakdown of locations in Moscow prisons, where and when.

SCHMIDT-DURMOND. The proper date of birth has now been given to the authorities and they will look for his file. Schmidt-Durmond died while incarcerated. Important file because of his role in the Balkans.

STAHEL, ...(1892). I have asked to see this file.

SCHMIDT. They will check further on all four names given as Schmidt through the MVD.

SCHNEIDER, Helmut. We have located the right Schneider but do not have information as to his interrogations in Moscow. They will try to give this information through the

Criminal File. Our true objective however is not only to determine the date of those interrogations but his cell occupancy during that period.

SUPPRIAN Karl. I have asked to see this personal file.

SZAKACS, Janos. I have asked to see this personal file or minimally to obtain his interrogation schedule.

TERELYA, Josef. Must be addressed through the Ukrainc. I have asked however to study his medical file.

UEBEL, Adam. Vladimir. MVD.

UISASSY, Istvan. Interrogation schedule.

VADILLO, Martinez. Numbered Vladimir Prisoner with mental health problems who sat with primary witnesses in Vladimir. Would like to see file, personal and medical.

VENDROVSKY, David. I have asked to see this file.

VOLKOV. Interrogation schedule and medical only.

VON DUFVING, Theodor. MVD

VON RICHTHOFEN, Herbert. I have asked to see this file.

VON SCHWAB. I have given over other names under which this file possibly may be found. MVD. Trying for interrogation schedules but essential factors would be his location and transfers, times etc. to verify his report of being with Wallenberg.

VOROBEL, Vasily F. Said to be a primary Wallenberg witness. Would like them to check with his last known place, i.e. the internat in Mordov, for his file. Have asked for cooperation in following up to determine how, and from what place, he was sent to the internat – also important is his role in the camp which cross references with a number of different Wallenberg sightings.

VOSS, Hans E. I renewed my request for Voss' interrogation schedule and that FSB confirm that Voss was moved directly from Internal Prison to Butyrka in August 1948 – after which he never left Butyrka to return to Internal Prison or Lefortovo or any prisons or camps until he was brought to Vladimir in 1952. Also to check with MVD.

WOLFIN, Isaac Markovitch. Even though Wolfin was an NKVD or GRU Soviet agent we absolutely need to study his personal file. Besides the fact that his Vladimir card describes him as a 'Swedish spy' and the fact that Wolfin sat with all the non-primary witnesses to Wallenberg in Vladimir (See my Preliminary Report One), since the Russians were so kind as to provide his interrogation schedule, it is now

clear that his earlier movements paralleled Wallenberg's closely, down to the fact that he was called for interrogation on July 17, 1947 around midnight. I am of the opinion that Wolfen is a strong candidate to have sat with Wallenberg after the latter was moved to Internal Prison in March of 1947—that is between May and July 1947. There is also new information which would indicate that Wolfen was used by the Vladimir authorities to accompany special prisoners coming in, say from Alexandrovsk, which could apply to both Wallenberg (as recounted by Kulinski) or Konoye.

WYNNE, Greville. Need arrivals and departures from Internal Prison—Moscow, the nature of his regime and approximation of his exercise program to check sighting.

YAOSHA, Shun. I have specified that we are looking for the high ranking Japanese prisoner said to have sat with Roedl and Loyda in Lubyanka Prison. May be prisoner whose ashes are mixed with that of prominent Hungarian. Interrogation schedule and specifics of location if possible.

.....


Please note that in addition to the Prisoner Files above, there are a number of collections we have asked to review in GARF related to the activities of the Prison Department, NKVD or MVD; the identification and processing and handling of Numbered Prisoners by the Prison Department; the activities of the Special Medical Department MVD in handling of special prisoners in psychiatric facilities. We are also requesting the reports from the MGB to the MVD for forwarding to higher instanzas on key interrogations, 1945 and following.: These volumes are also said to include things like correspondence from prisoners to Stalin and etc, which would apply in the cases of Okulicki and Wallenberg.

We are also awaiting information related to the processing and sending of numbered prisoners to Ivanovo starting in April/May 1947.

Finally, where the medical files are concerned, we will require the full cooperation of both the MVD Special Medical Department and the Ministry of Justice. The same may prove a factor with our requests to MVD above.

Thank you for your attention in these matters.

Sincerely yours,


Susan Ellen Mesinai

Сьюзен Эллен Месинай

Абакумов Виктор – только даты допросов. Полагаю, что в таком важном деле уже есть полный список допросов, и его нужно лишь скопировать. *Это необходимо для изучения допросов и скорее всего понадобится для Заключительного отчета.*

Альтер Фридрих – польский еврей. Как и в деле Огинса, необходимо разобраться в этом «исключении»; также потому, что он – социалдемократ, тесно связанный с еврейскими организациями в Восточной Европе.

Ангелис Максимилиан или Максимилиан (1899) – военнопленный, командир 2-ой танковой армии, захвачен американцами, потом югославами, приговорен к 20 годам каторжных работ за жестокости в Югославии. Доставлен в СССР в марте 1949 года и помещен во Внутреннюю тюрьму. Приговорен к 25 годам Военным трибуналом как военный преступник в феврале 1952 года. Репатрирован. Необходимо выяснить места содержания в московской тюрьме, даты допросов, документ об этапировании, документ об этапировании после приговора, в том числе назначение и особые условия изоляции. Дату возвращения в Фридланд. *Данные нужны для Заключительного отчета.*

Адельмани Рудигер (1893) – военнопленный. Мы располагаем датами его допросов, полученными от Российской стороны, но я должна тщательно ознакомиться с его передвижениями из тюрьмы в тюрьму, из камеры в камеру. Спасибо. *Данные нужны для изучения этапирований и для Заключительного отчета.*

Алаяни-Алаян Пьетро Стефан (1894). Заключенный № 15 Владимирской тюрьмы. Просим запросить данное дело в Специальном архиве Российской государственного военного архива, в связи с недавно полученным (30 августа 1999 г.) ответом Российской стороны. Спасибо /2. *Данные нужны для изучения заключенных, содержащихся под номерами, и возможно, для Заключительного отчета.*

Асхинис Антанас (1904) – литовец. Наша цель – установить факты его содержания в лагерях и тюрьмах, а также дату этапирования из Верхне-Уральска во Владимир, в надежде определить, кто еще был в этом этапе. *Изучение этапирования, возможно, представляет ценность для изучения лагерей и как подтверждение свидетельств о Куприянове.*

Бай Богуслав (1924) – повторная важная просьба. Дело необходимо для проверки его свидетельства о том, что он и другие польские заключенные встречали Валленберга в лагере около Братска в конце 40-х и начале 50-х годов. Так как проверка – одна из основных целей моей работы, мне нужно это дело для подготовки отчета. *Данные нужны для изучения лагерей и Заключительного отчета.*

Байер Фридрих – военнопленный. Немецкий капрал, содержащийся в нескольких лагерях (номер 53, номер 27 – Красногорск, специальный лагерь в Сухуми, Караганда, а также Лефортовская тюрьма – декабрь 1948 – май 1949).

Данные, касающиеся Лефортово, нужны для проверки важных свидетельств очевидца. *Данные нужны для изучения лагерей, тюрем, допросов и для Заключительного отчета.*

Бехер Курт – военнопленный, допрошенный советскими органами в Будапеште в конце 1945 года и возможно начале 1946, следователями из 2-го отдела 3-го Главного управления, т.е. Смерша, по-видимому, Карташовым в том числе. Нам сообщили, что дело не найдено, но мы просим изучить корреспонденцию и другие материалы этого отдела (позже этот отдел назывался 4 отделом 3-го Главного управления) и предоставить нам всю имеющуюся информацию относительно допросов Бехера. Одновременно мы ознакомимся с материалами по Бехеру, упомянутыми в меморандуме, переданном на заседании 18 октября 1999. Спасибо. *Данные необходимы для изучения допросов и для Заключительного отчета.*

Бентивеньи Франц (1896) – военнопленный, руководитель Абвера. Необходимо установить перемещения по камерам тюрьмы, процедуры следствия, в том числе допросы и приговор. *Данные нужны для изучения допросов и медицинской документации, возможно, также для Заключительного отчета.*

Бергер Лазарь (1922-1923) – русский и украинский еврей, заключенный Владимирской тюрьмы, который заявил, что знал Валленберга в начале 60-х годов. Важный свидетель. Дело необходимо для выяснения его местонахождения и некоторых аспектов его рассказа. *Данные нужны для Заключительного отчета.*

Бетлен Иштван – бывший премьер-министр Венгрии, умерший в плену. Необходимо ознакомиться с делом, чтобы выяснить, где он содержался, когда и с кем – в тюрьмах и лагерях, так как есть свидетельство, что Валленберг и Бетлен находились в лагере во Владимирской/Ивановской области. В ожидании дела Бетлена будет очень полезно получить данные о его допросах. *Данные нужны для изучения лагерей и медицинской документации, а также для Заключительного отчета.*

Богданос Антонас (1921) – литовец, родился в Шауляе, профашист. Есть свидетельства, что он содержался с Валленбергом в нескольких местах – лагерях и психиатрических больницах. Меня в основном интересуют первые годы его содержания в тюрьмах и лагерях, со времени ареста до прибытия в Казань в начале-середине 50-х, в том числе та часть его истории болезни, а также содержание в Сычевской психиатрической тюремной больнице. *Данные необходимы для изучения лагерей и медицинской документации, а также для Заключительного отчета.*

Браун Чарльз или Чарльз Клиффорд Браун или Чарльз Клиффорд, Клиффорд Чарльз – двойного гражданства, немецкого и австрийского. Поступил на Лубянку со Спешаком. *Данные нужны для Заключительного отчета.*

Вадилло, Мартинес. Нумерованный заключенный № 28 Владимирской тюрьмы с 11 апреля 1951 года по 25 апреля 1955 года.

Вендровский, Давид Ефимович (1880). Писатель-еврей. Содержался в заключении в Вернеуральске. Поступил во Владимирскую тюрьму 19 апреля 1954 года. По свидетельствам других лиц, в Верхнеуральске встречался с Валленбергом.

Винне Гревилл – британский заключенный в Москве и во Владимире, заявивший, что встречался с Валленбергом на Лубянке. Требуется полная история перемещения по камерам Внутренней тюрьмы, данные о режиме его содержания и расписание или программа его занятий. *Необходимо проверить его перемещения из тюрьмы в тюрьму и для Заключительного отчета.*

Винтер Фон Шваб Рудольф Гейдрих (1919). ВОЗМОЖНО, также Шваб Александр или фон Шваб Александр, так как его кодовое имя было Капитан Александр. Московская тюрьма, Верхне-Уральск. Заявил, что имел контакт с Валленбергом в Верхне-Уральске. *Необходимо проверить его местонахождение, полезно для изучения допросов, возможно, для Заключительного отчета, в зависимости от правдоподобности его заявлений.*

Волков Константин (1915) – советский агент, приговорен вместе с Шульгиным и Кутеповым и отправлен во Владимир. Дело представляет интерес также потому, что он был отправлен в Казанскую психиатрическую больницу, где, по-видимому, умер. *Необходимо для изучения этапирований, полезно для изучения медицинских документов и допросов, в связи с чем мы запрашиваем список его допросов.*

Воробей Василий Федорович (1910). Господин Никишкин любезно передал мне следующую информацию: родился в Бресте, определен Владимирским судом как «особо опасный рецидивист», содержался во Владимире с 22 июня 56 до 22 июня 76 года, освобожден и отправлен в инвалидный дом в Мордовии. Его дело может быть там. Так как Воробей считается прямым свидетелем содержания Валленберга во Владимирской тюрьме, я хотела бы проследить эту линию – ознакомиться с документацией относительно его передачи в инвалидный дом в Мордовии, названием заведения, а также связаться с его администрацией или местными органами, чтобы найти его дело. *Необходимо для изучения медицинской документации и для Заключительного отчета.*

Гарсия Мануэль. ТРЕБУЕТСЯ ДОПОЛНИТЕЛЬНАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ. *Данные нужны для изучения лагерей, возможно, для Заключительного отчета.*

Геррум Курт – долго содержался вместе с Гфроренером и по свидетельствам умер во Владимирской тюрьме. Важно для выяснения некоторых подробностей, касающихся Гфроренера, проверки местонахождения нескольких очевидцев, а также, возможно, для того, чтобы понять роль Вольфина. **ЭТО ДЕЛО МОЖЕТ БЫТЬ ВО ВЛАДИМИРЕ, ЕСЛИ ОН ДЕЙСТВИТЕЛЬНО УМЕР ТАМ. Я МОГЛА БЫ ПРОВЕРИТЬ ЭТО, КОГДА БУДУ ИЗУЧАТЬ ПЕРЕМЕЩЕНИЯ/ЭТАПЫ.** *Данные нужны для изучения допросов и медицинской документации, возможно, для Заключительного отчета.*

Готтлиб Роланд – австрийский военнопленный, жена шведка, работал в Немецкой миссии в Софии при Бекерле дешифровщиком. Его семья живет в Швеции. Я видела его дело, но вся информация о его допросах отсутствует. *Данные нужны для изучения допросов и Заключительного отчета.*

Демеско Михаил (1901) – двойного гражданства. Это дело существует в бывшем управлении КГБ в Курске, где его видел российский журналист. Я уже передавала Вам доверенность, по которой я могу ознакомиться с делом, интересующим меня в связи с тем, что сын Демеско предоставил нам свидетельства отца относительно Валленберга определенной важности, и сейчас необходимо проверить, откуда он мог взять такую информацию. Это дело также важно для завершения изучения лагерей и для понимания механизма направления заключенного в психиатрическое заведение. Мы просим доставить его в Москву, чтобы сразу же по ознакомлении вернуть. *Данные необходимы для изучения лагерей, допросов, медицинской документации/интервью, а также для Заключительного отчета.*

Де Сандберг – см. ниже

Дю Мор – см. ниже

Жакаш Янош или Шакаш или Сакаш или Шакач или Сакач или Жакач или Чакаш – военнопленный, бывший коммерческий атташе Венгерского посольства в Софии. Долгое время был сокамерником Гроссхайм-Криско. *Для изучения передвижений и допросов*

Калинский Абрам М. (1912) – офицер польской армии Краевы, возможно, также агент НКВД. Был в московской тюрьме, в Верхне-Уральске, Александровске, Владимире. Свидетельствовал о не прямых контактах с Валленбергом, многие свидетельства считаются ложными. Однако, тот факт, что он дал много информации, обязывает нас проверить, что является ложным, а что верным. Недавно я просила предоставить данные о его допросах, так же как о допросах Вольфина и других. Это очень важно, также как и его передвижения. *Данные нужны для изучения допросов, этапирования и для Заключительного отчета.*

Каплан Ян – русский еврей, сообщивший, что встречал Валленберга в медицинском учреждении в конце 70-х, в Бутырке и Халмер-Ю. Судьба неизвестна, так как он был вновь арестован, вероятно, когда на Западе поднялся шум из-за его свидетельств. *Данные необходимы для исследования медицинской документации и Заключительного отчета.*

Катон(а) Александр или Шандор (1913) – по информации, имеющейся на Западе, в ГУЛАГе было несколько человек под этим именем, один из них урожденный южной Венгрии, осужденный на 8 лет работ в шахте, судьба неизвестна; другой – шофер Венгерского посольства в Софии; третий имел большой срок, но был репатрирован. Нас интересует Шандор Катона, который был этапирован вместе с Лангфельдером 23 июля 1947 года. Судя по его биографии, он мог быть один из перечисленных выше, или все они вместе, или

еще какой-то Шандор Катона. Нас также интересует, не был ли он заключенным номер 1 во Владимире, «американским шпионом».

(фон) Клейст или Кляйст Эвальд (1881) – немецкий генерал, занимавший важный пост, военнопленный, умер во Владимире в 1954 году. Это дело важно для проверки свидетельств о Валленберге во Владимире и для установления его передвижений и регистрационных номеров в Москве. *Данные нужны для изучения допросов и медицинской документации* (Заметьте, что дело может быть во Владимире, так как он умер там).

Краффт Эрнст (1885) – немецкий адмирал, сокамерник Лангфельдера в Лефортово. Приговорен и отправлен во Владимирскую тюрьму, где скончался в 1954 году, однако по сведениям переводился из Лефортово в Бутырку в марте-апреле 1950 года. У меня есть данные о его допросах в Москве, но это дело *Необходимо для медицинского отчета и для Заключительного отчета.*

Круминьш Зигурдс Эрнестович (1927) – латыш. Во Владимирской тюрьме сидел со всеми «особыми» иностранными заключенными, включая Пауэрса, Макинена и «шведа Вандерберга». По сообщениям помилован. В данном случае, как и в следующем, я бы хотела также попросить, чтобы Владимирские органы посмотрели в картотеке и списках изоляции и установили точно, где и с кем Круминьш сидел. *Необходимо для Заключительного отчета.*

Кумиш Вилфред – американец, сидел в Владимире и заявляет, что сидел с Лангфельдером и Фоссом. Карточка регистрации не отражает его перемещений по камерам в течение нескольких лет. Я бы хотела попросить, чтобы Владимирские органы посмотрели тюремные карточки, карточки по корпусам и списки изоляции, чтобы определить, где Кумиш сидел с момента прибытия и с кем, прежде чем его поместили в общую камеру, и сообщили нам. Спасибо. *Необходимо для медицинского отчета и Заключительного отчета.*

Куприянов Геннадий Н. (1905) – из первоначального списка. Если это дело относится к разряду агентов, пожалуйста, дайте данные о его допросах, дате ареста, даты содержания в каждой тюрьме – прибытие и убытие, – о его этапе после приговора (номер 35/3 на основании 18/7), о том с кем он должен был быть помещен по прибытии во Владимир и о других подробностях, которые позволили бы нам установить факты его этапирования из Верхне-Уральска во Владимир (он прибывал туда дважды). Спасибо. *Необходимо для изучения этапирования и медицинской документации, а также для Заключительного отчета. Просьба также сообщить, не содержался ли данный заключенный в Александровске, Н9. Если содержался, то в течение какого периода.*

Ландвер фон Прагенау, Курт (1910). Доставлен во Владимир в 1948 году. Переведен из Владимира в 1955 году. Необходимо изучить его дело с целью выяснить, не встречал ли данный заключенный во Владимире Лангфельдера. Существенно для Заключительного отчета.

Лейвенгаупт, Карл Мориц. Гражданин Швеции, дипломатический посланник. Пропал без вести, находясь на пути в Посольство страны (точное место неизвестно) в конце войны. По имеющимся сообщениям, содержался в

ГУЛАГе. Важно установить, является ли именно Левенгаупт, а не Валленберг, тем "шведом", которого видели в ряде мест заключения (Новый запрос шведской Полиции безопасности).

Ляликов Николай Семенович (1924) родился в Витебске. Служил в 262 дивизии Красной армии, 950 отделении. Приговорен Военным трибуналом в мае 1944 к 20 годам. По свидетельствам умер 9 апреля 1949 года в тюремной больнице в Московской области. Содержался во Владимирской тюрьме с 28 июня 1944 по 26 сентября 1948 года. По свидетельствам переведен в Новочеркасскую тюрьму через Москву. Господин Никишкин любезно сообщил мне, что нет ни свидетельства о его смерти, ни дела, ни документа, подтверждающего уничтожение дела. Так как этот заключенный был связан с Катынью, мы надеемся получить больше информации о нем. *Необходимо лоя медицинского отчета и Заключительного отчета.*

Лукаш Бела – венгр. Был передан в тюрьму Кишкорос и рассказал Карло Катоне, что его содержали в лагере под Москвой с Бетлеюм и другими высокопоставленными офицерами. Катона был уверен, что то не был Красногорский лагерь. Другие тоже говорили о лагере с венгерскими заключенными, где находился Валленберг. Необходимо проверить дело, чтобы установить местонахождение лагеря. *Нужно для отчета о лагерях.*

Марек Фердинанд. Если я не могу ознакомиться с этим делом, я хотела бы получить информацию о его аресте, этапе в Москву, о том, где он сидел и в чьей юрисдикции. Я бы также хотела получить данные о допросах, как и в деле Бетлена. *Спасибо. Необходимо для изучения допросов и возможно, для Заключительного отчета*

Маркушевский Йозеф (1920) – польский заключенный из Армии Краевы, заявил, что встречал Валленберга в Кирове на этапе в 1949 году. Необходимо ознакомиться с делом, чтобы определить все перемещения, их даты и даты этапов и т.п. *Необходимо для изучения этапов.*

Майер или Мэйер Йозеф или Джозеф (1920) -- австрийский военнопленный, эсэсовец, обозначен как «американский шпион» в картотеке Владимирской тюрьмы. Служил лейтенантом в немецкой армии, осужден к 25 годам каторжных работ, отправлен в тюрьму. *Необходимо для медицинского отчета.*

Мельтцер Менахем (1907) – австрийский еврей, врач, заявил, что лечил шведа по имени Рауль в Жалмер-Ю в 1948-49 годах. *Необходимо для медицинского отчета.*

Меншагин Борис Георгиевич (1902 или 1909). Нумерованный заключенный. Свидетель Катыньских событий. Доставлен во Владимир 30 сентября 1951 года. ФСБ ответило, что у них его дела нет. Дело существует в Архангельской области (в Мончегорске), где он умер. Мы просим выслать его нам для ознакомления в присутствии архивного работника и немедленно возвратим. Пожалуйста, отметьте, что арест Меншагина и его длительное заключение под номером связано с тем, что он имел отношение к Катыни. Очень важно установить 1) когда он был арестован 2) когда ему был присвоен номер 3) когда

и как долго и в каких условиях, под номером или под своим именем, он содержался в Лубянской тюрьме и других местах заключения 5) кто хранил его дело в Тюремном отделе в Москве. *Необходимо для изучения допросов, номерных заключенных, медицинской документации и для Заключительного отчета. Также чрезвычайно важно в связи с Катынью.*

Меркис Антон и Натали. Я ознакомилась с делом их сына, но отец – важный заключенный. Мне нужно изучить его дело тоже, чтобы сравнить с делом сына и понять, когда он был отправлен из Московской тюрьмы в Иваново, по сравнению с сыном, а также выяснить другие вопросы. *Необходимо для изучения номерных заключенных, в связи с вопросом о пропавших «дипломатах», в связи с содержанием таких важных заключенных в тюрьмах и лагерях, чтобы понять, сидел ли Валленберг с ними. Чрезвычайно важно для Заключительного отчета.*

Мулле или Хорст Мулле или Мюлле – немецкий военнопленный, журналист и сокамерник Гогиберидзе во Владимире. Нужно ознакомиться с делом, чтобы проверить его показания.

Мунтерс или Мюнтерс Вильгельм (1898) и Натали (1897). Необходимо изучить данное дело на предмет установления места содержания Вильгельма Мунтерса до его ссылки во Владимирскую тюрьму и т. д., поскольку по сведениям ряда очевидцев из Владимирской тюрьмы, согласно различным источникам, Мунтерс находился во Владимире вместе с Раулем Валленбергом. *Нужно для изучения номерных заключенных в связи с дипломатами, для изучения допросов и Заключительного отчета.*

Окулицкий Леопольд. Хотя я знакомилась с делом, мне необходима копия списка допросов (машинописные листы, которые легко скопировать, не отвлекая архивных работников ФСБ). Спасибо. *Для изучения допросов и для Заключительного отчета.*

Панивигтц Хайнц. Материалы, имеющие отношение к этой просьбе, были переданы летом господину Виноградову. Это дело необходимо для того, чтобы сравнить с данными о допросах других свидетелей, включая, но не только, Санитцера, Радо, Калинского, Хоффштеттера, Лойду, Рихтера и Гфроренера. *Для изучения передвижений по камерам и допросов. Возможно, для Заключительного отчета.*

Пелконен Эрно – финский военнопленный. Мы знакомились с его делом, но в нем НЕТ ДАННЫХ О ДОПРОСАХ, кроме 22 июля 1947 года. Так как он – главный свидетель, нам нужны данные о его допросах в московских тюрьмах, в том числе в Сухановке. Нам также нужны **МЕДИЦИНСКИЕ ДОКУМЕНТЫ**, так как он сообщает, что был с Лангфельдером в Бутырской больнице после попытки самоубийства в 1947 году. *Для изучения допросов и медицинской документации, для Заключительного отчета.*

Радо Шандор. ФСБ проверило и ответило на мой вопрос относительно возможных контактов Радо с Валленбергом и его миссии. Таким образом,

установлено, что дело существует. Я бы хотела получить данные О ДОПРОСАХ для изучения допросов.

Рескампф Гюнтер – немецкий военнопленный. Необходимо проверить свидетельство о Валленберге во Владимирской тюрьме, а также получить данные о допросах и перемещениях в Московских тюрьмах. Для изучения допросов.

Риво Золтан (1921). Я знакомилась с делом, которое начинается с момента вынесения приговора и отправки из Бутырской тюрьмы в ссылку, так что необходимой нам информации о его передвижениях по московским тюрьмам нет. Нас интересует его регистрационный номер в Бутырской тюрьме, полная история перемещений по московским тюрьмам, а также список допросов и краткое содержание его допроса, проводившегося 22 июля 1947 года или примерно в это время.

Роде Гуннар Оскарович (1934) – бывший заключенный Владимирской тюрьмы, который заявил, что слышал о нахождении Валленберга в ГУЛАГе в 1973-74 годах от другого заключенного на этапе. Необходимо выяснить его передвижения из тюрьмы в тюрьму и из лагеря в лагерь. Для изучения этапов и лагерей.

Родде Вильгельм – военнопленный, который заявил, что его допрашивали в конце июля 1947 года и что он знал о нахождении Валленберга в московских тюрьмах. Мы получили данные о его допросах, но этой даты там нет. Мы хотим проверить его дело. Возможно, он умер во Владимире. Для изучения передвижений по камерам, допросов и медицинской документации. Возможно, для Заключительного отчета.

Редль Вилли – немецкий военнопленный и сокамерник Валленберга, который умер 15 октября 1947 года на этапе из Красногорского лагеря 27. В отсутствие дела мы бы хотели получить данные о допросах. Это было бы очень ценно для Заключительного отчета.

Супприан Карл – военнопленный. Имеет косвенные сведения о Валленберге в московских тюрьмах. Данные о его допросах, представленные Российской стороной, говорят о том, что его дело может помочь в выяснении событий в Будапеште, поэтому хотелось бы его видеть. *Необязательно, но было бы полезно для более полного представления о других свидетелях.* Для Заключительного отчета.

Терелия Йозеф – украинский националист, заявивший, что лично встречал Валленберга во Владимирской тюрьме в начале 70-х, а также имеет косвенные сведения о пребывании Валленберга в психиатрической больнице. В связи с тем, что показания Терелии широко публиковались на Западе, необходимо прояснить ряд деталей. *Необходимо для медицинского отчета и для Заключительного отчета.*

Фосс Ганс или Ханс Ерик (1897) – немецкий военнопленный, морской офицер высокого ранга, сидел в Москве и во Владимире, возможно, пересекается и

имеет отношение к Валленбергу и Лангфельдеру. *Необходимо для изучения передвижений по камерам в Москве и во Владимире, важно для изучения допросов, возможно, для Заключительного отчета.*

Примечание: В Архиве ФСБ утверждают, что личное дело Фосса в архиве отсутствует. Несмотря на это, нам хотелось бы получить у них полный список допросов Фосса, а также просим снова подтвердить, что в августе 1948 года Фосс был переведен из Внутренней тюрьмы непосредственно в Бутырскую тюрьму т.е. что с этого момента он больше не переводился из Бутырки обратно во Внутреннюю тюрьму, в Лефортово или любую другую тюрьму или лагерь за пределами Москвы до 1952 года, когда его перевели во Владимирскую тюрьму.

Фридман Самуил Аронович (1903) – Н9 во Владимирской тюрьме. "Арийский националист". Доставлен во Владимир 21 марта 1952 года, переведен из Владимира 27 мая 1954 года.

Примечание: По сообщению ФСБ, данное дело отсутствует. Тем не менее, важно установить, был ли данный еврей задействован в операциях по спасению населения.

Хаммершмидт или Гаммершмидт Фриц или Франц (1893) – военнопленный, из первоначального списка. Это дело существует в архивах бывшей Ленинградской специальной тюремной больницы, где он умер. Его необходимо доставить в Москву для нашего ознакомления, чтобы затем немедленно возвратить. *Данные необходимы для изучения допросов и медицинской документации.*

Хильд или Х(ь)ельд Харольд или Гарольд (1916) – швед/финн. Заявил, что лично встречал Валленберга в Верхне-Уральске. Необходимо проверить.

Хорст Мюлле или Мулле Хорст Теодор – немецкий военнопленный, косвенный свидетель пребывания Валленберга во Владимире (см. ниже Мулле)

Шална, Броннус Эдмундович (1919). Заключенный Владимирской тюрьмы, чей маршрут перемещений по тюрьмам предположительно совпадает с примерным маршрутом перемещений Валленберга. Изучение дела необходимо в целях проверки показаний других свидетелей, а также для составления Заключительного отчета.

Штейнберг Матус Озарьевич (1904)

Штейнберг Пауль – заключенный во Владимирской тюрьме, о котором работники тюрьмы сообщили, что он содержался в изоляции. Это два разных лица, из которых первого описывают как офицера Гестапо в очках. *В обоих случаях важно проверить свидетельства очевидцев. В случае Пауля Штейнберга необходимы данные о допросах и медицинская документация /3. В случае Матуса Штейнберга это может быть связано со свидетельствами Варвары Ивановны Лариной.*

Штейнберг, Вольдемар (1924). Гражданин Латвии. Заключенный Владимирской тюрьмы в период с 31 августа 1949 по 12 сентября 1957 гг. Цель – проверка вышеупомянутых свидетельских показаний. Для Заключительного отчета.

Шимкевич или Сиенксевич или Зинкевич Андре – двойного гражданства (российско-французского), сын знаменитого скульптора, но с другой фамилией, заявил, что провел два дня и ночь на Лубянке в камере с Валленбергом. Необходимо проверить это свидетельство. *Необходимо для Заключительного отчета.*

Шмидт-Дюмон или Дюмор или Дю Мор (возможно, Йоханнес Франц, 1914) Сокамерник Герстенберга и Катона в 1945 году, возможно, занимал высокий дипломатический или армейский пост, родился в Истамбуле).

Шмидт Ханс – во Владимирской тюрьме Н2, по поступлениям за 1952 год (Также нас интересуют Герхард Шмидт, Рудольф Шмидт и Вальтер Шмидт – все военнопленные, об одном из них сообщается, что он сидел с Валленбергом). *Необходимо для более полного понимания группы Н во Владимирской тюрьме, так как в ней много свидетелей, связанных с событиями на Балканах).*

Шнидер или Шнайдер Гельмут или Хельмут – немецкий военнопленный, командир танка. Я ознакомилась с его лагерным делом, но не видела Лефортовского. *Важно для Заключительного отчета. Примечание: В ответе ФСБ, пункт 18, июль 1999 года, сказано, что дело Шнайдера отсутствует. Существуют ли другие источники, подтверждающие, что Шнайдер сидел в Лефортово, а также определить период его заключения и номер камеры.*

Штагель, Райнер (1892). У нас имеется список его допросов. Важно подробнее изучить маршрут его перемещений для составления Заключительного отчета.

Узбель или Юбель или Убель или Эбель или Уибель Адам – немецкий военнопленный, заявивший, как и военнопленный Турин, что перестукивался со шведским дипломатом во Владимирской тюрьме в корпусе II. *В связи со свидетельствами Бруггера и Гроссхайм-Криско, будет включено в Заключительный отчет.*

Уйшаши Иштван (1894) – венгр, глава Военной разведки. Я благодарна за информацию, переданную мне Российской стороной в последнем ответе от 30 августа 1999 года. Я бы хотела отметить, однако, что никогда не видела его дела, но считаю важным ознакомиться с ним для сравнения с другими свидетелями, которые были возвращены как «военные преступники» и для изучения данных о его допросах. *Для изучения допросов.*

Фон Дуфвинг или Дуфвинг фон, Теодор – немец, который сообщил, что встречал Валленберга в транзитном лагере по дороге в Воркуту. Так как это свидетельство совпадает с двумя другими, необходимо его проверить. *Важно для изучения этапирований.*

Фон Рихтофен или Рихтофен фон, Херберт или Герберт (18) – бывший немецкий министр в Болгарии, отозванный в июне 1949 года и замещенный Бекерле. Фон Рихтофен был отправлен в Александровск с Йорданом, и оба – как Бекерле – были «срочно отозваны» и отправлены во Владимир в 1952.

Необходимо изучить данные об этапировании, допросах и особых обстоятельствах. Думаю, что будет ценно для Заключительного отчета.

Якобсон Рафаэл Саулович (1891) – эстонский врач и медицинский техник. Заявил, что лично встречал Валленберга в медицинском учреждении в Магнитогорске. Позже сидел во Владимирской тюрьме. Необходимо ознакомиться с его делом и медицинской документацией. Спасибо. *Данные необходимы для Медицинского отчета.*

Яоша Шун (1894) – японский генерал-майор, военнопленный. Считается, что он сидел с Лойдой и Редлем на Лубянке. *Необходимо для изучения перемещений и допросов, возможно, для медицинского отчета.*

1/ Я намерена представить два отчета. Первый будет содержать все технические подробности и всю информацию, полученную из дел заключенных. Конфиденциальность при этом не будет нарушена, но Рабочая Группа должна показать, что она тщательно и полностью проверила свидетельства очевидцев, а также предприняла дополнительные шаги для обнаружения следов присутствия Валленберга в ГУЛАГе бывшего СССР. Второй отчет будет обобщающим, в нем не будет содержаться конфиденциальной информации из дел заключенных, но он предложит ответы на поставленные вопросы, показывающие мировой общественности, что мы справились с задачей.

2/ Я благодарна Российской стороне за предоставленные этой информации о допросах. Этого одного листа не достает. Если такая работа уже была однажды проделана, я хотела бы попросить Российскую сторону о любезности – передать мне копию еще раз. Спасибо.

3/ Пожалуйста, примите во внимание документ о шведском заключенном, недавно переданный из личных архивов Сталина-Молотова. В Указателе его имя значится как Шелленберг. Мы хотели бы его видеть тоже. Хотя это может относиться к домашнему аресту Шелленберга в Швеции, возможно и искажение имен, и речь может идти о Шелленберге из дела Валленберга – это уже было замечено несколькими членами Рабочей Группы. В третьих, это может оказаться и другой заключенный с похожим именем. Поэтому нас интересует любой из них и все они – Шелленберг, Шилленберг, Шейнберг, Шэйнберг или Шайнберг, Стейнберг или Стайнберг и т.п., особенно если есть какое-либо указание на содержание в Москве и Владимире. Этот заключенный – еще один важный свидетель о Валленберге или сам Валленберг.

ANTAL SIDOR021



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

TELEFAX

Sid. 1 (3)

2000-01-11

Dnr. 15 ✓

Gezelius/Tojzner-Glückman

UD/EC/Amb Jan Lundvik
2000-02-01

Delges

Guy von Dardel

Lage Olson

Exp. 2000-02-01/RR

2000-02-12

(EC) P 2 Eu

L UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: ✓ EC, (Lundvik)

Kopia: Ambassaden Riga, (Magnusson)

Raoul Wallenberg - dokument i det ryska statsarkivet

Jag får härmed översända ett brev från V. Tutjnin på utrikesministeriets 2:a europeiska avdelning, i vilket ministeriet meddelar att i Ryska federationens statsarkiv (GARF) finns ett papper underskrivet av A. Sirotin, chef för det sovjetiska inrikesministeriets första specialsektion, den 8 augusti 1956 rörande återlämnande av material i R. Wallenbergärendet för förvaring i arkivet för särskilt viktiga ärenden vid det sovjetiska inrikesministeriets sekretariat.

LUTHMAN

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**ВТОРОМУ СЕКРЕТАРЮ
ПОСОЛЬСТВА
КОРОЛЕВСТВА ШВЕЦИЯ В
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

Э. ТОЙСНЕР-ГЛЮКМАН

На № _____ от _____

05.01.2000 № 12/2eq-ko

Wallenbergfallets fråga om dok i RF arkiv

Уважаемая госпожа Тойснер-Глюкман,

INK. AMB. MOSKVA		
12:3/6		
1900-01-07		
AVD.	GR.	MAL
R	18	RW

В дополнение к переданной нами шведской стороне в ходе встречи Российско-шведской рабочей группы по делу Р.Валленберга 18 октября 1999 года информации сообщаем, что в хранящихся в Государственном Архиве Российской Федерации (ГАРФ) документах имеется справка начальника первого спецотдела МВД СССР А.Сиротина от 8 августа 1956 года о возвращении материалов о Р.Валленберге для хранения в делах Особой важности Секретариата МВД СССР.

**НАЧАЛЬНИК ОТДЕЛА
ФИНЛЯНДИИ И ШВЕЦИИ
ВТОРОГО ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО
ДЕПАРТАМЕНТА МИД РОССИИ**

В.ТУЧНИН

Non-official translation from Russian

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**
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Phone 244-16-06

**2ND SECRETARY
EMBASSY OF SWEDEN IN
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

E. TOJZNER-GLÜCKMAN

January 5, 2000

Ref. nr 12/2ed-ns

Dear Mrs. Tojzner-Gluckman,

In addition to the information submitted to the Swedish side at the meeting held by the Russian-Swedish working group on Raoul Wallenberg's fate on 18 October 1999, we would like to inform you that the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) contains a paper (*spravka*) signed by A. Sirotin, head of the first special section of the MVD SSSR, on 8 August 1956, concerning the return of materials on R. Wallenberg to be kept at the archive of Special importance of the Secretariat of the MVD SSSR.

**HEAD OF SECTION FOR FINLAND
AND SWEDEN
2ND EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

V. TUCHNIN

1 ()



SVERIGES
GENERALKONSULAT

TELEFAX

12-januari-2000

Sveriges Generalkonsulat
New York

Utrikesdepartementet Dnr 4 ✓

Olle Wästberg, generalkonsul

UD/EC/Amb Jan Lundvik

2000-02-01

Delges

Delges via UD: ✓

Guy von Dardel

ss Per Nuder, SB

Lage Olson

ambassadör Lars-Erik Wingren ✓

ambassadör Jan Lundvik ✓

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr.		
2000 -01- 13		
AVD. P	GR. 2	MÅL Eu

Amerikansk Wallenbergskrift

Igår, 2000-01-11, lade The American Jewish Committee, fram en ny rapport om Raoul Wallenbergs försvinnande.


Boken, "The Wallenberg Mystery. Fifty-five Years Later" av historieprofessorn William Korey, innehåller i sak ingenting nytt. Den är en genomgång av de undersökningar som gjorts i Sverige, USA och Canada.

Det intressanta är dock den kraft The American Jewish Committee lägger bakom kravet på att alla handlingar nu måste fram från den ryska sidan.

Boken presenterades på ett lunchseminarium, där Korey, Agnes Adachi, den ungerske FN-ambassadören André Erdös och jag själv talade. Själv fick jag tillfälle att betona att det bästa sätt vi kan hedra Raoul Wallenberg är att inte glömma och hela tiden vara aktiva för de värderingar han stod för. Största delen av mitt tal handlade om den kommande regeringskonferensen i Stockholm.

Konferensen avslutades med ett tal av AJC:s exekutivdirektör David Harris. Han betonade att Wallenberg var utsänd av amerikansk organisation, att han var hedersmedborgare i USA och lade mycket stor tyngd bakom kravet på att USA nu ska pressa Ryssland på alla tänkbara möjligheter.

Allmänt sätt förekom kritik mot USA för att ha gömt sig bakom Sverige, men ingen kritik mot Sverige för försiktigheten under 40- och 50-talen..


Olle Wästberg

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Exp 2000-01-12
kl 16:00
✓



Lithander/Schönning

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

afakta
afakta

AME ~~EC~~
~~ESEK~~
PIK. inf

P 2 EU
(IN 18 N)

Invigning av Raoul Wallenbergmonument i Chile

3 bilagor

Samtidigt som Sverigedagarna (*Dias de Suecia*) pågick invigdes på årsdagen av Kristallnatten den 9 november 1938 ett monument till åminnelse av Raoul Wallenberg i kommunen Vitacura i Santiago. Monumentet initierades av rabbinen Dr Angel Kreiman och den judisk-kristna föreningen i Santiago.

Monumentet består av en grå rektangulär stålstruktur i vilken siluetter av en grupp människor skurits ut. Dessutom framträder siluetten av Raoul Wallenberg i relief. Monumentet står i en bassäng i en mindre park invid ringleden runt Santiago (se bilaga 1). Då den tidigare texten på monumentet innehöll vissa felaktigheter har ambassaden sökt korrigera detta. I skrivande stund har ännu inte en ny text färdigställts varför ambassaden ber att få återkomma när så skett. I det förestående anbudsförfarandet föll valet på detta bidrag av konstnärerna Cecilia Campos, Luz Maria Ovalle samt Ximena Joannon, vilka också närvarade vid cermonin.

Monumentet som finansierats av privata donationer från personer ur den ungersk-judiska kolonin i Chile (uppskattningsvis 30 000 USD) och ett hängivet arbete av Dr Kreiman. Kommunen Vitacura bidrog med upplåtande av mark till detsamma. Dessutom ordnade den lokale SAS-representanten flygbiljetter åt storrabbinen i Stockholm, Morton Narrowe och Gunnel Borgegård från de Nordiska Evangeliska Kyrkorna.

Invigningsscermonin var kort och värdig med ungefär 150 deltagare, bl.a. chefen för det chilenska utrikesministeriets Europaavdelning Jorge Dupuy, borgmästaren i Vitacura Raul Torrealba, överrabbinen från London Sir Sigmund Sternberg (som varit bidragande vid tillkomsten av Raoul Wallenberg-monument i bl.a. London och Buenos Aires), Narrowe och Borgegård samt ambassadörerna från bl.a. Storbritannien, Ryssland, Ungern, Israel, Sverige samt den tyske charge d'affairen.

Dessutom deltog två generaler från Armén respektive Carabineros samt representanter från media (däribland Raúl Sohr från TVN). Såväl HM Konungen som Chiles och Ungerns presidenter skickade budskap med anledning av invigningen. Den socialdemokratiske riksdagsmannen - och för detta ändamål den svenske regeringens representant - Tommy Waidelich framförde HM Konungens budskap (bilagorna 2 & 3). Den socialdemokratiske riksdagsgruppens kanslichef Tommy Ohlström med hustru närvarade också vid ceremonin.

Ett flera minuters - och med mycket god respons från allmänheten - långt inslag på Television Nationals (TVN) nionyheter samma kväll visade för chilensk publik ett sammandrag av Wallenbergs humanitära insats i Budapest under det Andra världskriget. Det var både dokumentärbilder samt intervjuer med två överlevande ungerska judar och riksdagsman Waidelich.


Efter mottagningen på residenset delades skriften *De esto contaréis a vuestros hijos* ("...om detta må ni berätta...") ut till gästerna. Gensvaret var mycket positivt och i princip samtliga gäster tog med sig minst ett exemplar. Flera av dem berömde även den höga kvaliteten och behovet av ytterligare information i Chile om dessa frågor. Representanter för svenska skolan anmälde intresse för skriften. Dessutom anmälde en representant från Goetheinstitutet intresse för ett stort antal exemplar med syfte att motverka den världsomfattande nynazistkongressen (*Primer Encuentro Ideológico Internacional Nacionalsocialista*) som har aviserats att hållas i Chile den 17-22 april. Denna har f.ö. den judiska kolonin och ett antal parlamentariker försökt stoppa.

Evenemanget organiserades inte huvudsakligen av ambassaden utan av den judisk-kristna föreningen i Santiago med stöd av det chilenska utrikesministeriet och kommunen Vitacura samt ambassaden. Ambassaden ansåg det vara tveksamt att formellt inkludera ett sådant evenemang i den mer kulturella, kommersiella och Sverigefrämjande kontext som *Dias de Suecia* utgjorde. Däremot fanns det ju förutom en samstämmighet i tiden, också ett stort antal gäster som bjöds in både till invigningen och till de olika programpunkterna av *Dias de Suecia*. Ambassaden tog också tillfället i akt att vid väl valda tillfällen påminna om invigningen av detta monument. Även om denna invigning inte hade några formella kopplingar till *Dias de Suecia* gav den en viktig extra dimension åt evenemangen.

Håkan Granqvist

För ambassaden
Peri Silveira

Bilaga 1, bilder på monumentet



Dnr	Avd	Grupp	Mål

MENSAJE DE SU MAJESTAD EL REY CARL XVI GUSTAF DE
SUECIA, CON OCASIÓN DE LA CONSAGRACIÓN DEL
MONUMENTO EN HONOR DE RAOUL WALLENBERG, EL 9 DE
NOVIEMBRE DE 1999

Quiero expresar mi aprecio por la iniciativa de erigir un monumento en Santiago de Chile en memoria de Raoul Wallenberg. Su obra y destino lo han convertido en un símbolo en la lucha contra la persecución e inhumanidad durante y después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial.

CARL GUSTAF

Ifylles av postexp

Avsänd med

☐ sv kurir

☐ utl kurir

☐ luftpost

☐ vanlig post

Avsändn datum

Sign

Message from His Majesty King Carl XVI Gustaf at the occasion of the
inauguration of the Roul Wallenberg Monument in Santiago de Chile,
November 9, 1999

I wish to convey my appreciation of the initiative to erect this monument in Santiago de Chile to the memory of Raoul Wallenberg. His contributions and destiny makes him a symbol in the struggle against persecution and inhumanity during and after the second world war.

CARL GUSTAF

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET
AME

☐ telex ☐ telefax ☐ PM ☐ skr/hbr ☐ övrigt

Datum _____ Handläggare:
Caroline Fleetwood

Godkännes	Ort/datum/nr eller namn
	<i>Santiago de Chile 2000-01-10</i>
	Avser <i>En riksgivning av</i>
	<i>Rasul Wallenberg minnelsest</i>
	<i>i Chile</i>

☐ HEMLIG

Delges för kännedom

☐ utan bil. ☒ jämte samtl. bil. ☐ jämte bil. nr. ☐ jämte bil. där så anges ☐ bil. kan lånas på UD tfn

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☒ SB		☒ Fö/MIL <i>ANDERSON</i>		☐ Generaltullstyrelsen		☐ SI - Sv institutet	
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☐ Utr.utskott et 41 ex.		☐ FI/		☐ Bankföreningen			
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☒ Kabinetssekreteraren		☒ Bitr utrikesråd pol		☐ Ss int utv		☒ Linner AME	
☒ UMK		☐ Utrikesråd int utv		☐ GC		☐ Tham AME	
☐ BMK		☐ Utrikesråd handel		☐ IC		☐ Kviele AME	
☐ ExpCh		☒ Lundborg UrH		☐ AF		☐ Belfrage AME	
☒ PROT		☐ EU-sekr		☐ MENA		☒ Cederberg AME	
☐ JAG		☐ EIM		☐ ASO		☒ Fleetwood AME	
☒ PIK <i>AL NADAF</i>		☐ EI		☒ FMR		☒ Nordströ AME	
☒ Handelsministern		☐ EP		☒ IRK		☒ Häggmark AME	
☐ Ss handel		☐ EC		☐ MAP		☒ Dahlstein AME	
☒ Lindström HMK		☐ GS		☐ IH		☒ von Knorring AME	
☐ Runnbeck HMK		☐ RS		☐ PES		☐ Rapportsekr.	

Antal ex. *10* Antal sid. *5* Kopierad *000720* Sign. *EC* Distribuerad *2000.01.20* Sign. *SL*



2000-01-13

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

P 2 En'

(EC)

exp 0001 B/cl

Ambassaden Riga

Raoul Wallenberg

K

Ambassadören från Lundvik.

Tack för Dina kommentarer. Jag delar helt Din uppfattning att i vissa lägen är en okonventionell och fantasifull approach effektivare än den byråkratiska, och något bättre exempel på det än RW själv finns ju inte. Han agerade under extraordinära förhållanden, men också till vardags har iakttagelsen sin giltighet. Problemet är bara att en byråkrati som använder sig av okonventionella agenter måste utöva sådan kontroll att inte uppdragsgivaren själv blir lidande av fantasifullheten. Inte bara är vi skyldiga att tillse att statens medel används på ett försvarligt sätt, utan vi bör också i båda parter intresse för den okonventionella agenten klargöra var gränserna går och reagera när de överskrides. Mesinai har vant sig vid att kunna framlägga alla möjliga fantasifulla påståenden utan att belägga dem, och då jag i somras i samband med hennes anklagelser mot Per Anger började begära bevis reagerade hon med det bortskämda barnets trotsiga vägran. Det är med tillfredsställelse jag noterar Ditt konstaterande att vi nu måste ta itu med problemet.

Cabinet

NL

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

TELEFAX

Sid. 1 (2)

2000-01-13

Dnr 20 ✓

Gezelius/Tojzner-Glückman

UD/EC/Amb Jan Lundvik

2000-02-01

Delges

Guy von Dardel

Lage Olson, ESEK

EXP 2000-02-01 / MP

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC, (Lundvik) ✓

Kopia: Ambassaden Riga, (Magnusson)

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr.		
2000 -01- 14		
AVD. P	GR. 2	MÅL EU

Raoul Wallenberg - dokument i det ryska
generalstabsarkivet

Med hänvisning till punkt 12 på ambassadör Magnussons lista med frågor inför den svensk-ryska arbetsgruppens möte i Moskva den 22 februari 1999 låter Tutjnin i bifogade brev meddela följande: Inga uppgifter om Raoul Wallenberg har påträffats bland dokumenten i de ryska beväpnade styrkornas generalstabsarkiv, innehållande radioupptagen information från andra världskrigets slut.

DAHL

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119 590 MOSKVABesöksadress
Ulitsa Mosfilmovskaja 60Telefon
(095) 937 92 00
(503) 937 92 00Telefax
(095) 937 92 02
(095) 937 92 03 (viseringsavd)
(095) 937 92 04 (handelsavd)Telex
64-413 410



**МИНИСТЕРСТВО
ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

121200, г. Москва, Г-200,
Смоленская-Сенная площадь, дом 32/34
Телефон 244-16-06

10.01.00 № 62/2ер

На № _____ от _____

**ВТОРОМУ СЕКРЕТАРЮ
ПОСОЛЬСТВА
КОРОЛЕВСТВА ШВЕЦИЯ В
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ**

Э. ТОЙСНЕР-ГЛЮКМАН

Andra europeiska

Uggt om Rv i 2:a världskriget

INK. AMB. MOSKVA		
D. 12.8/10		
2000 - 01 - 12		
AVD.	GR.	W/AL
R	18	Rw

Уважаемая госпожа Тойснер-Глюкман,

Ссылаясь на пункт 12 перечня вопросов посла Х.Магнуссона к заседанию российско-шведской группы в Москве 22 февраля 1999 года (передан нам вместе с письмом А.Вальберга от 12.02.99 г.), сообщаем, что в находящихся в Генштабе ВС РФ архивных документах с радиоперехватами конца Второй мировой войны данных о Р.Валленберге не обнаружено.

**НАЧАЛЬНИК ОТДЕЛА
ФИНЛЯНДИИ И ШВЕЦИИ
ВТОРОГО ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО
ДЕПАРТАМЕНТА МИД РОССИИ**

В.ТУЧНИН



REGERINGSKANSLIET

EC P 2 Eu 1
Sid. 1 (1)

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Jan Lundvik
Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Moskva
Kopia: Ambassaden Riga

08-00-01-14
RE

Raoul Wallenberg

Tojzner Glückman från Lundvik

Secundo i ovancerade är obegripligt.

- a. Enligt min utgåva av Davidssons Rysk-svenska ordbok från 1976 betyder **nadzor** "1. uppsikt, tillsyn, övervakning, 2. (*organ*) inspektion, 3. (*technitjeskij*) inspektion" och **nadsmotr** "uppsikt, tillsyn", orden är m a o synonymer. De är inte persons substantiv, i så fall skulle det, fortfarande enligt Davidsson, heta **nadziratel'** resp. **nadsmotrsjtjik**.
- b. Enligt min utgåva av Ozjegovs Slovar' russkogo jazyka från 1973 betyder **nadzor** "1. *sm.* nadzirat', 2. Grupp lits, organ dlja nabljudenija za kem-tjem-n." Under **nadzirat'** återges substantivet **nadzor** med förklaringen "nachodit'sa pod nadzorom". Under **nadsmatrivat'** står det kort och gott "To zje, tjto nadzirat'. *Susjtj.* nadsmotr". Orden betraktas m a o också av Ozjegov som synonymer.
- c. Tolkningen att orden skulle betyda observer resp. overseer saknar alltså varje i lexikon från 1970-talet konstaterbar grund. En enklare och mera näraliggande förklaring är att antingen befann sig RW själv, eller frågan om hans yrkesbeteckning, pod nadsmotrom = pod nadzorom = under uppsikt. Vad sedan det skulle betyda kan diskuteras, men någon länk till Washington kan inte utläsas.

Cabinet



REGERINGSKANSLIET

KRYPTOFAX

KRYPTOFAX

2000-01-14

Inkom Krypto

2000 -01- 14

Sid. 1 (1)

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Moskva
Kopia: Ambassaden Riga

13 ✓ / Exp 000114 1314

Raoul Wallenberg: Brev till Susan Mesinai

1 bil

Från Lundvik

Benäget överlämna närslutna brev till Susan Mesinai.

Cabinet

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X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE

Besöksadress
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Telefax
08 - 723 11 76

Telex
105 90 MINFOR S



REGERINGSKANSLIET

Stockholm, 14 January 2000

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telephone +46 8 405 3114

Susan Mesinai

Ambassaden i Moskva

Administrative and policy issues

Dear Susan,

Mr. Eliasson has asked me to answer your letter to him dated 29 December 1999, in which you ask him for "commitment, focus and a strong unified direction" and claim that "we can miss the mark if certain administrative and policy issues aren't resolved". You also refer to new discoveries in the Russian archives, of which Mr. Eliasson "may or may not be aware" as you put it.

What you have in mind is not very clear, so let me begin by defining the framework within which these administrative and policy issues have to be dealt with. The long-standing commitment of the Swedish Government to establish the truth about Raoul Wallenberg's fate remains unchanged, and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs continues to devote considerable resources to it. At the Ministry in Stockholm one senior official – i.e. myself – is exclusively assigned to it, and another experienced official, Lage Olson, works half-time on it. We are both members of the Working Group on Raoul Wallenberg, the other members of which are Hans Magnusson as chairman, Guy von Dardel, Carl Persson, Krister Wahlbäck and Eva Tojzner-Glückman. The Working Group has assigned certain research projects to Marvin Makinen, Suzanne Berger and yourself as independent experts.

This means that I am responsible for all aspects of the case, political as well as research. In the research field the Working Group is the main vehicle, but it is also part of my responsibilities to keep in touch with research taking place elsewhere. The independent experts report to the Working Group without being members of it. They are consultants with specific assignments, and these assignments expire within the next six

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Visitors' address
Fredsgatan 6

Fax
+46 8 723 11 76

Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

Stockholm, 14 January 2000

months. During the second half of the year the report of the Joint Swedish-Russian Working Group will be completed and made public. This is the framework within which your assignment has to be carried out and in which administrative and policy issues should be resolved.

When you refer to "new discoveries" that you assume Mr. Eliasson may or may not be aware of it is difficult for him to assess their importance without knowing what they are. The Embassy tells us that it is a reference to the issue of the meaning of the words nadsmotr and nadzor, an issue of such doubtful validity that it hardly merits to be brought to his special attention.


I take this opportunity to reply to some of the points in your letter to me 26 December.

If the document regarding General Key mentioned in your January 1999 report does not exist, how could you refer to it as a fact a year ago? Whatever your findings and conclusions are they should be based on factual evidence made available to the Working Group. In this respect your work leaves much to be desired, and the suddenly missing document referred to above is yet another example.

I see no point in discussing further with you the question of the cancelled seminar. When you write that I "had been preparing this event for a long time without briefing us or including us in any way in the picture" you effectively dispell any remaining belief in your intellectual honesty that I may have had. The truth is that I briefed you in Moscow about the tentative plans for a seminar, just as I briefed Ambassador Hirdman and Mr Tuchnin, and you had no objections, in fact you responded positively.

That you should visit our archives here in Stockholm in order to identify witnesses whose testimonies might be relevant to your work is what I suggested in July last year. You have been slow to act on it, but better late than never. Please contact Lage Olson about the practicalities.

Yours sincerely



Jan Lundvik



Kop. DA
Orig. JL
SVERIGES AMBASSAD
TEL AVIV

2000-01-11

R 18

Ambassadör Jan Lundvik

UD EC

11/001

EC P 2 Eu

22
12
Raoul Wallenberg

Broder,

Sent omsider fick jag så tillfälle att besöka American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee's arkiv i Jerusalem tisdagen 4 januari. Arkivarien fru Sara Kadosh tog emot och gav mig tillträde till de RW-relevanta dossierer som hon kunnat identifiera.

JDC:s arkiv i Jerusalem innehåller främst material från de JDC-kontor som öppnades i europeiska länder under andra världskrigets slutskede, i Turkiet, Sverige och Schweiz, samt från kontor som etablerades efter krigsslutet (Paris huvudfilial för JDC i Europa, kontoret flyttades småningom till Genève). Övrigt JDC-material finns i organisationens arkiv i New York, där också Sally Meyer dokumentsamlingen finns i original, uppgav Kadosh.

De RW-relevanta dossierer som jag fick tillgång till härrörde från Paris-, Genève- och Stockholmskontoren. Det var en diger lunta dokument som jag fick för granskning. I huvudsak var dokumenten av två slag, korrespondens gällande finansiella överföringar från bankkonto(n) som stått till RW:s förfogande och allmän korrespondens gällande diverse flykting-ärenden.

Vad gäller den finansiella korrespondensen, gällde den huvudsakligen olika personers krav på ersättning

för medel som det gjordes gällande ställts till RW:s förfogande under andra halvåret 1944 och verifikation av dessa krav. Dokumenten härrör från perioden 1946-55. Skriftväxlingarnas aktörer var utöver JDC, Stockholms Enskilda Bank, Ivar C Olsen, War Refugee Board, Jerome J Jacobson (JDC), Laszlo Sarlo, Fredrik von Dardel, Danielsson och Ekmark från svenska legationen i Budapest under andra världskriget, m fl. Såvitt jag kunde bedöma, innehöll dokumenten information som får förutsättas vara känd i Stockholm sedan tidigare.

För att ge Dig intryck av den typ av dokument det handlar om, bad jag JDC kopiera ett antal av dem, som jag kommer att vidarebefordra till Dig så snart de inkommit till ambassaden. Bl a bad jag om kopia på en uppteckning av en Simon Margal, tolk och sekreterare vid legationen i Budapest, med vittnesbörd över legationens (och RW:s) aktiviteter under hösthalvåret 1944.

Huvuddelen av dokumenten från JDC:s Stockholmskontor som jag fick att granska handlade dock om judiska flyktingärenden, frågor om viseringar och uppehållstillstånd, efterforskning av anhöriga, ansökningar om bistånd för sjukvård och resebidrag, upphandling av varor, m.m., och saknade relevans för RW-fallets utredning.

Om Du skulle bedöma det vara av intresse, kan besök på JDC-arkivet i Jerusalem ordnas i samband med Ditt besök hit i mars.

12
Dag Juhlin-Dannfelt



REGERINGSKANSLIET

EC

PA Eu¹

Sid. 1 (1)

2000-01-17

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Riga
Kopia: Ambassaden Moskva

J Ep. 000177/ME

RW: Anförande av umin

1 bil

R

Ambassadören från Lundvik

Härmed översändes för ev. synpunkter utkast till utrikesministerns anförande vid ceremonien för hedrande av Raoul Wallenberg i samband med öppnandet av utställningen Visas for Life den 26 januari.

Cabinet

MD

UTKAST

Anförande av utrikesminister Anna Lindh vid ceremonien för att hedra Raoul Wallenberg den 26 januari 2000

We have gathered here today to honour Raoul Wallenberg - his life and work.

Many books and articles have been written, and many movies and TV programmes have been produced about the work of Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest. We know that he - together with his own loyal staff and with brave colleagues from several countries - saved the lives of tens of thousands of people. We know that, by his involvement in the efforts to stop the destruction of the ghetto in Budapest, Wallenberg helped saving another 60 000 people. And we know that he became one of the outside world's witnesses - the eyes and ears of the international community - at a time of horrific human degradation.

It is now almost exactly 55 years since Raoul Wallenberg disappeared in

Budapest. What conclusions can be drawn today from his effort? What does Raoul Wallenberg tell us about our own responsibility when facing the forces of evil?

First, Raoul Wallenberg showed, together with his friends and colleagues in Budapest, that one individual - through compassion, determination and conviction - *can* make a difference. He showed that we do not always need to be well prepared to do what is right. He showed that we can all rise to the occasion, even capable of superhuman effort. He showed that by keeping hope alive and always working for a better future, powerlessness and despair can be overcome.

Secondly, Raoul Wallenberg showed that action is not only possible, but necessary, in the struggle against evil. He was well aware of the dangers of delay, the damage from waiting too long and not acting in time. With his daring rescue operations he showed the importance of arriving in time and acting decisively to defend life and human dignity.

Thirdly, Raoul Wallenberg reminds us of the moral responsibility of each

individual. He himself clearly understood that there is no room for hesitation in the face of evil. He and his co-workers never doubted what was required of them during those weeks in Budapest, of what was needed for the rebirth and rehabilitation of the Jewish community in Hungary. He knew which path he had to walk. He had an unfailing moral compass.

* * *

Sadly, we still lack a full account of Raoul Wallenberg's fate after his disappearance in Budapest 1945. We had strong expectations that a new and open Russia would help us establish the truth. We have indeed had a good and constructive co-operation with the Russian authorities within the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, which was set up in 1991. The Working Group has systematically been examining documents and collecting evidence. We know that he was brought to Moscow, and we have been able to gain considerable information on what happened to him during the first two years in Soviet custody. His fate from 1947 and onwards is however still unclear.

Looking back at more than half a century of Swedish investigations on Raoul Wallenberg's fate it must be acknowledged that in the early stages not everything was done that could and should have been done. Mistakes were made that may have had unfortunate consequences. These issues are also being studied by the Working Group, whose report can be expected in the second half of this year.

* * *

The legacy of Raoul Wallenberg truly lives on. It has been said that fundamental for his efforts was the focus on human life, on each human being. Conclusions from this can be drawn also today and in a wider perspective. Nations should not be seen as pawns on a geopolitical chessboard but as societies with individuals - all with right to political freedom, to economic and social justice and a life in dignity for all. In Hungary, Raoul Wallenberg saw the forces of evil in the eye, but he never gave up, and never stopped taking action. He and others in similar situations, like Count Folke Bernadotte, knew what they had to do. They needed no decision-making process.

Raoul Wallenberg's determination and accomplishments, his compassion and moral convictions will indeed live on, as examples of lasting truths and values - which must guide all of us today, as well as future generations.



2000-01-18

AVG. AMB. RIGA		
D.Nr. 5/5		
2000-01-18		
AVD. <i>ER</i>	GR. 18	MÅL Wallenberg

Delegation från

en adressering/samt

UMK

BMK/ *WW*

EC *P 2 Eu*
UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr 5 ✓

Till: EC (Jan Lundvik)

Kopia: amb Moskva

Raoul Wallenberg: anförande av utrikesministern

(1 bil.)

Utkastet till utrikesministerns anförande den 26 januari är på det hela taget utmärkt. Jag har i den bifogade texten några förslag till smärre justeringar.

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UTKAST**Anförande av utrikesminister Anna Lindh vid ceremonien för att hedra
Raoul Wallenberg den 26 januari 2000**

We have gathered here today to honour Raoul Wallenberg - his life and work.

Many books and articles have been written, and many movies and TV programmes have been produced about the work of Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest. We know that he - together with his own loyal staff and with brave colleagues from several countries - saved the lives of tens of thousands of people. We know that, by his involvement in the efforts to stop the destruction of the ghetto in Budapest, Wallenberg helped saving another 60 000 people. And we know that he became one of the outside world's witnesses - the eyes and ears of the international community - at a time of horrific human degradation.

It is now almost exactly 55 years since Raoul Wallenberg disappeared in

Budapest. What conclusions can be drawn today from his effort? What does Raoul Wallenberg tell us about our own responsibility when facing the forces of evil?

First, Raoul Wallenberg showed, together with his friends and colleagues in Budapest, that one individual - through compassion, determination and conviction - can make a difference. He showed that we do not always need to be well prepared to do what is right. He showed that we can all rise to the occasion, even capable of superhuman effort. He showed that by keeping hope alive and always working for a better future, powerlessness and despair can be overcome.

Secondly, Raoul Wallenberg showed that action is not only possible, but necessary, in the struggle against evil. He was well aware of the dangers of delay, the damage from waiting too long and not acting in time. With his daring rescue operations he showed the importance of arriving in time and acting decisively to defend life and human dignity.

Thirdly, Raoul Wallenberg reminds us of the moral responsibility of each.

individual. He himself clearly understood that there is no room for hesitation in the face of evil. He and his co-workers never doubted what was required of them during those weeks in Budapest, of what was needed for the rebirth and rehabilitation of the Jewish community in Hungary. He knew which path he had to walk. He had an unfailing moral compass.

* * *

Sadly, we still lack a full account of Raoul Wallenberg's fate after his disappearance in Budapest 1945. We had strong expectations that a new and open Russia would help us establish the truth. We have indeed had an *interesting* ^{and} ~~good and~~ constructive co-operation with the Russian authorities within the Swedish-Russian Working Group on the fate of Raoul Wallenberg, which was set up in 1991. The Working Group has systematically been examining documents and collecting evidence. We know that he was brought to Moscow, and we have been able to gain considerable information on what happened to him during the first two years in Soviet custody. His fate from 1947 and onwards is however still unclear.

5

Looking back at more than half a century of Swedish Investigations on Raoul Wallenberg's fate it must be acknowledged that in the early stages not everything was done that could and should have been done. Mistakes were made that may have had unfortunate consequences. These issues, are also being studied by the Working Group, whose report can be expected (in the second half) of this year. *They are all things with the Russian side*

It should be noted towards the end

* * *

The legacy of Raoul Wallenberg truly lives on. It has been said that fundamental for his efforts was the focus on human life, on each human being. Conclusions from this can be drawn also today and in a wider perspective. Nations should not be seen as pawns on a geopolitical chessboard but as societies with individuals - all with right to political freedom, to economic and social justice and a life in dignity for all. In Hungary, Raoul Wallenberg saw the forces of evil in the eye, but he never gave up, and never stopped taking action. He and others in similar situations, like Count Folke Bernadotte, knew what they had to do. They needed no decision-making process.

6

Raoul Wallenberg's determination and accomplishments, his compassion and moral convictions will indeed live on, as examples of lasting truths and values - which must guide all of us today, as well as future generations.

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
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Wallenberg-anförande 26 januari

Lundvik från Hirdman.

Utmärkt anförande. Föreslår en ändring, nämligen att sista meningen sid 4 "His fate from 1947 and onwards is however still unclear" ersätts med: "We still do not know the full truth of what then happened to him in Moscow in 1947".

Mina egna synpunkter i Wallenberg-ärendet kommer om någon dag.

HIRDMAN

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The WALLENBERG MYSTERY

Fifty-five Years Later

WILLIAM KOREY

The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and freedoms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semitism and promotes human rights for all; works for the security of Israel and deepened understanding between Americans and Israelis; advocates public policy positions rooted in American democratic values and the perspectives of the Jewish heritage; and enhances the creative vitality of the Jewish people. Founded in 1906, it is the pioneer human-relations agency in the United States.

Cover photographs: Swedish protective pass (*Schutzpass*) issued to Adalbert Szekely, Budapest, Hungary, Sept. 22, 1944. Gift of Katalin Szekely, Museum of Jewish Heritage, New York. Photograph by Peter Goldberg. Photo of Wallenberg: Hagstromer & Qyberg Fondkommission AB, courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives.

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

William Korey, Ph.D., is the author of, among other books, *The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia* (1973) and *NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1998).

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FOREWORD

More than twenty years ago, on July 24, 1979, the American Jewish Committee hosted a press conference in New York City where Mrs. Nina Lagergren, the half sister of Raoul Wallenberg, announced the formation of the Free Wallenberg Committee. This was the first time that most Americans had ever heard of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat stationed in Budapest who, working for the U.S. War Refugee Board, saved thousands of Hungarian Jews from the Nazis in the final days of World War II, and was last seen being taken into custody by the Russians on January 17, 1945.

That AJC press conference and the media attention it attracted laid the groundwork, two years later, for the House of Representatives resolution that granted Wallenberg honorary U.S. citizenship, only the second time in American history that a non-American was accorded this status. This, in turn, created the legal basis for the American government to intervene directly with the Russians to determine what happened to Raoul Wallenberg.

From the very start, two of the leading spirits behind the campaign to investigate Wallenberg's fate have been Congressman Tom Lantos of California and his wife, Annette—who was one of those Hungarian Jews saved by the Swedish diplomat. Acknowledging the AJC's unique role, they wrote: "We shall never forget the actions of the American Jewish Committee, who were the first to help us at a time when the rest of the world was indifferent to the fate of the heroic savior of the Jewish people."

Despite continuing efforts over the years by AJC and others, including noted scholars, to get at the truth, today, fifty-five years

after Wallenberg's disappearance, we remain to a disturbing degree in the dark about what actually happened to him and why.

In commissioning and publishing this comprehensive analysis, by the distinguished researcher Dr. William Korey, of all the evidence adduced so far, the American Jewish Committee hopes to revitalize the search for answers to the Wallenberg mystery. As we enter a new century, it is surely time to do justice to Raoul Wallenberg, one of the truly heroic figures of our age.

David A. Harris
Executive Director
The American Jewish Committee

THE WALLENBERG MYSTERY: FIFTY-FIVE YEARS LATER

Confronting the Nazi machinery of death in Budapest in the summer and fall of 1944, Raoul Wallenberg, secretary of the Swedish legation, rescued tens of thousands of Hungarian Jews. UN secretary-general Kofi Annan has singled out Wallenberg as a "role model" for "moral behavior in the face of evil and injustice." But, Annan asked, "why were there so few Raouls?"¹ Elie Wiesel called him "extraordinary," and noted, too, how his initiatives reveal "what could have been done to save Jewish lives if more people had cared."²

Even when the Nazi war machine had almost ground to a halt in Budapest and the Soviet Red Army had occupied most of the city's Pest area, Wallenberg refused to respond to pleas from his closest colleague to stop risking his life and go into hiding in the Buda area with other members of the Swedish legation. Wallenberg explained: "For me there's no choice. I've taken on this assignment and I'd never be able to go back to Stockholm without knowing inside myself I'd done all a man could do to save as many Jews as possible."³

Wallenberg said this on January 10, 1945. Exactly one week later—January 17—he was seized by Soviet secret police and disappeared into the Kremlin's infamous gulag.

On the eve of the new millennium, the Holocaust—the greatest horror of a century of horrors—is receding into the past. But for Wallenberg, a moral giant who bestrode the historical stage for only a moment, there is still no closure. Raoul Wallenberg disappeared fifty-five years ago, and despite the enormous amount of detailed knowledge that has accumulated about the Holocaust, the world knows neither why he was taken nor what happened to him.



Wallenberg's exploits were extraordinary. With no weaponry and minimal political leverage, he concocted fantastically clever schemes to rescue a significant segment of Hungarian Jewry. He created, printed, and distributed the *Schutzpass* (protective passport) carrying the insignia of the Swedish crown, which was supposed to ensure their holders of Swedish protection.⁴ This was Wallenberg's top priority almost from the moment he arrived in Budapest on July 9, 1944.

In fact, as his colleague at the Swedish legation, Lars Berg, would later comment, "the most remarkable thing about his [Wallenberg's] work was that it was not based on any legal rights whatsoever."⁵ No one at the Swedish legation, Berg explained, had any right or authority to interfere with the way Hungarian officials or the Nazi military who backed them chose to handle their "Jewish problem." Berg further observed:

Nor was Wallenberg supported by physical force. Neither weapons nor soldiers gave weight to his words. He began his mission with only one source of power: an unflinching faith in himself buttressed by the justness of his cause.

Wallenberg had been trained as an architect and was therefore familiar with design techniques. He devised this formal passport complete with a number, the official seal of Sweden—three crowns—and the legation minister's signature. The passport stated that the holder was to go to Sweden within the framework of repatriation authorized by the Swedish Foreign Office. Until the bearer's departure, he and his property were under the protection of the Swedish legation. Wallenberg persuaded the Hungarian authorities to recognize the passports.⁶

Endless hours were spent printing the documents. Wallenberg was personally involved in the process, aided by volunteer workers recruited from the Jewish community, who themselves were among the first bearers of the passports. Eventually, the number of these volunteers reached 350. One of them later related that, at Wallenberg's insistence, "we had to work around the clock." She observed, too,

that there was no such thing as a day off; instead, when tired, "we would lie on the floor for an hour's nap."⁷

Knowledgeable sources estimated that some 15-20,000 protective passports were in circulation. But no accurate figures are possible since the documents, once prepared, could be, and were, forged or reproduced by others. The most dramatic impact of the faked passports came in November 1944 when Adolf Eichmann ordered the deportation of Jews by trains to death camps. As described by two biographers, Wallenberg, oblivious to his own safety, would appear suddenly on top of a deportation train "handing out Swedish papers to all the hands that could reach them." He would then insist that those holding papers be allowed off the train.⁸ Or he would show up at a train stop, climb aboard and shout to the Jews: "Get off this train. I issued you a passport. Your name is right here in my book!"⁹ And Jews would get off the train and climb aboard trucks whose timely arrival has been arranged by Wallenberg.

Even more daring was Wallenberg's method of interrupting death marches and rescuing some of the doomed. By the end of November the Nazi war machine was in desperate straits in the face of the Soviet and Western onslaughts. With a shortage of trains to transport Jews to the gas chambers, Eichmann ordered death marches of over one hundred miles to the murder sites. He had to contend, however, with Wallenberg, who would appear at the site of the death march and literally pull people out. He would shout, "In the name of the [Hungarian] government, I demand those with Swedish passports to raise them high." Then, after identifying himself as "Wallenberg, Swedish legation," he would point to an astonished man and yell: "You there! Give me your Swedish passport and get in that line. And you [pointing to another], get behind him. I know I issued you a passport."¹⁰

The initially confused Jews would quickly grasp the ruse-in-the-making. They would reach in their pockets for any type of identification, such as a driver's license or birth certificate. Within minutes, Wallenberg had the Jews climbing into International Red Cross trucks that he had assembled. On the way back to Budapest, Wallenberg, with the help of his colleague, Per Anger, filled out protective

passports that they had brought along. Along the way, trucks would stop at first-aid stations where food was delivered to the marchers. Aware that a little bribery could be useful, Wallenberg made certain that that nearby policemen would be given mugs of cognac and packages of cigarettes. The cash to pay for this came from a Swedish bank account—the funds for which were supplied by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and the U.S. government—as well as payoffs from six warehouses that had been stocked with foodstuffs and other valuables, used primarily for Jews in need.¹¹

Not all of Wallenberg's colleagues were enthusiastic about the protective passports. Lars Berg related that he and Anger "argued often with Raoul about these passes."¹² They feared that their mass production would lead to a glut and result in their having "no value at all." But, Berg went on:

Our arguments were pointless. Raoul was determined to have his way. When it came to saving lives, Raoul felt he knew best what would work.

In the end, Wallenberg's swashbuckling initiative paid off in the saving of lives. According to one foreign diplomat, "Raoul accomplished feats that no other twenty diplomats in the world would even have attempted."¹³ At the Eichmann trial in 1961, prosecutor Gideon Hausner captured the special quality of Wallenberg as a diplomat "who threw protocol to the wind to save human lives."¹⁴

The *Schutzpass* was not the only trick in Wallenberg's bag. He also rented buildings on the Pest side of Budapest and unfurled the Swedish flag. After long and arduous negotiations, he got permission from the Hungarian ruler, Miklos Horthy, for those with protective passports to live in these designated buildings. The illusion was created that the inhabitants of "Swedish Houses" enjoyed a special right of "diplomatic immunity" while they presumably awaited departure for Sweden. With the number of passports increasing daily, an intensified flow of new residents would enter the buildings, frequently during the dark of night. By the end of 1944, thirty-two such houses had been rented. Estimates placed the number of their residents holding protective passports at 13,000.¹⁵

Wallenberg's gall in maintaining the security of these houses—

and he generously chose to live near them in the Pest side of Budapest—can be seen in the following episode. As Arrow Cross activists (Hungarian Nazis) with rifles were breaking into the Swedish-rented houses, Wallenberg suddenly arrived, confronting them with nothing but his blustering moral authority: "Cowards! Slobs! What criminal arrogance! How dare you enter a Swedish-protected house! Nothing takes place without my permission."¹⁶ The bluff worked.

A similar episode was recorded by an eyewitness. Nazis had just seized one of these buildings, which housed some fifty Jewish tenants. After collecting all the wedding rings, small chains, and remaining food, they forced everyone into one corner of the yard. In the opposite corner stood a machine gun manned by three Nazis. The eyewitness, a hostage, recalled:

Then suddenly a group of people stormed the courtyard, led by Wallenberg. He seemed to me like an angel of mercy. He was shouting that this was an extraterritorial building. Little by little the shouting ceased, the Nazis picked themselves up and left. They left without taking what they gathered, the food, the rings, etcetera [sic]. We could not believe our own eyes.¹⁷

Wallenberg's bravado reached a climax in early January 1945.¹⁸ As the Red Army was making deep inroads into Hungary, penetrating the outskirts of Budapest, German military officials with 500 soldiers at their disposal, together with the fanatical Arrow Cross, were planning the liquidation of Budapest's central ghetto in which some 70,000 Jews lived. An Arrow Cross contact of Wallenberg's learned about the plan. He told a trusted go-between to "get to Wallenberg. Tell him the pogrom is about to start."

Wallenberg conveyed a message through his Arrow Cross contact: "Wallenberg says to tell the German general that if he doesn't stop this, the Swede will personally see to it that he is charged with murder and genocide by the War Crimes Tribunal." The SS general, August Schmidhuber, was not eager to face the anticipated Nuremberg Tribunal. He called in the commander of the German garrison as well as the representative of the Hungarian Arrow Cross government. "Call off your men," ordered Schmidhuber, "there will be no

pogrom.” Wallenberg’s role in preventing a pogrom of 70,000 Hungarian Jews, when added to the 20-30,000 saved through protection passes whether in or out of “Swedish houses,” lead some to claim that the total rescued by this “Angel of Rescue” was 100,000.

The rescue of Budapest Jewry was certainly Wallenberg’s primary aim. But his fertile mind was already at work on a second scheme as well—an elaborate relief plan for the Jewish survivors.¹⁹ With the Red Army battering down the Nazi fortress in Hungary in December 1944, he had his staff work up the details that he himself hoped to deliver personally to the head of the Soviet occupation forces, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, whose headquarters were in Debrecen, some 130 miles from Budapest. Arrangements for a meeting with Malinovsky were made with the Soviet commander in Budapest, who assigned a Soviet military officer as well as a two-man motorcycle escort to Wallenberg and his Hungarian driver, Vilmos Langfelder.

The Disappearance

On January 17, 1945, Wallenberg started out on a journey that was supposed to last no more than eight days. For a short distance within Budapest a close colleague, Dr. Ernő Pető, rode with him. Wallenberg, pointing to his Soviet escort, told Pető: “I don’t know if they’re protecting me or watching me. I’m not sure if I’m their guest or prisoner.”²⁰ The observation proved prophetic. Pető soon took his leave, and later recalled wishing Wallenberg “all the best on his adventurous trip.” It would turn out to be the last that anyone would see of Wallenberg as a free man.

What happened next is not clear. On the very day Wallenberg disappeared into Soviet hands, January 17, 1945, the Soviet Ministry of Defense issued a secret order for his arrest.²¹ It was signed by one of the Kremlin’s highest officials, Nikolai Bulganin, the deputy minister of defense and a member of Stalin’s war cabinet. A decade later Bulganin would become Nikita Khrushchev’s principal associate in ruling the USSR, first as minister of defense and later as prime minister. His signature on the arrest order meant that it had the approval

of the top command and state leadership. Significantly, the document and its information were kept totally confidential. No one was to learn of it—and this meant all Western governments—until 1991, forty-five years later. Equally significant is that the order, as disclosed in the 1991 archival document of the Ministry of Defense, simply indicated that the military command in Budapest was directed to arrest Wallenberg and transport him to Moscow by any necessary means. It said nothing about the reason for the arrest.

Precisely when the formal seizure of Wallenberg and his driver took place is not known. An archival document, unearthed in October 1989, stipulated that the Swedish diplomat was arrested on January 19, two days after he had left Budapest.²² The arresting agency was military counterintelligence, SMERSH, the acronym for “Death to Spies,” headed by Viktor Abakumov, who would shortly become minister of state security, in charge of the NKVD, the predecessor of the KGB.

Certainly, Wallenberg never reached Debrecen or any point nearby. According to biographer Kati Marton, Wallenberg and his driver were driven under Soviet military escort to Budapest’s Eastern Railroad Station. A long train trip across the Romanian countryside followed.²³ After stopping at a Russian-Romanian border town for a while, the train resumed its journey to Moscow, arriving there on an afternoon. Here, strangely enough, the two “captives” were taken to view one of the city’s prized tourist spots—the Moscow subway.

They were soon brought to the notorious Lubyanka prison, though there are puzzling time gaps in the recorded trip from Budapest to the prison. As specified in an archival document—a registration file—made available in October 1989, Wallenberg was given a special card identifying him as a prisoner of war who had come from Budapest to Moscow on February 6, 1945, under the protection of SMERSH.²⁴ The identification of Wallenberg as a prisoner of war implies that he was considered an agent or soldier of some country with whom the USSR was at war at the time. Sweden, of course, was neutral. Could a diplomat from a neutral country be taken as a “war prisoner”? As for the United States, it was an ally of the Soviet Union. Was Wallenberg perceived as an agent of Nazi Germany?

"extensive peccations of OSS" almost from the very moment the latter was organized.²⁷

How Wallenberg became involved in this extraordinary saga underscores the unique role of the United States in his activities and, therefore, its distinctive responsibility and obligation to find out his fate. On January 22, 1944, the United States created the War Refugee Board (WRB).²⁵ Till then the United States, most egregiously the State Department, had failed to respond effectively to the Nazi persecution of European Jews. President Roosevelt created the board after Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. confronted him with overpowering evidence that the State Department had not only been uncooperative in saving European Jewry but had actually hampered rescue. The findings, researched by high Treasury officials, required immediate action, as the Holocaust, which had already struck much of Europe, would soon threaten the last sizable European Jewish community, that in Hungary. President Roosevelt created the War Refugee Board within the Treasury Department to seek to save Hungary's Jews.

It was none too soon. On March 15 the Nazis swept into Hungary, and Adolf Eichmann was authorized to bring about the "final solution" for its 800,000 Jews. President Roosevelt vigorously spoke out, warning that war crimes, including the massacre of Jews, would not go unpunished. Offices of the War Refugee Board were established in several countries, none more important than Sweden. As a neutral country with a legation functioning in Hungary, Sweden was indispensable to the humanitarian effort. It made its diplomatic office in Budapest the centerpiece of a major rescue mission, and Raoul Wallenberg would become its instrument.

The United States, through the War Refugee Board, selected Wallenberg and provided him the guidelines for his mission to save the Jews of Hungary.²⁶ The key American figure was Iver C. Olsen, the representative of the War Refugee Board in Stockholm. In addition to his WRB functions, Olsen represented the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)—precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—in Sweden. This fact might, indeed, have piqued later Kremlin suspicion, especially since we now know that Soviet agents made

Olsen had to find a Swede who could handle an extremely difficult and dangerous task with intelligence, energy, compassion, and courage. He established a small, ad hoc committee of prominent Swedish Jews to advise in the selection process. After a Hungarian government veto of the committee's initial choice, Wallenberg came under consideration. He had been working for Kalamán Lauer, the head of a trading company, and Lauer, part of the inner Jewish leadership group, was greatly impressed by Wallenberg's abilities, telling Olsen that Wallenberg was "the only one with the courage to undertake the mission."²⁸

Olsen met privately with Wallenberg on June 9, 1944, in a marathon twelve-hour session that lasted into the early morning of the following day. The WRB representative was more than impressed. He later told the *Jewish News* of Newark, New Jersey, that Wallenberg appeared to be "extraordinarily imaginative and vigorous"; indeed, "he was perfect for the job."²⁹ Olsen arranged for the head of the U.S. legation in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, to see Wallenberg. Johnson's reaction was equally favorable. By the end of June, the Swedish government had appointed Wallenberg secretary of its legation in Budapest, with the understanding that the new Swedish diplomat would operate under the aegis of the United States, specifically the War Refugee Board.

Johnson reported to the State Department that he and Olsen wanted the WRB to focus on "implementing this action [the appointment of Wallenberg] of the Swedish government, particularly with respect to financial support." Shortly afterward, Johnson cabled the State Department that the Swedish Foreign Office felt it had cooperated in "lending all possible facilities for the furtherance of the American program" (emphasis added).³⁰ In fact, Johnson continued, "Wallenberg was fully aware that he was in effect carrying out a humanitarian mission on behalf of the War Refugee Board." On June 21, 1944, Johnson reported to the State Department that "the specific purpose" of Wallenberg's appointment was to deal with the "persecution of Jews and minorities." Wallenberg sought from the board

"full instructions as to the line of activities he [was] authorized to carry out" as well as "assurances of adequate financial support for these activities."

The reply came on July 7 from U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull. It spelled out the "general approach" to be used by Wallenberg and promised appropriate funding for a variety of purposes, including "inducements" to facilitate the rescue of Jews. If a proposal had a financially "substantial character," it would have to be "referred to the board for clearance." Hull wanted Wallenberg to communicate to the appropriate persons that there was "no question of American determination to see to it that those who [shared] the guilt [of persecuting Jews would] be punished." At the same time, the U.S. secretary of state was emphatic that the U.S. connection must be hidden from public view. Wallenberg, he stressed, "cannot of course act" as the representative of the WRB "nor purport to act in its name." Even so, the Swedish diplomat should not hesitate to advance "specific proposals" to Olsen.

Wallenberg could not wait to take on his new responsibilities. Initially, it was expected that he would leave Stockholm toward the end of July. Instead, he left Stockholm on July 6. "Every day I stay costs human lives," he wrote Lauer.³¹ After a short stay in Berlin, he arrived in Budapest on July 9.

That the 32-year-old Wallenberg would be willing, indeed eager, to undertake an American-sponsored task to rescue Jews was not as odd as it might appear. Born in 1912 into a prominent Swedish family of bankers, businessmen, and diplomats, Raoul was no stranger to the United States or to Jewish concerns. He had traveled extensively through the United States in the 1930s and had studied architecture at the University of Michigan. He took pride in the fact that his maternal great-great-grandfather was of Jewish origin. In 1936 he had gone to work in Haifa for a Dutch bank, perhaps in preparation for a banking career with his Swedish family. While in Haifa, he came to know young Jews who had fled to Palestine from Hitler's Germany. Their experiences profoundly affected him.³²

Wallenberg's impressive achievements for the War Refugee Board and, therefore, for the United States did not go unnoticed in

Washington. The end of 1944, while in the midst of his rescue work, he received a personal letter from John Pehle, the executive director of the WRB, delivered in the Swedish diplomatic pouch. Pehle wrote: "You have made a very great personal contribution.... I wish to express our very deep appreciation for the vigor and ingenuity which you brought to our common humanitarian undertaking."³³ Acting Secretary of State Edward Stettinius cabled Olsen to convey to Wallenberg the U.S. government's "sincere appreciation" for "the courage and ingenuity displayed by Mr. Wallenberg himself."³⁴ In Olsen's final report to the War Refugee Board, he credited Wallenberg with saving 100,000 lives, 20,000 of which were saved by means of the *Schutzpass*. The report described "the work of Raoul Wallenberg" as being "nothing short of brilliant—to say nothing of being highly courageous."³⁵

But it would take nearly thirty-five years for the U.S. government formally to recognize Wallenberg's heroic work. In the fall of 1981 the Congress of the United States bestowed upon him a special, almost unprecedented, distinction for a foreigner—"Honorary Citizen"—that had theretofore been granted only to Winston Churchill. President Ronald Reagan signed the legislation on October 5. The move in Congress was initiated by Representative Tom Lantos of California, himself a survivor of the Hungarian inferno. In his Wallenberg initiative, Lantos was strongly supported by his wife, Annette, also a survivor of Budapest, who said of Wallenberg: "He was like a Moses from the north, who came to us in the most terrible days." The Lantos resolution was introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives on March 26, 1981, with 258 cosponsors. These members of Congress hoped that the resolution would "give the State Department the legal basis to pursue the case of the ultimate American hostage."³⁶

What Happened?

Why was Wallenberg arrested on January 17, 1945? If the Kremlin knew that he was engaged in a humanitarian mission for the United States, would that be perceived as threatening Soviet interests? And, if

so, in what way? The cold war had not yet begun. In fact, the arrest took place just weeks before the Yalta Conference, a high point in the cooperation of the three allied leaders—Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin. It was at Yalta that the final stage of the struggle against Hitlerism was mapped out and plans laid for coordinating the war against Japan.

According to a secret official Kremlin report—not prepared, however, until April 1956, eleven years after the imprisonment—Wallenberg was arrested on the charge of spying for the Nazis against the Soviet Union. A more blatant absurdity is difficult to conceive, and the document offered no evidence to back up the allegation, although the spy charge would be consistent with the “prisoner of war” designation that Wallenberg was given in Lubyanka. The 1956 report, officially requested by the Central Committee on April 3, 1956, was dated April 28 and signed by the head of the KGB, Ivan Serov, and the minister of foreign affairs, Vyacheslav M. Molotov.³⁷

This Kremlin report was itself kept from public view until the demise of the USSR in December 1991, over thirty years after it was signed. The secretiveness of the totalitarian monolith totally blanketed the Wallenberg case. In the early postwar years, all requests for information about him were met by a standard response ordered by the ruthless Abakumov: “Wallenberg is not in the USSR.”³⁸ Even after Abakumov was removed from his post by Stalin in 1952, and then executed in 1954, the suffocating silence remained. In late 1991, however, the KGB logs in which Wallenberg’s name was inked out, as well as “absolutely secret” memos on him that circulated among the KGB, the Party Central Committee, and the Foreign Ministry, were finally disclosed.³⁹

Back in 1945, however, the Soviet security organs were shrouded in secrecy, and it was difficult for anyone to respond immediately to Wallenberg’s disappearance. Information first came to the Swedish embassy in Moscow in a memo dated one day before the disappearance. Soviet deputy foreign minister Vladimir Dekanosov wrote that “Russian military authorities have taken measures to protect Raoul Wallenberg and his belongings.”⁴⁰ The date of the Dekanosov memo—January 16—suggested that the Kremlin already

knew the details of the Berlin order of January 17, had prepared the specifics of the arrest, and had set in motion how the violation of international law would be rationalized, at least initially. The Dekanosov memo would mark the first stage in a long history of Kremlin deception and cover-up. In February, Wallenberg’s mother queried the Soviet ambassador to Sweden, Aleksandra Kollontai, about her son and was officially informed that he was safe in Russia and would soon return. According to one Wallenberg biographer, the Soviet ambassador said to her: “He will be back, but don’t make too much noise about it.”⁴¹ Kollontai gave similar information to the Swedish foreign minister’s wife, saying: “Yes, Wallenberg is in Russian hands safe and sound.”⁴²

These private assurances were put into question in March when the Soviet-controlled Kossuth Radio in Hungary broadcast a story that Wallenberg had been murdered en route to Debrecen by Hungarian fascists or by “agents of the Gestapo.”⁴³ If the Swedish public was now concerned, so too were American officials. The U.S. minister in Stockholm cabled the State Department to instruct the American ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, to assist the Swedish legation in the USSR, as the United States “had a special interest in Wallenberg’s mission to Hungary.”⁴⁴ On April 9, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius cabled Harriman to extend “all possible support” to the Swedes. At about the same time, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. advised the executive director of the War Refugee Board (which operated under the Treasury’s jurisdiction) to “let Stettinius know that [he was] personally interested in this man.”⁴⁵

Strangely, Staffan Söderblom, Sweden’s ambassador in Moscow, rejected the offer of U.S. assistance. He told Harriman that “the Russians are doing everything they can already.” His hostile query to the Foreign Ministry in Stockholm was equally odd: “What good would the Americans’ interference do?” Even more unsettling was a conversation he had with Stalin a year later, on June 15, 1946, in which he raised the Wallenberg case. Stalin asked: “You say his name was Wallenberg?” (Stalin was certainly aware of Wallenberg, as the decision to arrest the Swede could hardly have been taken without his approval.)

"Yes, Wallenberg," was the response. Söderblom called the line out and Stalin wrote it out on a pad in front of him. But the Swede went on to say that "I am personally convinced that Wallenberg fell victim either to a road accident or bandits." Whether the comment resulted from stupidity or a genuine belief that Wallenberg was dead, it could only have had a devastating effect on Wallenberg's fate. Swedish prime minister Tage Erlander later called the conversation "dangerous and perhaps disastrous."⁴⁶

Indeed, almost from the beginning, and despite the fact that Wallenberg came from one of Sweden's most prominent families, Swedish officials avoided getting deeply involved. From the very start of Wallenberg's humanitarian mission in Budapest, in fact, Stockholm officials registered an obvious lack of enthusiasm. Several weeks after Wallenberg started his Jewish rescue initiatives in Budapest, Iver Olsen notified Washington: "The Swedish Foreign Ministry are somewhat disturbed over Wallenberg's activities in Budapest.... I am sure they would prefer he had dealt with the Jewish problem along diplomatic lines...." This, he added, "would mean not helping Jews."⁴⁷

The journalist who tracked down this document, after studying the early responses of the Swedish government to the disappearance of Wallenberg, concluded that instead of pursuing his case "vigorously" and "insisting forcefully on Wallenberg's return, Swedish officials merely inquired about his whereabouts."⁴⁸ She called attention to a secret telegram from the Swedish ambassador in Moscow to his Foreign Office in Stockholm in April, only a couple of months after the disappearance, saying that the truth about what happened to Wallenberg will probably never be known. This "strangely pessimistic attitude" of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, she found, seemed to have been noticed by the American embassy in Stockholm. In the initial draft of a cable to the State Department in September 1945, it reported that the Swedes feel "the Soviets will never produce Wallenberg alive."

Nor did Sweden respond positively to U.S. offers of assistance. When U.S. officials, in April 1945, offered their services to the Swedish ambassador in Moscow, Stockholm's reply was negative.⁴⁹ As

spelled out in a memorandum by the U.S. embassy in Moscow to Washington, Stockholm believed "that Soviets are doing what they can to locate him [Wallenberg] and they [Swedish officials] do not feel that an approach on our part to Soviet Foreign Office would be desirable."⁵⁰ The negativism and pessimism of the Swedes extended to the patriarch of the Wallenberg family, Marcus Wallenberg. According to Suzanne Berger, President Harry Truman, in 1947, offered Marcus U.S. assistance and his response was: "He [Raoul] is probably already dead by now."⁵¹

As late as 1949 the United States continued to offer assistance to Stockholm but the response was still negative. The then Swedish ambassador to Moscow, Rolf Sohlman, said: "We cannot drive in tandem with the Americans."⁵² Per Anger, the distinguished Swedish diplomat and close colleague of Wallenberg, commented on these missed opportunities:

As is now known, the Americans showed through their embassy in Moscow great interest in the Wallenberg case as early as 1945. But the Swedes never followed up on this, and no cooperative effort on this matter was ever established between the American and Swedish missions in Moscow. Still another example of the paralysis that characterized the Swedish behavior in the beginning!⁵³

Why the United States gave in to this Swedish attitude is not altogether clear. Conceivably, the United States could have raised the question of Wallenberg's disappearance at Yalta. It did not. With the death of President Roosevelt in April, the U.S. embassy in Moscow may have been too preoccupied to follow up on the Harriman initiative. Two years later, the acting secretary of state, Dean Acheson, offered an explanation. In a letter to the Senator Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had wondered why the State Department could not make a "special effort" on Wallenberg's behalf, Acheson replied:

In view of the fact that Mr. Wallenberg acted as a member of the Swedish mission in Budapest, the initiative in inquiries directed toward the Soviet Government rests with the Swedish authorities.⁵⁴

U.S. diplomacy certainly followed the Wallenberg case. In the fall of 1945, a telegram sent by the State Department on September 20 to its Moscow embassy and signed by Acting Secretary of State Acheson notes that diplomatic sources reported that Wallenberg was still alive. The telegram, which was located only recently, called upon the embassy to make "further inquiries" about the Swedish prisoner and pointed out that Soviet authorities were understood to have seized all of Wallenberg's documents and notes "for use in proceedings against Hungarian collaborators."⁵⁵ Why they would have had to be "seized" is not made clear. Would not Wallenberg have given them to Moscow upon request?

The State Department document includes a deletion that raises some serious questions. A line of dark ink was drawn through the section that explains that Swedish officials believed that the Soviets would "never produce Wallenberg alive."⁵⁶ This deletion suggests that the section, for reasons unknown, may have been removed from the actual telegram. Both the initial draft formulation and excision are puzzling in the extreme. Even more puzzling is why the United States, aware of the grave danger confronting Wallenberg, didn't demand his release at the time.

Soviet Cover-up

If the United States was hesitant to undertake more direct intervention, Moscow engaged in strenuous diplomatic and public-relations efforts to shut off all inquiry into the status of the unlawfully seized Swedish diplomat. The Dekanosov communication to the Swedish government and the report to Wallenberg's mother were the last bits of official information provided to the outside world. But Sweden's continuing inquiries required some sort of response, and the Moscow Foreign Ministry decided upon a new posture.

A confidential document written on May 14, 1947, but not released by the Kremlin to Sweden until October 31, 1991 (and not published until the summer of 1993), throws some light on the pressures that confronted the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the dilemma it faced in dealing with them. The document, a memorandum written

by Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky to Molotov, his superior in the Foreign Ministry, clearly reveals the power of the intelligence services and the Soviet Foreign Ministry's dependence on them.

Vyshinsky began the memorandum by listing Sweden's various inquiries about Wallenberg's status—eight formal notes and five oral interventions. He then observed that the Foreign Ministry had many times during 1945-46, in both "written form and orally," asked SMERSH and later the Ministry of State Security "about the fate of Wallenberg and his location." Vyshinsky disclosed the important information that not until February 1947 was it learned that Wallenberg was "in the possession" of the Ministry of State Security. According to the document, the latter had promised to report to Molotov personally about any further action. Apparently, such reports had not been forthcoming.

Even with the knowledge of Wallenberg's presence in the USSR until at least May 1947, Vyshinsky, in keeping with his infamous role as the "Grand Inquisitor" in the great purge trials of the 1930s, engaged in gross prevarication. On August 18, 1947, the deputy foreign minister sought to end all further questions from Sweden by saying that an extensive search had indicated that "Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union and is unknown to us." This marked the beginning of the second stage in the cover-up. But how then to explain the earlier Dekanosov admission? That message, said Vyshinsky, was "based on indirect statements by one of the commanders of the military forces fighting in Budapest." According to the deputy foreign minister, such statements could not be verified, and the Soviet officer who was initially reported to have made them could no longer be found.

When this failed to satisfy the Swedish media and public, Soviet authorities took a new tack. On January 21, 1948, *New Times*, the semiofficial Foreign Ministry weekly, denounced "fables" about the Soviet secret police holding Wallenberg, calling them a "filthy campaign" that constituted "the vilest of provocations" perpetrated by "the Swedish stepbrothers of the American war-mongers." *New Times* suggested that Wallenberg had been killed by the Nazis or by their supporters in Hungary.⁵⁷

On the official level, however, the USSR continued to assert

that Wallenberg was simply unknown to Moscow. The need for the reiteration of this theme was brought to the attention of Stalin himself. In a Russian Foreign Ministry memorandum of June 10, 1952, addressed to Stalin, Vyshinsky (still deputy foreign minister) complained about a new note from the Swedish foreign minister dated May 23, 1952, which inquired about the status of Wallenberg.⁵⁸ (The memorandum to Stalin was only made available to the Swedish authorities by Moscow sometime during 1991-92.)

After recapitulating the case background (which included a formal denial by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm to Swedish authorities on April 16, 1952), Vyshinsky contended that there was no further need to answer the latest formal Swedish inquiry since his denial of August 1947 was still valid. He then advised that, should the Swedish government seek to raise the issue again with Moscow or with the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, the response should be that "we" have no knowledge about Wallenberg, information that had already been communicated to the Swedish Foreign Ministry.

Although the "big lie" that Wallenberg was not in the USSR and was "unknown" to the authorities would now be perpetrated upon the unsuspecting world community, recent evidence documents his precise whereabouts during the years 1945-47. The evidence was discovered in late 1990 by Vadim Birstein and Arseny Roginsky, two members of the joint Soviet-International Commission created at that time to ascertain Raoul Wallenberg's fate.⁵⁹ They had been given permission to view the files of foreign prisoners of war at the Central State Archive as well as the files of Vladimir prison.

In February 1945, Wallenberg was in cell number 121 or 123 of Lubyanka prison, a cell also occupied by a former police attaché of the German embassy in Bucharest and an Austrian soldier. One month later, Wallenberg was moved to another cell in the same prison, a cell he again shared with two other people. In April or May he was transported to Lefortovo prison, also in Moscow. Moved with him was one of his old cell mates, the German police officer from the Nazi embassy in Bucharest. They would occupy cell number 203 until February 24, 1946, when they would be transferred back to Lubyanka prison, cell number 7. At that point, the trail of archival

evidence ended, further documentation could not be found.

Not until the mid-fifties did some information begin to surface in the West concerning Wallenberg's imprisonment during the years 1945-47. In 1955, Moscow had initiated the release of vast numbers of German and Austrian war prisoners. (The release was an outgrowth of friendly negotiations with West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer as well as the signing of a peace treaty that made Austria a neutral state.) Swedish authorities were able to locate and interview former prisoners who had been in contact with Wallenberg during the years 1945-47, contact that often took the form of wall-tapping (Wallenberg was known to his fellow prisoners in the early days of his captivity as a "keen tapper"). Some former prisoners had been cell mates of Wallenberg's driver, Langfelder.

After extensive interviewing, Sweden ascertained that Wallenberg had been held as a suspected spy and that his Soviet jailers sought to prevent information about him from spreading among the other prisoners.⁶⁰ When Sweden submitted its discoveries to Moscow, it received no response. A subsequent note from the Swedish foreign minister, dated March 10, 1956, carried a declaration by two Swedish Supreme Court justices stating that the interview evidence proved beyond a doubt that Wallenberg had been a prisoner in the Soviet Union. Moscow responded nine days later in a negative and hostile letter. According to the Soviet authorities, a "thorough investigation" had confirmed that Wallenberg was not and never had been in Russia. They sharply rejected the oral testimony of "war criminals" that was given to Sweden.

But this time the Swedes would not be silenced. On a visit to the Kremlin in April 1956, Prime Minister Tage Erlander met with Nikita Khrushchev and gave him the Foreign Office documents that demonstrated that Wallenberg had been a Soviet prisoner. In a communiqué at the end of the visit, the USSR promised to study the documents. Over the next ten months, Sweden continued to make a series of formal demands, and the Kremlin promised new investigations, but there were zero results. Finally, after Stockholm expressed "surprise and great disappointment" with the broken Soviet promises, and after more delay, Moscow changed course.

The Kremlin could no longer stonewall. Instead, there was a total reversal of previous denials, and stage three of the cover-up was launched. In a formal diplomatic note dated February 2, 1957, Soviet deputy foreign minister Andrei Gromyko declared that a "page-by-page research" of archival prison records had produced a single document that appeared to refer to Wallenberg. This document would become central to the future Soviet posture on Wallenberg.

The document was attributed to a Colonel A. L. Smoltsov, the head of the prison's health services.⁶¹ It was addressed to Viktor Abakumov, the minister of state security, and was dated July 17, 1947. The text, together with a misspelling of Wallenberg's name, follows:

I report that the prisoner Wallenberg, who is well-known to you, died suddenly in his cell this night, probably as a result of a heart attack. Pursuant to the instructions given by you that I personally have Wallenberg under my care, I request approval to make an autopsy with a view to establishing the cause of death.

An additional comment was reported to have been scrawled across the bottom in the same handwriting. It read: "I have personally notified the minister and it has been ordered that the body be cremated without autopsy." Although the document was attributed to "Smoltsov," it should be emphasized that the Gromyko report did not include the original of the document or even a photocopy of it.

In an accompanying note, the Kremlin asserted that "no other information whatsoever" concerning the case had been found. And Smoltsov was reported to have died on May 7, 1953. Thus the matter was clearly resolved: "the conclusion should be drawn that Wallenberg died in July 1947."

Curiously, new evidence indicates that the 1957 Gromyko memorandum went through several drafts, beginning nearly a year earlier.⁶² In April 1956, an appendix to the memorandum from Molotov and Serov stated that Wallenberg had been held in Lefortovo prison and that he died in that prison hospital in July 1947. It added that his body had been cremated. Several months later, in

October 1956, a second draft appeared. Soviet foreign minister Dmitri Shepilov sent a memorandum to the Communist Party Central Committee noting that Wallenberg was held in both Lefortovo and Buryrka prisons and that he suddenly died on July 17, 1947—for the first time, that specific date was indicated—and that his body was cremated.

What is striking about these earlier drafts was that they did not mention Smoltsov at all. Thus, even before the presumed solid evidence of Smoltsov's report was located and released in February 1957, earlier drafts or formulations of the Wallenberg matter alleging his sudden death in July 1947 and his cremation had been circulating among the Soviet party leadership. In addition, the earlier drafts placed the location of his death not in Lubyanka but in other prisons—Lefortovo and Buryrka.

Especially intriguing were the very different reported sources for the Wallenberg death in the different drafts.

The April 1956 draft gave as its source the records of Abakumov. The October 1956 draft stated that its information came from several persons. The final draft of February 1957—the Gromyko memorandum—specifically stated that its sole source of information was the Smoltsov note and that, aside from that source, "no data were found containing information on Wallenberg's stay in the Soviet Union." The Gromyko memorandum further explained that a thorough search was made in the archives relating to prisoners as well as in the investigation files of the prisons of Lefortovo, Lubyanka, and Vladimir. In none of these prisons, noted the memorandum, was information about Wallenberg to be found. This was the first time Vladimir prison appeared in any official communication dealing with Wallenberg, which may have been due to the fact that that prison was identified as the location of several reported sightings of the Swedish diplomat. In fact, in September 1990 several researchers visited that prison and ascertained that no previous inquiry on Wallenberg had been made.⁶³

Even at this point the Kremlin did not discuss why Wallenberg was cast into the Soviet gulag. Strange, too, was the purported cause of death. Smoltsov's note suggested that it was "probably" a heart

attack. Yet Wallenberg was only 35 at the time. Would so young a man with no record of cardiac problems be suddenly afflicted with a heart attack? And how? Were there no other medical reports in the prison records?

To shift suspicion away from the NKVD, the Soviet note deliberately focused on the person to whom the Smoltsov document was addressed. Viktor Abakumov was an especially convenient target. A former key aide to Lavrenti Beria, Abakumov had been convicted in 1954 for undefined "gross crimes" and was executed. According to the Kremlin note, it was "indisputable" that "Wallenberg's detention in prison, as well as the incorrect information about him supplied by certain former leaders of the security organs to the Soviet Union's Foreign Ministry over a period of years, was a result of Abakumov's criminal activities." The convenience of the Kremlin evidence was mind-boggling. One man is guilty of everything and he is dead. He alone was responsible for Wallenberg's detention; and he alone was responsible for ten years of denial and lying by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Case closed. But was it? In fact, the recently released indictment of Abakumov, in its catalog of his "crimes," did not mention Wallenberg.⁶⁴ Moreover, the Kremlin overlooked Bulganin's January 17, 1945, order to arrest Wallenberg. In 1955, of course, Bulganin held the post of prime minister of the USSR.

The Smoltsov document may have been the centerpiece of the Kremlin case in 1957, but its authenticity and credibility would later encounter serious challenges. Beside the misspelling of Wallenberg's name and the doubt about the possibility of cardiac arrest in a fairly young person, an investigation conducted by a Swedish-Soviet commission—created in mid-1991, almost forty years after the alleged Smoltsov document was first released—noted a crucial problem concerning the reference to cremation.⁶⁵ According to a KGB search made available to the Swedish-Soviet commission, the official list of cremations conducted in 1947 by the only crematorium in Moscow did not include the name of Wallenberg. Another former security official noted that the only prisoners who were cremated, as a general rule, were those who had been executed. The question naturally arose as to whether Wallenberg was executed. In November 1991, a high-

level KGB official, V. Nikonov, stated that, in his "personal" opinion, Wallenberg "was executed" because his arrest had created such "a political scandal" that the authorities "did not know what to do with him." Still, no evidence has been advanced offering any confirmation of an execution.⁶⁶

The possibility that the Smoltsov document was a fabrication was enhanced by handwriting analysis. A researcher, writing in 1991 in a popular Moscow journal, contended that a comparison of the handwriting of Smoltsov, which appeared on the death certificate of another prisoner, with that on the 1947 document concerning "Wallenberg," suggested that the latter was probably forged.⁶⁷

Also arousing suspicion was the assertion in the Gromyko memorandum that the Smoltsov note had been found in the medical service archive at Lubyanka prison. According to Konstantin Vinogradov, the deputy head of the archives of the Kremlin's Federal Security Service (the former KGB), no such archive exists or ever existed. Besides, a KGB official told the Swedish Working Group of the joint commission that he had searched Lubyanka prison records and found no Smoltsov report.⁶⁸

What happened on July 17, 1947, then, remains a mystery. That something terrible occurred is suggested by evidence accumulated by Dr. Vadim Birstein from archival inquiry and the testimony of witnesses.⁶⁹ On July 22, 1947—only five days after the date of Wallenberg's presumed heart attack—every person who had ever been a cell mate of Wallenberg or his driver, Langfelder, was interrogated by the KGB officials in the Lubyanka and Lefortovo prisons. The interrogations sought to elicit what the cell mates knew about Wallenberg or Langfelder. More significantly, according to Birstein, the purpose of the interrogations was to instill a sense of terror in the cell mates to prevent them from uttering the name of Wallenberg or Langfelder in the future.

Although the veracity of the Smoltsov document of 1947 has been seriously questioned, no alternative explanation of what happened to Wallenberg has been unearthed. Absolute proof of his death in 1947 simply does not exist, and numerous "sightings" of Wallenberg in the Soviet gulag have been reported.

One particular case, however, does merit special attention in view of the publication several years ago of the intriguing 1964 minutes of the Communist Party Central Committee's Presidium, which refer specifically to the Wallenberg matter. The case involved the personal experience of a highly qualified source, Professor Nanna Svartz, a prominent Swedish physician, who also happened to be the private doctor of Maj von Dardel, Wallenberg's mother. The professor arrived in Moscow in January 1961 to attend a medical congress, as she had many times in the past.⁷⁰

At the congress, Svartz met with a leading Soviet specialist, Professor Aleksandr Miasnikov, with whom she had discussed scientific subjects at earlier conferences. While she sat with him in his office on January 27 and talked (in German) about matters of mutual interest, she decided to raise the case of Wallenberg and asked whether he knew about it. When the response was positive, Svartz noted that Wallenberg's kin had received reports that he was still alive. Could her colleague advise her on how she might discover Wallenberg's whereabouts?

According to her account, Miasnikov said "that he knew about the case and that the person [she] was asking about was in poor condition." After a further exchange, her "informant then said in a very low voice that the person inquired about was in a mental hospital." Shortly afterward, Miasnikov refused to talk further with Svartz. When she saw him again, he denied making the comments she attributed to him, and Svartz's various attempts to see her Soviet colleague during 1963-64 came to naught. She, of course, had informed the Swedish government of her initial discussions with Miasnikov, and they became the basis for strong inquiries to the Kremlin by Swedish prime minister Tage Erlander.


The subject had obviously grown embarrassing. As a document from Communist Party Central Committee archives released only recently—in mid-1993—indicated, the Presidium (formerly Politburo) of the Central Committee, at its meeting on April 28, 1964, decided that "it would be advisable" for Miasnikov to write Svartz a letter that "should refute her statements" that he had ever "given her any information about Wallenberg."⁷¹ The denial was promptly writ-

ten and sent the next day. Miasnikov, in his letter, attributed the "misunderstanding" to his inadequate knowledge of German. At a meeting the following year, held in Moscow in the presence of Foreign Office representatives from both the Soviet Union and Sweden, Miasnikov emphatically denied that he knew anything about Wallenberg "since he had nothing to do with prisons or prison hospitals or with prisoners of war." Four months later, the Soviet doctor died suddenly. Svartz wondered whether "it was really a case of natural death."

Even as the Svartz-Miasnikov episode was coming to a close, another intriguing development occurred. As recorded in the memoirs of Carl Perssons, the former director of the Swedish Security Police, published in 1991, three KGB officials initiated a strange conversation in East Berlin in 1964. These officials were attached to the Soviet embassy in the capital of the East German communist regime. They had approached a certain Carl Swingel, who was active in the Swedish Lutheran Church in West Berlin and had worked with the East German lawyer Wolfgang Vogel, prominently involved in East-West prisoner exchanges.⁷²

Reportedly, the KGB agents suggested an exchange of Wallenberg for Stig Wennerstrom, a Swedish military officer who had been apprehended and convicted for espionage on behalf of the USSR. The stunned Swedish intermediary then asked the KGB officer who had proposed the swap, "Is Wallenberg alive then?" The response of the Soviet security agent was said to be: "We're not in the habit of dealing with dead bodies." The Swedish cabinet chose not to pursue the matter further even though Perssons felt, at the time as well as later, that it was a "credible lead."

What gave the Wennerstrom episode a special resonance was that it recalled discussions among Swedish Foreign Ministry officials in the late 1940s concerning prisoner exchanges. The Swedish chargé d'affaires in Moscow at the time had reported that, whenever he had raised the question of Raoul Wallenberg with Soviet officials, the latter would in turn mention the names of those they wanted from Sweden. This practice of exchanges with Moscow was known to have been carried out successfully by the Swiss, the Italians, and the




Danes. In contrast, the Swedes eventually returned Russian spies without asking for anything in return.⁷³

Per Anger, who had been assigned the Wallenberg matter in 1948, called the attention of his foreign minister, Östen Undén, to these prisoner exchanges. In addition, Anger noted, Sweden had given Russia a billion crowns in credit during 1946 trade negotiations. When Anger then asked Undén why not ask the Soviets for Wallenberg in exchange for apprehended Russian spies, the reply of the foreign minister was strange: "The Swedish government does not do such things." Later, during the height of the cold war, such prisoner exchange programs between the United States and the Soviet Union brought about the release from the Soviet gulag of such prominent dissenters as Yuri Orlov and Anatoly Shcharansky.

Once Moscow had released the Smoltsov material, it must have been aware that its diplomatic note would be negatively received in Sweden and elsewhere in the West, since it implied that for over a decade Moscow had been lying to the world in saying that it knew nothing about Wallenberg and that, indeed, he was not in the USSR. A document made available for the first time in December 1991 indicated that Gromyko was informed that acknowledgment of Wallenberg's death "would be certain to provoke a hubbub."⁷⁴

Indeed, Stockholm reacted with shock and dismay. Initially, the Swedish government complained about the "meager information" in the Kremlin's documentation. According to Stockholm, Moscow's official note said nothing about the motives for Wallenberg's arrest or about his fate during the years that followed. A week later, Stockholm spoke out sharply and angrily. How was it conceivable that Soviet security organs could imprison a diplomat of a neutral country for two years without reporting it to the Soviet Foreign Ministry? And why did the Soviet government delay for so long the "thorough investigation" it had repeatedly assured the Swedish government it had undertaken? Especially inconceivable was the Kremlin's assertion that, aside from the Smoltsov note, all other documentation concerning Wallenberg had been "completely obliterated."



America Backs Away

Oddly, U.S. intervention, after the initial spurt of concern in 1945, diminished. This was hardly an appropriate posture for Wallenberg's primary employer, but the intensification of the cold war may have given the United States pause. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in July 1949, did promise Guy von Dardel, Wallenberg's half brother, that the United States would provide "any assistance" it could, but it does not appear that any subsequent "assistance" was ever offered.⁷⁵

With the era of détente in the early 1970s, a new opportunity presented itself. Wallenberg's aged mother, Maj von Dardel, wrote to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on May 4, 1973, reminding him of her son's work in Budapest and asking him to seek information that would "throw new light on [her] son's fate and if he is still alive to return him to liberty."⁷⁶ It was a desperate appeal of an 80-year-old mother who had not heard about her favorite child in over a quarter of a century. She hoped that the prominent U.S. secretary of state, for whom she had "the greatest admiration" for his "patience and struggle for peace" in Vietnam, would perhaps bring some solace in view of Raoul's efforts on behalf of the U.S. government in 1944.

A confidential memorandum signed on August 21 that year by Thomas Pickering, then a key career State Department official as executive director of Kissinger's office, urged that the United States comply with the mother's request. The memo recalled that "the American government was the driving force behind Wallenberg's mission in Hungary" and then went on to propose that the United States "make new inquiries at the Soviet Foreign Ministry." In addition, Pickering recommended that a letter to Wallenberg's mother be sent by "a State Department official at a suitable level" which would say that "I wholeheartedly support your desire to know definitely what happened to your son...." A letter was drafted reflecting deep humanitarian concern. Noting her son's efforts on behalf of Hungarian Jewry, the draft read that the United States, through its embassy in Moscow, would ask the Kremlin "what has happened to your son." It then cautioned, with great sensitivity, that while she would be informed "immediately" about what the United States might learn,

she should "not be too optimistic about the possibilities to obtain exact information about his case." The draft concluded with this unusual sentence: "With the greatest compassion for your sufferings during all these years."

The proposed memorandum, though signed by Pickering, was actually prepared by the European Bureau of the State Department with the encouragement of Pickering. The bureau at the time was headed by Walter J. Stoessel. In an interview recently, Pickering—now under secretary of state—recalled that the usual procedure for handling communications like Mrs. von Dardel's would require initial attention by the European Bureau.⁷⁷ Had the inquiry been made, it could have taken the form of a communication signed by Kissinger to be transmitted by the U.S. ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The more likely option, in the later opinion of Pickering, was that the matter could have been handled by Kissinger "directly" with the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin.

But the proposed memorandum, rejected by the secretary of state, went nowhere. "Disapproved by Kissinger" was the statement that appeared at the top of Pickering's memorandum. The date of the disapproval was October 15, 1973. Kissinger never offered his colleagues, according to the recollection of Pickering, any reason for his decision. In neither of Kissinger's two massive memoirs of his career as secretary of state did he make any reference to the episode or to Wallenberg.⁷⁸ In the judgment of Pickering, the reason for Kissinger's decision was that he had "more important fish to fry." Kissinger's overall strategy at the time was geared to détente with the USSR and he might have seen U.S. intervention on behalf of Wallenberg as challenging or undermining that strategy. Besides, he was never particularly enthusiastic about human rights issues.

When Pickering was asked in an interview in the fall of 1999 how he had felt about the rejection of the memo he had signed and the proposed letter to Wallenberg's mother, he responded: "Disappointed." He went on to add that he would have welcomed the inquiry initiative even if it had meant "banging our head once again on the Soviet wall." Asked whether the proposal for a formal State

Department inquiry ever came up again later on, Pickering said that he didn't think so.⁷⁹

Clearly, the Kissinger strategy precluded any initiative by the United States on Wallenberg. Nor was the "human rights" presidency of Jimmy Carter one of vigorous advocacy of the Wallenberg case. Guy von Dardel did meet with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in the fall of 1979 and received a promise of American support.⁸⁰ And shortly afterward, President Carter told Congressman Lantos's wife, Annette, that he actually had raised the subject at his summit meeting with Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev in the spring of 1979 in Vienna.⁸¹ How strongly is not known.

The first known substantive American intervention came at the Helsinki forum in Madrid in November 1980. At the forum Ambassador Max Kampelman pressed the Swedish ambassador to launch the discussion on Wallenberg. Immediately afterward, Kampelman spoke in support of the Swedish initiative and demanded that "the facts about [Wallenberg's] disappearance" be disclosed.⁸² The chief U.S. representative made a point of emphasizing that "the American people feel a special debt to Mr. Wallenberg and his family." (A decade later, Kampelman would again raise the issue at another Helsinki forum in Copenhagen.)

In response to the appeals by the Swedish and American ambassadors at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) talks in Madrid, USSR representatives said nothing. For more than thirty years after the Gromyko note was released, Moscow maintained the cover-up. Earlier lies to the effect that the Kremlin knew nothing about Wallenberg were replaced by a partial truth, that he indeed had been under Soviet jurisdiction. Everything else was said to be unknown and unknowable—the reasons for Wallenberg's arrest and the circumstances of his two-year incarceration and death.

The Cold War Thaws

As glasnost blossomed in the USSR and Mikhail Gorbachev himself began to call for research to fill in the "blank spots" of Soviet history, there was hope that a new day might dawn for the Wallenberg case. A

key State Department official, Richard Schifter, director of its Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, raised the matter privately with Soviet Foreign Ministry officials in Moscow.⁸³ It may have been the first time that the subject was treated directly in quiet diplomatic discourse. The Soviet officials, in response to the Schifter intervention, offered the Smolotov story and reiterated the theme that no Wallenberg file had been found. The American stood his ground. The search for the file should be pursued and, he added, there "must be people around who served at Lubyanka" during Wallenberg's incarceration. Could they not be questioned? The Soviet officials' response, Schifter reported, was "a mere shrug."

Public diplomacy in the Helsinki forum elicited a different response. In September 1988, at the Vienna review conference, the United States, following the Kampelman initiative of 1980, sought to end the silence of Soviet officials. At a plenary session, the U.S. ambassador to the Vienna talks, Warren Zimmermann, called for "a full and open accounting of that part of Soviet history affecting a man who stood for so many of the [Helsinki] ideals to which we are dedicated."⁸⁴ The British and Canadian delegation chiefs quickly joined Zimmermann in urging a Soviet investigation and disclosure. Of far greater significance was the fact that the Hungarian delegation chief, Andre Erdos, also rose to plead with Moscow, saying, "We would welcome with great emotion any new information which would shed light on [Wallenberg's] fate or complete our knowledge [about him]."⁸⁵ It was the first time that an ambassador from a communist regime belonging to the Warsaw Pact dared to challenge Moscow in a European public plenary meeting.

The smooth and affable diplomat Yuri Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation, responded by warmly praising Wallenberg's "noble activities."⁸⁶ It was the first time that a Soviet spokesman had taken such a positive view of the Swedish hero. Kashlev promised that if any documentation were uncovered by Soviet authorities concerning Wallenberg as they pursued the task of removing the stains upon Soviet history, Moscow would publish it. Several months later, optimism soared when the Soviet ambassador to Belgium, Petr Bogdanov,

attended a special ceremony sponsored by the Belgium Committee for Raoul Wallenberg honoring the Swedish hero at Brussels's Egmont Palace. Never before had a Soviet official participated in such a ceremony.⁸⁷

The event, held on January 19, 1989—the day that the Helsinki accord talks came to an end in Vienna—could not and did not go unnoticed. Wallenberg's half brother, Guy von Dardel, told the Brussels gathering that "the presence of the Soviet Ambassador is a significant gesture that ... gives us hope for a change in the Soviet attitude toward the Wallenberg case."

But hope soon crumbled. In June 1989, the issue of Wallenberg's fate surfaced for a moment at the Helsinki-sponsored conference on the "human dimension" held in Paris, but just as suddenly disappeared down history's "memory hole." At the Paris meeting, the USSR was on its very best behavior. An extraordinarily large delegation, twice the size of that of any Western power, was on hand to demonstrate affability and willingness to meet with nongovernmental representatives and any interested Westerners. On June 1, the third day of the session, the Soviet delegation held a well-attended news conference designed to show off their specialists in a variety of fields.

Not surprisingly, the delegation included a high official of Moscow's procurator general's office, Vladimir Andreyev, who was known to have investigated the Wallenberg case. In the new era of glasnost, with some "blank spots" of history being filled in, how would the mysterious tragedy of the disappearance of the extraordinary Swedish diplomat and rescuer of Jews be explained or clarified?

It was, of course, the new Soviet "voice" that spoke about Wallenberg. No longer were the comments hostile or neutral. Instead Andreyev said that the arrest and disappearance of Wallenberg constituted "a somber page in [Soviet] history," adding that the Soviets profoundly regretted his death. The words precisely echoed the language of Ambassador Kashlev, and the Russian's tone, rich in sorrowful and sympathetic expressions, was aimed at assuring Western representatives that Moscow shared the democracies' outpouring of humanitarian concern for the Swedish hero-diplomat. To reinforce

this sense of shared humanitarian interests, Andreyev commented: "Our attitude toward him is positive, [and] we understand the importance of the cause which he served."⁸⁸

But the Kremlin continued to underscore that Wallenberg was considered dead. Investigation by Andreyev's bureau demonstrated beyond any doubt—it was alleged—that he had died in prison in 1947. Persistent reports of Wallenberg's presence in the Soviet gulag were nothing but "rumors." It was apparent that the Smoltsov document remained at the heart of Moscow's position even if it was not specifically mentioned in the press conference.

The Soviet official had nothing new to offer about the circumstances of Wallenberg's arrest or death. His associate, Ambassador Kashlev, took the floor to explain that the ones who were responsible for "destroying such persons as Wallenberg also destroyed documents."⁸⁹ As if to close the book on the investigation, Kashlev added that of course Moscow would make public disclosure "if, by magic, we were to obtain new information." Magic, of course, is not easily available to judicial investigators. Andreyev sought to downplay the uniqueness of the Wallenberg case and, thereby, make it appear logical and reasonable that all the evidence could disappear. "Unfortunately, he was not alone," observed Andreyev. "Millions of others" similarly represented a "sombre page" in Soviet history. But the fact is that the Wallenberg case was unique, and it was mystifying that a careful investigation could throw absolutely no light on his plight during the two and a half years that he was said to be in the hands of his jailers—January 1945 to July 1947.

Kashlev's insistence that all the documents in the Wallenberg case, other than the alleged Smoltsov paper, had been "destroyed" was suddenly contradicted by Soviet officials themselves. Only four months after the Soviet ambassador had made his definitive remarks in Paris, the Kremlin chose to invite Wallenberg's half sister, Nina Lagergren, his half brother, Guy von Dardel, and two officials of the Swedish Wallenberg Association, Chairman Per Anger and Secretary Sonia Sonnenfeld, to Moscow. The gesture, clearly designed to placate Western concern, was in keeping with Gorbachev's new humanistic and democratic orientation.

Lo and behold, the Swedish guests were greeted on October 15, 1989, by their Soviet hosts with newly discovered materials presumably in Wallenberg's possession at the time of his arrest—his diplomatic passport, his identification card, his diary, a cigarette case, and money in old dollars and Hungarian pengos.⁹⁰ The high Soviet officials who greeted the Swedish group, Deputy Foreign Minister Valentin Nikiforov and Deputy KGB Chairman Vladimir Pirezhkov, informed the visitors that these materials had been *accidentally* found in a sack just before their arrival. However, all requests by the Swedish guests to see the person who found the sack were rejected by the KGB as "not expedient."⁹¹

The way the Wallenberg materials were allegedly discovered is hardly credible. Presumably the various articles were contained in a parcel located on a top shelf. When the shelves were being cleaned in order to transfer KGB records from wooden files to metal files, the parcel accidentally fell to the floor. Could this be the way that materials belonging to one of the gulag's prized prisoners were stored? How could official archivists not know anything about this parcel? Indeed, as Canadian researcher David Matas learned, the reported form of storage was contrary to rules and regulations of the Soviet system. Even more revealing was the fact that the various items in the parcel were not likely to have come from one file but rather from four separate files.⁹²

The Soviet officials accorded far less significance to Wallenberg's personal effects than they did to another artifact they had presumably unearthed—what they claimed was the *original* Smoltsov document (instead of the *copy* that Gromyko had given the Swedish government in April 1957). But the guests hardly found the evidence persuasive. Per Anger, the prominent former Swedish diplomat who had served with Wallenberg in Budapest, observed: "The report is not an official paper, doesn't have an official stamp.... Nobody on our part had ever believed that document."⁹³ Nina Lagergren told the press after the meeting with Soviet officials: "We simply don't believe them."

Nor would the Swedish guests accept the argument that the files on Wallenberg had been destroyed. Their skepticism was strongly reinforced by Andrei Sakharov, who, in his memoirs, categorically

rejected the Kremlin thesis that "the file of [Wallenberg's] case was destroyed"; in his view, the thesis was "most assuredly untrue."⁹⁴ He explained that NKVD and KGB investigation files are stamped "To be preserved forever"; this he learned from a key KGB official at the top secret installation in which he had previously worked. The KGB informant had supervised the sorting of files in the thirties and forties.

Another important concession was made by the USSR in the summer of 1990. It would open up its prisons and archives to an international human rights commission, the so-called "Soviet-International Commission on the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg."⁹⁵ The Soviet announcement stressed that the commission's only purpose was to "search for the truth." The head of the Ministry of Interior's prison service told commission members: "We will do everything to assist you in determining the true fate of this great man. We do not want to be on the wrong side of history."⁹⁶ Clearly, the Helsinki process was having a lingering impact.

Several of the members of the commission had strong credentials: Guy von Dardel, a physicist in Switzerland, was Raoul's half brother; Professor Marvin Makinen, a former prisoner in the Soviet Union, was head of the Department of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at the University of Chicago; Professor Irwin Cotler of the McGill University law faculty was a prominent international human rights activist; and Vadim Birstein was a Soviet scientist active in the human rights group, Memorial.

One of the commission's findings was most instructive. It concerned Vladimir prison where several former occupants of the gulag reported seeing Wallenberg. Apparently the prison, which often housed foreigners, including foreign diplomats, had a special arrangement for this category of prisoners: they were usually registered not under their own name but under a number of false identities.⁹⁷ Might not Wallenberg have been there?

But the commission also learned that the prison dossiers of foreigners at Vladimir had been transferred to KGB files in Moscow. Equally disturbing was the commission's finding that the USSR, over the past forty-five years, had never conducted an investigation about

the possibility of Wallenberg's having been at Vladimir, never examined prison archives, never interviewed any of its officials, and never interrogated possible witnesses. Soviet officials, despite pledges to cooperate, had stonewalled. Professor Makinen charged that

the investigative commission is often thwarted in following previous leads because not all documents it requests are made available. Some KGB files remain totally inaccessible to the commission. In fact, the KGB does not acknowledge that these archives exist.⁹⁸

Birstein's research into the Central State Archive and the files of Vladimir prison failed to locate any "smoking gun" with respect to the Smoltsov document. What it did illuminate was that any prisoner who shared a cell with Wallenberg evoked the deep concern of Soviet officials.⁹⁹ The case of one of his cell mates, Gustav Richter, who had been identified in a prison document as a former high-level Nazi security officer in Bucharest, clearly illustrated this point. The supervising Soviet military counterintelligence official—a Major Boris Solovov—explained that Richter had to be treated as "an especially dangerous criminal" not only because of his past but also because he "was connected to an especially important prisoner." Strikingly similar language appeared in a document about another prisoner who, while serving as a German businessman in wartime Budapest, had known Wallenberg. Once again, the German was identified as "dangerous," in part because he "was connected to an especially important prisoner."

Birstein found that Solovov, the Soviet intelligence official, was retired and still living in Moscow at the time of the research in early 1991.¹⁰⁰ But, said Birstein, he "refuses to speak to any Soviet or foreign journalists" without permission of the KGB authorities. The KGB was also an obstacle in other vital respects. When Birstein sought to examine various files known to be in the KGB records, he was abruptly denied further access to the Central State Archive. Notwithstanding glasnost and the desire to accommodate the West, independent investigations of the Wallenberg case had reached a dead end. As the gatekeeper of past security secrets, the KGB was determined to stonewall any further inquiries.

On April 24, 1991, Tass, the official Soviet press agency, made it evident that the authorities would not budge from their position that Wallenberg had died in 1947 and that nothing further need or could be said on the subject.¹⁰¹ Tass reported that the deputy head of the State Security Committee, Valery Lebedev, joined by Deputy Interior Minister Leonid Sizov and Deputy Foreign Minister Valentin Nikiforov, told Guy von Dardel and the Swedish ambassador in Moscow that Wallenberg's death in 1947 was "an irrefutable fact" and "there [was] no reason to continue to investigate his fate." Once again, high Kremlin security officials had decided to shut down any further investigation. "All the available materials" had been opened and "there is nothing more," they said. The theme of 1957 was being replayed thirty years later.

The Tass statement carried a significant omission that marked stage four of the continuing cover-up. It made no reference to the Smoltsov document. Without such a document, the question of how Wallenberg was supposed to have died remained unanswered. While Smoltsov had reported that the Swedish prisoner had died suddenly of a heart attack, the Tass statement did not mention the manner of Wallenberg's death. It was enough to say that he had died. Perhaps high Russian officials were reluctant to refer to the Smoltsov document because it had so little credibility. But this scarcely solved the problem of what happened to Wallenberg.

Not until the attempted August 1991 coup against Gorbachev did Soviet authorities make any further move to respond to Western concern. From the Kremlin's vantage point, the KGB's public gestures had sufficiently demonstrated its new posture of openness and its newly acquired commitment to legality. But that commitment, as the attempted coup in August 1991 demonstrated, was rather shallow. The head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, was himself deeply involved in the detention of Soviet president Gorbachev. Certainly, the response to inquiries about Wallenberg was in line with the ancient KGB mode of behavior. No further disclosures were to be made about the Swedish diplomat. The world would have to accept the security services' conclusions.

Hope and Disappointment

The collapse of the coup ushered in, for the moment, a new, almost revolutionary, situation. The top party apparatus, together with the KGB and military leadership, were discredited. A radical reform supporter of glasnost, Vladimir Bakatin, was brought out of retirement to head the KGB. Bakatin had served as a reformist minister of interior when some progress had been made in the Wallenberg case, but then had been fired from that post by Gorbachev in late 1990 in an effort to placate Communist Party conservatives. In assuming the new job, Bakatin warned that he was intent upon breaking up the KGB.

The new KGB chief was as good as his word. He lopped off the agency's auxiliary bodies—the border troops, armored divisions, and communications structure. He promised to reduce its size to a mere 40,000. And he would open up the KGB files to parliamentary researchers. Those interested in ascertaining the truth about Wallenberg saw the opportunity for a major breakthrough.

Indeed, it was while Bakatin was in charge, on October 30, 1991, that the KGB members of the Swedish-Soviet commission (established the previous spring) disclosed facts about the Moscow crematorium list that severely undermined the credibility of the Smoltsov document. And it was Bakatin's top aide, Nikonov, who, on November 22, openly repudiated the Smoltsov document's cremation story by suggesting that Wallenberg had been executed and had not died of a heart attack. In keeping with the KGB's new orientation under Bakatin, new KGB documents suddenly began to appear, and an intriguing bit of evidence surfaced to reveal the extraordinary lengths to which the KGB had gone to cover up every piece of information relating to Wallenberg. His name was shown to have been deliberately expunged from records by some form of inking-out process.¹⁰²

The atmosphere in Moscow was so altered after the failed coup that the possibility of solving the Wallenberg mystery was discussed at the Helsinki-sponsored "Human Dimension Conference," then in its third and final meeting in the Russian capital. (The two previous meetings had been in Paris in June 1989 and in Copenhagen in June



1990.) On September 16, Swedish ambassador Henrik Amneus told a plenary meeting that his delegation "welcomes the new helpfulness displayed by Soviet authorities to get at, and share with others, the truth of what happened to Wallenberg."¹⁰³ An American delegate, Ambassador Sam Wise, was equally enthusiastic in his concluding remarks on October 2. He commended "Soviet authorities, and particularly Mr. Bakatin," and urged that the "important investigation" be extended into every possible area: "We believe the case of Raoul Wallenberg, above all, is one which merits the fullest possible inquiry."¹⁰⁴

But the promising new era of KGB openness ended suddenly, after only a few months. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the third week of December, Boris Yeltsin, president of Russia and hero of the resistance to the August coup, became the dominant power. Gorbachev was removed along with all his appointees, including Bakatin. Yeltsin's choice as head of the newly created Russian Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs (which incorporated the KGB) was Viktor Barannikov, a career police officer with no aspirations for reform.

The reversal of the policies of Bakatin (who, as one perceptive observer emphasized, was "hated" by KGB officers) happened quickly. The Ministry of Security (the other part of the title was dropped off in January 1992) was to be augmented, not cut back. Approximately 90 to 95 percent of the middle-ranking KGB officers remained in the same positions they had held before the coup, and the policy-making collegium of the new ministry was recruited from the former and current middle ranks. Bakatin, interviewed by *Izvestiya* shortly after his removal, warned that the KGB had not changed.

With the dumping of Bakatin, access to KGB files was once again denied to outsiders. "Temporary regulations" issued by Yeltsin in January 1992 restored to the Ministry of Security almost all the powers it had previously enjoyed. In a separate decree, the Russian president also restored the old policy of tight controls over state secrets. This decree was to be operable "until the issuance of new legislation."

That the enhanced influence of the KGB in its newest guise was certain to cripple the search for truth about Wallenberg scarcely needed documenting. In fact, Russia's top archival official, Rudolf Pikhoya, the head of the Russian government's Committee for Archival Affairs, bitterly and publicly complained that the KGB had deliberately classified certain documents on Wallenberg as "operational intelligence" and thereby closed them to public scrutiny.¹⁰⁵

Further progress on the Wallenberg case appeared impossible, inhibited as it was by a security system that was primarily interested in preventing any embarrassment to its agents, past or present. Although at least twenty retired KGB officials who had dealt with Wallenberg were still alive in December 1991, there was no indication that their recollections were being tapped for public disclosure.

Nevertheless, moral concern in the West would not be stilled. When Andrei Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister, visited the European Community headquarters in Brussels in late March 1992, the EC commissioner for external relations, Frans Andriessen, told him that the community wanted the Wallenberg case to "be solved once and for all."¹⁰⁶ Andriessen's words reflected the irritation of enlightened European opinion, and a spokesman for the EC Executive Commission observed that the Russian foreign minister's answer "seems to warrant a certain optimism." Still, Kozyrev's writ did not extend to the KGB. Besides, under the growing pressure of nationalists and conservatives in Moscow, his influence diminished as threats to oust him grew. Nearly eight years after the European Community's demand for a solution to the Wallenberg case, nothing has happened to offer any encouragement.

The character of the leadership of the Ministry of Security was and remains of vital importance. The orientation of Barannikov, Yeltsin's head of the ministry, was made patently evident on February 13, 1993, when he delivered a major speech in Moscow to a national conference on crime. He placed the blame for the spread of crime in Russia upon Western intelligence services, which, before the attempted August 1991 coup, had been the traditional scapegoat for all Soviet ills. Outsiders were stunned. It was hardly accidental that Barannikov would come to see his role as similar to that played by

Yet Another Version

former KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov in the August 1991 coup. As opposition to Yeltsin's economic reforms grew during the summer of 1993, Kremlin suspicions about Barannikov grew as well. He was removed from his post in July and appears to have joined the leadership of those who threatened to topple Yeltsin in early October of the same year.

Precisely how committed the other Ministry of Security leaders were to Yeltsin was not known. That Yeltsin might opt for a major shake-up was not inconceivable. The opportunity came with the parliamentary election of December 12, 1993. To the shock and dismay of the Kremlin, Vladimir V. Zhirinovskiy and his so-called Liberal Democratic party won nearly one-quarter of the party-preference vote, a significantly larger percentage than that garnered by any other party and one that exceeded the amount won by Russia's Choice, the party that backed Yeltsin, by some eight percentage points. The Kremlin, which appeared to have been taken by almost total surprise, was embarrassed. Of what value were the internal intelligence services?

Only nine days after the election, Yeltsin abolished the Ministry of Security. Whatever his motivation, his public explanation was rather startling. The ministry was said to be "unreformable" as well as "obsolete, ineffective ... and a restraining factor for the implementation of political and economic reform." Established in its stead was a federal counterintelligence service. But it was unlikely that this would mean a change in the traditional KGB orientation. Nikolai M. Goulushko, a career KGB officer, was chosen as the head of the new Federal Security Service (FSB). Unlike Bakatin, he had not displayed any inclination for reform or for cooperation on the Wallenberg case. The lack of cooperation extended to every area. It is not surprising that, during 1998-99, all three of Yeltsin's choices for prime minister of Russia—Yevgeni Primakov, Sergei Stepashin, and Vladimir Putin—had served first in the KGB and then the FSB.

With the basic Smoltsov document on Wallenberg's reported death perceived, by the end of the Bakatin interlude, as a dubious concoction, and with the Kremlin imposing a halt on independent inquiry into archives dealing with Wallenberg, how was the government to resist the demand for information on Wallenberg's fate? An *Izvestiya* article in June 1993 showed how.

Entitled "Wallenberg Is Dead: Unfortunately, There Is Sufficient Proof," and written by journalist Ella Maksimova, the article reprinted for public view the text of a confidential letter from Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky to Vyacheslav Molotov dated May 14, 1947.¹⁰⁷ In the letter Vyshinsky outlined how, after repeated Swedish diplomatic interventions seeking information about Wallenberg, "we" in the Foreign Ministry had decided to submit to SMERSH and later to the Ministry of State Security "requests" seeking "clarification on the fate and whereabouts of Wallenberg." The letter then reported that "only in February of this year" (1947) did the chief of counterintelligence in the KGB inform "us" that Wallenberg was, in fact, in the hands of the Ministry of State Security and that Molotov would be informed "personally on further undertakings" of the ministry.

A key, if controversial, paragraph followed. While noting that the Wallenberg case "at the present day remains without progress," Vyshinsky asked Molotov "to direct Comrade Abakumov to submit a summary on the essence of the case and proposals about its liquidation." Four days later—May 18, 1947—Molotov sent the letter to Abakumov noting in the left-hand corner that he should "report to me." The word "liquidation" (*likvidatsii* in the text) was interpreted in the article to mean that Wallenberg personally was to be targeted for death.

In fact, however, the word's meaning is ambiguous. After all, the memorandum does not specifically mention the liquidation of Wallenberg. The tone of the memo suggests that Vyshinsky may have been irritated and embarrassed by the security service's two-year delay in dealing with the case and wanted it removed from the agenda. If

so, "liquidation" might refer to liquidating—that is, closing—the case. Oddly enough, shortly before the *Izvestiya* article appeared in Moscow its essence had already been published—in leading Swedish and Danish newspapers on May 30, 1993, and two days later, on June 1, in the London *Evening Standard*. According to the Swedish and Danish press accounts, the details of the Vyshinsky letter were "expected to be published in *Izvestiya* within the next few days." The headline in the *Evening Standard* was pointed: "Wallenberg Died on Stalin's Orders."¹⁰⁸ Obviously, Moscow wanted the story to be carried in leading Scandinavian and British organs. These foreign journals had a veritable scoop. Perhaps the Vyshinsky letter, with its reference to "liquidation," could convince the West that the Wallenberg case was solved.

But the *Evening Standard* story was quickly challenged by a cousin of Raoul in New York, Jacob Wallenberg, who also served as vice chairman of the Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States. An adviser to the New York relative, who was reported to have an "intimate knowledge" of the Russian language as used in "documents like" the Vyshinsky letter, believed that the word liquidation "refers to the removal of the problem, not necessarily to the man."¹⁰⁹

Jacob Wallenberg also pointed out that the Vyshinsky document was not a "new" document at all. It had been released two years earlier—on October 31, 1991—to the Swedish-Soviet commission.¹¹⁰ Jacob had access to expert members of the Swedish Working Group and probably received it from one of them. That it had not been publicized for two years is puzzling. Presumably the Kremlin made a decision in 1993, long after the Bakatin reform era, to seize upon and exploit a document that had been available for some time but that could only now fulfill some purpose. And it was clearly a purpose that served Moscow's interest, otherwise why have an *Izvestiya* exclusive released in advance to other European papers?

Yet, as Jacob Wallenberg noted, the document did not state how Raoul Wallenberg was supposed to have died. Furthermore, while informed researchers knew of Molotov's query to Abakumov, the head of the State Security Ministry, Abakumov's response was not known. From other documents, one can ascertain that the unreleased

Abakumov response is called Document 3044-A, and is presumed to have been written in July 1947. In Jacob Wallenberg's view, "this particular document could hold one of the keys to the riddle of Wallenberg's fate."¹¹¹

Three years later, Little, Brown, a leading American publisher, released a book purporting to be the memoirs of a former KGB spy-master, Pavel Sudoplatov, and an entire chapter was devoted to the Wallenberg case. The book was entitled *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster*.¹¹²

While Sudoplatov does not specify what degree of involvement he had with the Wallenberg case, he asserts that Soviet military counterintelligence sought to recruit Wallenberg as a Soviet agent, but the failure of this initiative compelled Soviet authorities to eliminate him as an "unwanted witness." This was accomplished by injection with a poison prepared by a secret toxicological laboratory next to the Lubyanka prison. The head of that laboratory—Lab X in official documents, he said—was Grigori M. Maironovsky.

Sudoplatov referred to no new documents or oral sources. Instead, he relied on "the pattern of military counterintelligence reports" on Wallenberg and his family's connections, which "made him a candidate for recruitment." This "pattern" was compounded with another "pattern": "His arrest, interrogation, and death in Lubyanka all fit the pattern of a recruitment effort gone bad."

Why were the Soviets interested in recruiting Wallenberg? Sudoplatov, in surrealistic fashion, argued that in 1945 the Kremlin leadership was manipulating the Soviet Jewish question by spreading rumors that an autonomous Jewish republic would be established in the Crimea, not Palestine, "in order to mollify our British ally." "My speculations," he said—without a shred of evidence—"are that Stalin wanted Wallenberg recruited to assist in raising the international capital that Stalin hoped to attract for postwar economic reconstruction using the bait of a Jewish homeland."

As for Wallenberg's fate, Sudoplatov contended that "probably" Wallenberg was taken to a "super secret cell" in the Soviet secret police headquarters that was supposedly monitored by the head of the toxicological laboratory, Maironovsky. There, "my best estimate,"



Sudoplatov went on, was that "Wallenberg was killed by Maironovsky who was ordered to inject him with poison under the guise of medical treatment." Sudoplatov cited the evidence produced by Ella Maksimova in her *Izvestiya* article, carrying the text of Vyshinsky's confidential memo to Molotov on May 14, 1947, in which the term "liquidation" appeared. Sudoplatov commented: "To me it is clear that this was not a suggestion to close the case but one to eliminate Wallenberg."

While not focusing specifically on the book's discussion of the Wallenberg case, a number of scholars—Thomas Powers, George Kennan, and Walter Laqueur—have cast extremely grave doubt on Sudoplatov's version of events, with Powers suggesting that the work might have been written by others.¹¹³ Even the noted historian Robert Conquest, who wrote a foreword to the memoir, observed that Sudoplatov displayed "imperfect knowledge and imperfect deduction in the period of his own experience."¹¹⁴ The book's discussion of Wallenberg, in the absence of supporting sources, cannot be relied upon.

The most recent scholarly study of the Wallenberg case, partially funded by the Canadian government, was produced in 1998 by David Matas. Matas sought information from the Swedish-Russian commission on the case, which was a continuation of the Soviet-International Commission launched in 1990. Matas quickly found that whereas the Swedish members were "open and accessible," the Russian representatives were uncooperative.¹¹⁵ While Matas was in Moscow in 1997-98, the Russian Working Group was comprised of four persons, two of whom were archivists from two national security agencies. When he sought meetings with those officials through the assistance of the Canadian embassy in Moscow, he was told by his host in the Foreign Ministry, who was head of its Swedish-Finnish section, that meetings would be "inappropriate" as "they were in possession of confidential information" that could not be disclosed to someone outside of the bilateral discussions between Sweden and Russia.

The Foreign Ministry host further informed Matas that the head of the Russian Working Group had been reassigned as ambas-

sador to Sweden and, therefore, was removed from his chairmanship. There was no indication who would replace him. The head of the Foreign Ministry's Department of International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights was equally uncooperative. Matas was convinced that their conversation was being taped—the office in which they met had "a definite electronic echo"—as the human rights official argued that current research efforts concerning Wallenberg constituted "a wild goose chase." It was the Canadian's impression that the human rights official was anxious "to get his own remarks on tape...."¹¹⁶

From all the nongovernmental Russian researchers with whom Matas spoke came the same kind of message: "They had got no cooperation from Russian archival officials, and I could expect none."¹¹⁷ The former KGB (now FSB) archives were kept in closed stacks, he learned. A particularly interesting suggestion was made by one Russian researcher: if the Canadian government were to make a "formal request" for cooperation by the Russian security service in archival research regarding Wallenberg, it might be granted.

From the beginning of his research project, Matas would hear virtually every month that the Swedish Working Group, jointly with the Russian Group, would be releasing a report within, at most, two months. The rumors became a "mirage." His explanation was devastating:

The Swedish working group was never quite ready to release its report, because the Russian side was so lethargic in answering requests for information. The Russian lethargy was met with Swedish politeness. Swedish officials have done little to press Russian officials who did not provide information that was requested of them. Who denied access to archives or who provided information only after lengthy delays.¹¹⁸

America Must Act

If Moscow is ever to disclose further information about Wallenberg, it most likely will be the result of high-level diplomatic pressure from Washington. Boris Yeltsin was remarkably cooperative on the subject of missing American prisoners of war—an issue that surfaced early in



1992 as a spin-off of the Vietnam missing-in-action problem that had traumatized Congress and the Bush administration. After Yeltsin, in a special address to a joint session of Congress that year, had committed himself to "no more lies" in dealing with the United States, one of his top military aides, Dimitri Volkogonov, conducted an extensive investigation in the Russian archives. He communicated his detailed findings in person to the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs on November 12, 1992.¹¹⁹

Major disclosures of NKVD or KGB crimes that relate to foreign matters have been extremely rare and have occurred only when they served broader Kremlin interests. Pressure exerted at the highest level by a government whose favor Moscow is anxious to sustain or win can prompt the Kremlin to take account of these broader interests. A case in point is the Katyn forest massacre of thousands of Polish army officers by the NKVD in 1940. Denial of Soviet responsibility was a constant feature of Soviet diplomacy for fifty years.¹²⁰ As late as 1990, a high Party Central Committee official, Valentin Falin, advised Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev to tell the Poles that a thorough search of the archives had produced no solid evidence about those responsible for the massacre.

But Gorbachev, under pressure from Polish communist leaders trying to satisfy the nationalist longings of their own constituencies, committed himself to airing hidden documents. No doubt, he thought that it would help the Polish communists maintain their moral authority and keep Poland aligned with Russia. The truth about Katyn was officially acknowledged on the occasion of President Wojciech Jaruzelski's visit to Moscow in April 1990. Gorbachev expressed "profound regret" for "one of the gravest crimes of Stalinism." It wasn't until two years later that President Yeltsin presented Polish president Lech Walesa with the full set of documents concerning Katyn. The disclosure was part of Yeltsin's war against the Soviet Communist Party and Gorbachev, and it included a revelation about Gorbachev's complicity in the cover-up.

If Washington were to press Moscow on the Wallenberg issue, it could make a difference. It is now fifty-five years since a U.S. secretary of state expressed, however indirectly, any concern about Wallen-

berg's disappearance. Since then there has been no indication that a U.S. president or his secretary of state considers the issue a priority. The fate of Wallenberg has been discussed between the United States and Russia at lower diplomatic levels and largely in the context of the Helsinki process, which is designed to inform the public of gross human rights violations, not to produce an immediate substantive result.

America's unique "honorary citizen" deserves more. With the fifty-fifth anniversary of Wallenberg's disappearance into the notorious Soviet gulag upon us and the new millennium having begun, it is time for an administration that claims to be committed to human rights and, in numerous instances, has championed human rights, finally to act on the Wallenberg case. The ethical imperative must be joined to power to finally ascertain what happened to one of the twentieth century's moral giants and why. A similar imperative obliges Russia, the successor state to the USSR, to disclose all evidence about this egregious crime.

America would not be the first non-Swedish government to raise the Wallenberg case at the highest level. Then-chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany took such action in 1989.¹²¹ Per Anger, Wallenberg's old associate, asked Kohl to intervene with Soviet president Gorbachev. Anger was given an extension phone as Kohl called Gorbachev. Kohl, as reported by Anger, pleaded with the Kremlin ruler to "let that old man go," but Gorbachev "had no answer." Afterward Anger went to Moscow to appeal personally to the Soviet leader. The result was not productive. Gorbachev, said Anger, "showed no interest" and "implied that he had no control over the KGB." This was still two years before Bakatin took control of the KGB.

Extraordinarily impressive has been the intervention of the Canadian government. It began with the unanimous passage of a bill by Canada's House of Commons on December 10, 1985, proclaiming Raoul Wallenberg an "honorary citizen" of Canada.¹²² This action was taken four years after the identical decision of the U.S. Congress, but, significantly, the Canadian government has used the "honorary citizen" device to intervene with the Kremlin, a step so far avoided by Washington.

The House of Commons proclamation became a trigger for vigorous demands. At the Vienna forum of the CSCE process in 1988 where U.S. ambassador Zimmerman had initiated the discussion about Wallenberg, Canada's representative, Ambassador William Bauer, was especially tough. He stressed that the Soviet Union had never provided full information about what happened to Wallenberg and then commented: "few people will be satisfied until the evasions, the ambiguities and obfuscations surrounding his case are removed, once and for all."¹²³

On October 25, 1989, the Canadian embassy in Stockholm, in a telex to Ottawa, asserted that it was quite certain that Wallenberg did not die in Lubyanka in 1947 as the Soviets claimed. The embassy then added this assertion:

The Soviets also know that Raoul Wallenberg is an honorary Canadian citizen. They also know that Canada frequently champions humanitarian causes relating to the USSR. Thus to ignore the Raoul Wallenberg case now that it has been reopened could give inappropriate signals to the Soviets.¹²⁴

Therefore, suggested the telex. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and his senior officials who were traveling to the USSR should raise the Wallenberg case.

On his way to Moscow, Mulroney stopped off in Stockholm and met with Swedish prime minister Ingvar Carlsson. After emphasizing Wallenberg's honorary citizenship, he told the Swedish prime minister that he was intent upon having the issue raised when he was in Moscow. Presumably the Swede raised no objections, as the following week a high official of Canada's External Affairs Ministry raised the issue with the Soviet foreign minister.

On September 5, 1996, Canada's minister of foreign affairs and international trade, Lloyd Axworthy, announced that his ministry would help subsidize a research investigation by a human rights specialist, David Matas, to determine the fate and whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg.¹²⁵ In making the announcement, Axworthy declared: "Canadians attach real importance to the extraordinary heroism of Mr. Wallenberg and the inspiration it offers to champions of human rights...." Beside the financial assistance, the Department of Foreign

Affairs called upon its ambassadors in Europe to aid Matas in his inquiry. Such diplomatic assistance gave Matas "access and status with government officials," he reported, especially in Moscow where the meetings he had with Russian government officials "were arranged by the Canadian embassy."¹²⁶ Matas's "basic conclusion" in 1998, after a detailed summary and analysis of the evidence, was that "the fate of Wallenberg is not yet known, but that it is knowable," provided the documentary sources are fully revealed.

If Canada could engage in this vigorous type of intervention on the ground that Wallenberg was an honorary citizen of that country, why should the U.S. government not do the same? After all, it granted honorary citizenship to Wallenberg before the Canadians did. And far more important, the United States, through its War Refugee Board, had hired Wallenberg, arranged for him to be placed in the Swedish legation in Budapest, and paid for his operations. To all intents and purposes, he was employed by the U.S. government, which bestowed upon him the highest accolades. And it goes without saying that the United States has far greater leverage than either Sweden or Canada. During the cold war it may have made some sense to allow Sweden to take the lead in engaging the Soviets with respect to the Wallenberg case. Currently, however, this second-fiddle role for the U.S. appears anachronistic.

To be sure, the American position with respect to Wallenberg has never been one of neutrality. With the strong encouragement of Congressman Lantos, the U.S. Postal Service on May 8, 1997, unveiled a stamp honoring Wallenberg. Precisely because neither Lantos nor many of the supporters of this distinctive honor were certain that the Swedish hero was dead, the Postal Service carefully crafted a statement that avoided describing the stamp as "commemorative" which would have implied that he was dead.¹²⁷ (The Postal Service rarely issues stamps honoring living persons.)

Two years before the Wallenberg stamp appeared, Washington—again encouraged by Lantos—held a special ceremony for the hero as a new bronze bust of him, sculpted by an Israeli artist, was installed in the Capitol Rotunda. Only seven other non-Americans have been honored with busts in the Rotunda. Large numbers of leg-

islator, government officials, and cultural leaders attended the ceremony, which featured music, poetry, and speeches in honor of Wallenberg. Still, the current administration, like previous administrations, appears reluctant to challenge Russia on what is surely a great American humanitarian concern.

What happened to Wallenberg—and why—is among the crucial unanswered questions about the Holocaust. Significantly, the street next to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington is named after Raoul Wallenberg. Must it necessarily be assumed that the Kremlin, prodded by the successors to the NKVD and the KGB, will reject a U.S. presidential demand? On November 18, 1998, at a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Vice President Albert Gore gave the then Russian prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, a letter from President Bill Clinton formally asking him to locate American prisoners of war from the Vietnamese conflict.¹²⁸ Unlike similar previous attempts by American officials on POWs that had been brusquely rejected by Russia, Primakov chose to accept Clinton's letter and promised to revive an earlier probe. Might he or a later prime minister respond favorably to a vigorous demand by Washington on Wallenberg? Clinton, back on May 29, 1995, vowed that he would "leave no stone unturned" to ascertain the truth about the missing-in-action American prisoners of war.¹²⁹ When Wallenberg was brought to Lubyanka, he was given a card identifying him as a "prisoner of war." Could he not be considered a missing American prisoner of war?

Moscow's responsibility is great. After all, it is the Kremlin that perpetrated a vast deception about the Wallenberg case. In the Stalinist epoch, the deception moved through two contradictory stages: at first, the Kremlin—admitting to neither the kidnapping of the Swedish diplomat nor to his incarceration in the Lubyanka prison—acknowledged that he was in Soviet hands. Two years later, it claimed that he was totally unknown to Soviet authorities. The third stage came a decade later, during the Khrushchev era, with the acknowledgment of Wallenberg's imprisonment at Lubyanka and the assertion that he had died of a heart attack in 1947. At the core of this revelation, which was accompanied by the flat assertion that no other information existed, was the highly questionable Smoltsov document.

with its puzzling reference to cremation. Stage three was to last nearly a quarter of a century, until it was replaced by the fourth stage, during the high point of the glasnost era. Although it was implied that the Smoltsov document was no longer considered valid, adherence to the document's main thesis was maintained: Wallenberg was said to be dead. But how his death occurred remained a mystery.

Even as the process of disclosure disposes of the more flagrant falsehoods, the deception continues. To this day, Moscow has deliberately concealed vital documentation that would answer the two central questions: Why was Wallenberg, in violation of international law, apprehended and kept in detention? And precisely what happened to him? His half brother, Guy von Dardel, continues to insist that "our duty is to find the facts."¹³⁰ The unveiling of the truth about past crimes is of fundamental importance to the successor states of former totalitarian societies whose very political culture, as George Orwell made plain, ineluctably had incorporated lies, distortions, and deceptions. Accountability for crimes is essential. Full acceptance into the international community of free nations requires that successor regimes make a clean break with the past. Cover-ups must come to an end.

The historic significance of the Wallenberg case transcends its momentary anniversary commemoration. Emblematic of the traumatic horrors of our past epoch—disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, and massacre—is the attempted cover-up of such horrors. In an era when the features of the Holocaust, against which Wallenberg so valiantly struggled, find a shattering, if partial, reflection in the tragedies of Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor, the international community, moving into a new millennium, must be guided by the ethical imperative of full disclosure and the rendering of justice.

Endnotes

1. UN Press Release, SG/SM/6539, Oct. 15, 1997, p. 3. Several months earlier, Annan officially attended an unveiling in London of a mon-



ument to Wallenberg. The UN secretary-general had a personal interest in Wallenberg, as Raoul was the uncle of Annan's wife, a point he made in his speech.

2. The comments of Wiesel are on the back cover of Kati Marton, *Wallenberg: Missing Hero* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1995). The book was first published by Random House in New York in 1982.

3. Per Anger, "Afterword," in Harvey Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, rev. ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1995), p. 222. The "Afterword" was written in January 1981. Anger served with Wallenberg in the Swedish legation in Budapest. Later, he became a top-level Swedish ambassador and Foreign Ministry official.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

8. Elenore Lester and Frederick E. Werbell, "The Lost Hero of the Holocaust: The Search for Sweden's Raoul Wallenberg," *The New York Times Magazine*, Mar. 30, 1980, pp. 20-28, 32-39, 62-63. This article was inserted by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan into the *Congressional Record* - Senate, Apr. 10, 1980, pp. S3782-3785.

9. Marton, *Wallenberg*, p. 111.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

12. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 37.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

15. Lester and Werbell, "Lost Hero of the Holocaust."

16. *Ibid.*

17. Elenore Lester, *Wallenberg: The Man in the Iron Web* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 9.

18. Marton, *Wallenberg*, pp. 142-43.

19. John Bierman, *Righteous Gentile: The Story of Raoul Wallenberg, Missing Hero of the Holocaust* (New York: Viking Press, 1981), pp. 117-19.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

21. The document is to be found in Marvin Makinen, *The Search for Raoul Wallenberg* (Chicago: n. p., June 30, 1994), mimeo, Appendix II, p. 36. In part, the Makinen document was an appeal for funds to conduct further research.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

23. Marton, *Wallenberg*, p. 158.

24. Esther Fein, "Soviets Show Wallenberg's Jail Card," *New York Times*, Oct. 21, 1989, p. 3.

25. For the significance of the U.S. War Refugee Board, see William Korey, "The Case of Raoul Wallenberg," *Freedom Review*, no. 4 (July-August 1994): 41-43.

26. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, pp. 31-37.

27. David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashin, and George Bailey, *Background Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 4.

28. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 26. Also see Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, pp. 32-33.

29. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 27.

30. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, p. 34.

31. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 28.

32. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, pp. 21-25.

33. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 64.

34. Marton, *Wallenberg*, p. 96.

35. The letter, dated June 15, 1945, is in *Raoul Wallenberg: Letters and Dispatches, 1924-1944* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1994), pp. 268-70.

36. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, p. 189.

37. Serge Schmemmann, "Soviet Files Show K.G.B. Cover-up in the Disappearance of Wallenberg," *New York Times*, Dec. 28, 1991, p. 6.

38. *Ibid.*

39. David Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* (Winnipeg, Manitoba: n. p., Sept. 8, 1998), p. 12. This study was privately printed.

40. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, p. 124.

41. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 112.

42. Marton, *Wallenberg*, p. 160.

43. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, p. 124.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-30.

47. The communication was to John Pehle, director of the War Refugee Board in Washington. It is cited in an article in *Dagens Nyheter*, July 17, 1997, written by Suzanne Berger, an independent journalist working in Washington who has done considerable research on the Wallenberg case. She shared her English translation of the article with the author.

48. Another article by Suzanne Berger, published *ibid.*, May 11, 1997.

49. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 145.

50. *Ibid.*

51. Berger's article in *Dagens Nyheter*, May 11, 1997.

52. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 148.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-49.

54. Ibid., p. 148.
55. Mäkinen, *Search for Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 43.
56. Ibid.
57. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, p. 135.
58. This document, an exact copy of the original, was made available to the author by a Wallenberg researcher in Budapest, Maria Ember, on Dec. 10, 1993. It had been originally given by the Swedish Foreign Ministry to the organizers of an exhibition on Raoul Wallenberg held in Budapest in 1992.
59. Vadim Birstein, *Secret Cell Number Seven: The Mysterious Fate of an "Extremely Important Prisoner"* (New York: n.p., 1991), mimeo. Birstein made this privately produced document available to the author. A shorter version appeared in the independent Soviet newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Apr. 25, 1991.
60. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, pp. 150-60.
61. Ibid., pp. 151-52.
62. Information on the various drafts was found and made available by Canadian human rights researcher David Matas on a grant from the Canadian government's Department of Foreign Affairs. See Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* pp. 9-10.
63. Ibid., p. 10. Matas's source for this observation is the report of the Soviet-International Joint Commission on the Fate and Whereabouts of Raoul Wallenberg, Sept. 5, 1990, particularly Principal Findings one and two.
64. Ibid., p. 9.
65. The Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States, Press Release, Dec. 4, 1991, p. 1.
66. Ibid., p. 2.
67. Ibid., p. 3.
68. Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* p. 11.
69. Birstein, *Secret Cell Number Seven*, pp. 7-11.
70. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, pp. 158-65.
71. Details appeared in an article in the Swedish paper *Svenska Dagbladet*, June 2, 1993. The article was translated by Jacob Wallenberg and made available to the author by the Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States. The headline in English translation reads: "Soviet Ordered Disclaimer."
72. Mäkinen, *Search for Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 12; *Dagens Nyheter*, May 11, 1977; and The Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States, Press Release, Dec. 4, 1991.
73. Lester and Werbell, "Lost Hero of the Holocaust," pp. 134-35; Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* p. 27.
74. Schmemmann, "Soviet Files Show K.G.B. Cover-up."
75. Lester and Werbell, "Lost Hero of the Holocaust," p. 136; Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 148.
76. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, pp. 190-92. The general outline of the episode was confirmed in the author's interview with Thomas Pickering on Apr. 24, 1997. Pickering, at the time, was acting under secretary of state. Also see William Korey, "Perspective on Raoul Wallenberg: Honor This Hero by Getting the Truth About His Fate," *Los Angeles Times*, July 4, 1994 (Commentary Section, B7).
77. Author's interview with Thomas Pickering, Oct. 15, 1999, conducted by telephone. A biographer of Wallenberg stated that it was a panel of five State Department officers who prepared the memorandum; see Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 165. Pickering did not recall any such panel. Rosenfeld drew his information from material acquired by a Swedish radio reporter.
78. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982); and Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999).
79. Interview with Pickering, Oct. 15, 1999. In that interview, he told the author at the very end: "Thank you for continuing to pursue this."
80. Bierman, *Righteous Gentile*, p. 197; and Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 38.
81. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 38.
82. William Korey, *The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, The Helsinki Process and American Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 270.
83. Letter from Richard Schifter to the author, Sept. 21, 1994. He noted that general guidelines on human rights issues were established by Secretary of State George Shultz. On Jan. 17, 1984, a statement of Shultz was publicly read by U.S. ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. He said: "The Kremlin has a moral obligation to put to rest, once and for all, the questions that continue to arise about Raoul Wallenberg." He went on to call for "a full accounting" of his fate. See Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. xxv.
84. Korey, *Promises We Keep*, p. 271.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. William Korey, "Will Little Signs Add Up to a Real Soviet Thaw on the Wallenberg Case?" *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 27, 1989.
88. Korey, *Promises We Keep*, p. 303.
89. Ibid.
90. Esther Fein, "Soviets Give Kin Wallenberg Papers," *New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1989; and David Remnick, "Wallenberg's Papers Returned: Soviets Insist He Died in 1947," *Washington Post*, Oct. 17, 1989.

91. Birstein, *Secret Cell Number Seven*, p. 4.
92. Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* p. 13.
93. Helen Davis, "New Optimism on Fate of Wallenberg," *Jewish Week* (New York), Oct. 20, 1989; Remnick, "Wallenberg's Papers Returned."
94. Andrei Sakharov, *Memoirs* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), p. 531.
95. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, pp. xxx - xxxi; Bill Keller, "Soviets Open Prisons and Records to Inquiry on Wallenberg's Fate," *New York Times*, Aug. 28, 1990.
96. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. xxx.
97. Makinen, *Search for Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 8; Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. xxx. This appeared in a summary of the commission's findings on Sept. 9, 1990.
98. Rosenfeld, *Raoul Wallenberg*, p. xxxi.
99. Birstein, *Secret Cell Number Seven*, pp. 7-9.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
101. Tass, Apr. 24, 1991. The headline read: "Meeting with Swedish Ambassador in Moscow."
102. Schmemmann, "Soviet Files Show K.G.B. Cover-up."
103. "Statement by Ambassador Henrik Amneus of the Swedish Delegation to the Moscow CSCE Meeting," Sept. 16, 1991.
104. "Statement by Ambassador Sam Wise of the U.S. Delegation to the Moscow CSCE Meeting," Oct. 2, 1991.
105. *Sobesednik*, no. 39, 1991. For background, see Vera Tolz, "Access to KGB and CPSU Archives in Russia," *RFE/RL Research Report*, no. 16 (Apr. 17, 1992): 1-7.
106. *Jewish Week* (New York), Apr. 3-9, 1992, citing the Jewish Telegraphic Agency.
107. Ella Maksimova, "Vallenberg Merv: K Sozhalyeniyu Dokazatel'stv Dostatochno," *Izvestiya*, June 3, 1995, p. 5.
108. Letter by Jacob Wallenberg, vice chairman of the Raoul Wallenberg Committee of the United States, to the editor of the London *Evening Standard*, June 4, 1993, made available to the author by the Wallenberg Committee. The Swedish newspaper in which the story appears was *Svenska Dagbladet* and the Danish organ was *Berlingske Tidende*.
109. *Ibid.* A similar interpretation was given to the author by Catherine Fitzpatrick, who has been a professional translator of major Russian books and is now director of the International League for Human Rights. In her linguistic judgment, "liquidation" in the context of the quote refers to the case, not the person of Wallenberg.

110. The full text is in the article by Ella Maksimova in *Izvestiya*, June 3, 1993.

111. Jacob Wallenberg letter to the editor of the London *Evening Standard*, June 4, 1993. On July 7, 1947, Vyshinsky wrote to Abakumov asking where Wallenberg was taken under the protection of the Soviet military, to what places he was subsequently moved, whether there was fighting, or bombing in the area, whether he had freedom of movement, and whether he had been in touch with members of the Swedish legation. Answers to these queries were "important" so that he (Vyshinsky) would be able to figure out a reply to the questions posed by the Swedish government. See Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* p. 8.

112. Pavel Sudoplatov and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness—A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994). The chapter was entitled "Raoul Wallenberg, Lab X, and Other Special Tasks," pp. 265-84.

113. Thomas Powers, "Were the Atomic Scientists Spies?" *The New York Review of Books*, June 9, 1994, pp. 10-17; George Kennan, "In Defense of Oppenheimer," *ibid.*, June 23, 1994, p. 8; Walter Laqueur, "Red Herings," *The New Republic*, June 6, 1994, pp. 38-41. Sudoplatov's views on Wallenberg did find favor with Kati Marton, a biographer of the Swedish diplomat. See Kati Marton, "The Liquidation of Raoul Wallenberg: At Last, the True Story Is Out," *Washington Post*, Jan. 22, 1995; and "Afterword" in her book, *Wallenberg*, pp. 219-25.

114. Robert Conquest, "Foreword," in Sudoplatov, *Special Tasks*, pp. xi - xii.

115. Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* pp. 15-17, 29.

116. Internet communication from David Matas to the author, September 1998. The computerized version is in the author's possession.

117. Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* p. 16.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 60. Ambassador Jan Lundvik, coordinator of the Swedish Foreign Ministry's efforts within the Working Group, informed the author by telephone on Nov. 9, 1999, that the commission plans to complete all its field work by spring 2000, and that each of the Working Groups is expected to prepare its final report by the end of the year.

119. *New York Times*, Sept. 5, 1993.

120. Louisa Vinton, "The Karyn Documents: Politics and History," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2:4 (January 1993): 19-30; and Vera Tolz, "The Karyn Documents and the CPSU Hearings," *ibid.*, 1:44 (Nov. 6, 1992): 27-33. Also, see *New York Times*, Apr. 14, 1990.

121. "The Angel Was a Spy. New Evidence: Sweden's Raoul Wallenberg was a U.S. Espionage Asset," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 13,

1996, p. 51. Prof. Marvin Makinen refers to the Kohl intervention in his *The Search for Raoul Wallenberg*, p. 6. Makinen adds that Moscow's October 1989 invitation to the half sister and half brother of Wallenberg, along with Anger, to come to the Soviet capital, resulted "particularly from the insistence of Chancellor Kohl."

122. Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* p. 62.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid., pp. 62-63.

125. "Canada to Contribute to Research on Raoul Wallenberg," News Release, Canada Department of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 5, 1996.

126. Matas, *What Happened to Raoul Wallenberg?* p. 3.

127. Michael Baadke, "U.S. Stamp for Wallenberg in 1997," *Linn's Stamp News*, May 20, 1996, p. 2; "Stamp of Approval," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 13, 1996, p. 28.

128. "World Briefing," *New York Times*, Nov. 19, 1998. The item is taken from an Associated Press story.

129. Todd Purdum, "Clinton Promises Full Effort to Account for M.I.A.'s," *New York Times*, May 30, 1995.

130. William Korey, "A Stamp for an Unanswered Letter," *Hadassah Magazine*, January 1997, p. 11.



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

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Gezelius/Tojzner-Glückman

Utrikesdepartementet

UD/EC/Amb J Lundvik
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Nina Lagergren,
Guy von Dardel


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Raoul Wallenberg - förlängd tidsfrist

Skrivelse 122 A
(2 bil.)

I bifogad note från det ryska militära chefs-
åklagarämbete meddelas att Guy von Dardels
andra skrivelse beträffande rehabilitering av Raoul
Wallenberg har behandlats. Det militära chefs-
åklagarämbetet låter meddela att den ryska federala
säkerhetstjänsten fått tidsfristen för brottmåls-
rekonstruktionen rörande bl a Raoul Wallenberg
uppskjuten till den 10 mars 2000.


Sven Hirdman

MD



ГЕНЕРАЛЬНАЯ ПРОКУРАТУРА
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

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ГЛАВНАЯ
ВОЕННАЯ ПРОКУРАТУРА

«06» января 2000 г. г. Милитара huvudprokuratoriet
№ 7у-496-99 к жолд к Валленбергу

103160, Москва, К-160

К н/исх. 7у-173/99 от 26.08.99 г.

В Главной военной прокуратуре рассмотрено повторное обращение гражданина Швеции Ги фон Дарделя по вопросу о реабилитации его брата - Валленберга Рауля.

Прошу уведомить заинтересованных лиц, что срок восстановления органами ФСБ России уголовного дела в отношении Валленберга Р. и других руководством ГВП продлен до 10 марта 2000 года.

~~О результатах будет сообщено дополнительно.~~

С уважением,

Начальник отдела
реабилитации

А.В.Чичуга

При ответе ссылаться
на наш номер и дату

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
Moskva
Magnus Dahnberg

ÖVERSÄTTNING
2000-01-20

Översättning från ryska

RYSKA FEDERATIONENS
RIKSÅKLAGARÄMBETE

**MILITÄRA
CHEFSÅKLAGARÄMBETET**

6 JANUARI 2000
Nr 7u-496-99

Ref till vårt nr 7u-173/99 av den 26 augusti 1999

Militära chefåklagarämbetet har behandlat svenske medborgaren Guy von Dardels andra skrivelse rörande rehabilitering av hans bror Raoul Wallenberg.

Härmed får jag anhålla att berörda personer informeras om att tidsfristen för den ryska federala säkerhetstjänsten när det gäller att rekonstruera brottmålet mot bl. a. Raoul Wallenberg av ledningen för militära chefåklagarämbetet har förlängts till den 10 mars 2000.

Vi återkommer med information om utgången av ärendet.

Med vänlig hälsning
/namnteckning/
A. V. Tjitjuga



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
BUDAPEST

2000-01-17

aa
P

Ambassadör Jan Lundvik

Utrikesdepartementet

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr. 17/001		
2000-01-21		
AVD. P	GR. 2	MÅL Eu

(EC)

Raoul Wallenberg


1 bil

Broder,

En artikel ur The Hungarian Observer, 1999/1, nummer 12, med rubriken "Life-saving passports" bifogas. Jag skickar den också till Per Anger.

*Besta hälsningar och god fortsättning på 2000
Tillgivne Sören*

Sören Lundvall



The travelling exhibition itself can now be seen in Geneva, Switzerland.

Guest of honour on the occasion was Ambassador Per Anger of Sweden, who revisited Buda-pest expressly to attend the exhibition. As a young diplomat posted to the Hungarian capital, Mr. Anger had assisted Raoul Wallenberg in the heroic efforts to provide passports and other official documents for Jews in Hungary, many of whom were enabled in this way to escape deportation and the gas chamber.

It is worthy of note that one of the life-saving diplomats of the times was a Hungarian, Pál Komor, honorary consul during

LIFE-SAVING PASSPORTS


There will be a special exhibition on April 2, 2000 in the UN headquarters in New York to pay tribute to the diplomats who provided passports and visas during the Holocaust to tens of thousands of Jewish people, helping them escape the horrors of being Jews or of Jewish extraction. The exhibition will focus on this epic work by Budapest embassies of neutral countries, and will also revive the story of the some ten thousand German Jews who were helped to land in Shanghai at the end of 1941 on their way to safety. Eric Saul, Director of the San Francisco Holocaust Educational Center, is already making arrangements for the success of the event.

The first exhibition in honour of the dauntless life-saving diplomats was held in the early 1990s in Tokyo and San Francisco. The next time it was in 1998 at the Yad Vashem centre in Jerusalem that the copies of the surviving documents were put on display.

In May this year the material was shown at the National Széchényi Library in Budapest. The exhibition had been initiated and organized in the main by János Hóvári, who was until 1998 Councillor at the Hungarian Embassy in Tel Aviv.

the critical period of Hungary in Shanghai. (Komor's adventurous life will be the subject of a separate article in a later issue of *The Hungarian Observer*.)

This autumn, Mr. Anger came back to Budapest again, to take part in the presentation of his book *With Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest*, which was published in Hungarian by Belvárosi könyvkiadó in October 1999, with András Mezei as the responsible publisher. An excerpt from the book follows.



Wallenberg's file from the KGB archives

WALLENBERGS FAST ACTS HIS UNIQUE ACTION PLAN

Wallenberg's words, the last time we saw each other, were typical of him and of the seriousness with which he took his assignment. "I'd never be able to go back to Stockholm without knowing inside myself I'd done all a man could do to save as many Jews from deportation. Many are the stories of how he could pop up on the most unexpected occasions and succeed in preventing the removal of Jews with protective passports, or to stop the Arrow Cross men from forcing their way into the Swedish houses." "It was often he who was the prime mover in the neutral legations' protests against the inhuman treatment of the Jews."

Wallenberg always had people on watch who could warn him in time to get to the stations before the train's departure. On one occasion, he arrived with several long lists of the holders of protective passports and demanded in an authoritative tone to check whether any such persons had by mistake been taken abroad. The Germans were taken by surprise



Per Anger, left, Mrs. Anger and President Árpád Göncz

and, right under their noses, Wallenberg pulled out a large number of Jews. Many of them had no passport at all, only various papers in the Hungarian language – drivers licenses, vaccination records or tax receipts – that the Germans did not understand. The bluff succeeded.

Another time, when I was there, the Germans tried to stop us with guns. But we stood our ground, showed our Swedish diplomatic passports, and were able to leave with our charges.

One day when Wallenberg was elsewhere, I rushed out to a station from which a trainload of Jews was about to depart. There was no time to debate with the Germans. I explained that a terrible mistake had been made, since apparently they were about to deport Jews who had Swedish protective passports. Should they not be released immediately, I would make sure that Veessenmayer was informed. The German train commander did not dare to risk being reported to the dreaded Veessenmayer. I went into the cars to call the roll, but found only

two Jews with protective passports. However, with the help of the Hungarian police officer there, Batizfalvy (who secretly cooperated with Raoul Wallenberg and me), I succeeded, despite the SS commandant's orders, in freeing 150 Jews from the station even though 148 had no protective supports.

Wallenberg sometimes arranged for special expeditions in which Jews who looked Aryan, dressed in Arrow Cross uniforms, raided camps and prisons and on several occasions succeeded in freeing a large number of Jews on the pretext that they were being taken away to deportation.

Yet it was not through the kind of personal interventions just described that Wallenberg made his greatest contribution. It was as a negotiator that he achieved his greatest results. He was the driving force behind the agreements entered into with the Arrow Cross regime concerning their respecting not only the 5,000 Swedish protective passports but also corresponding documents of other neutral lega-

A GREAT SWEDE

Born in Göteborg in 1913, Per Anger completed his studies at the University of Upsala in 1939, and entered diplomatic service in 1940. From his first post in Berlin he was transferred in 1942 to the Swedish Legation in Budapest in the rank of attaché.

In the capital city Per Anger soon joined in the efforts of some of the neutral countries and the International Red Cross to save Hungarian Jews from slave labour and deportation.

When Raoul Wallenberg arrived in Budapest in 1944, the two men, now both working at the Swedish Legation, began to organize and execute rescue operations together.

After the war, Anger was posted in Cairo, Addis Ababa, Paris and Vienna, until he was appointed Consul General in San Francisco, a post where he spent five years. In 1970 he became the Swedish ambassador to Australia. In 1976 another ambassadorial post followed: in Canada. In 1979 he returned to Sweden as a diplomat of considerable repute.

For 15 years Per Anger was president of the Swedish Wallenberg Society, making tremendous efforts to find out just what had happened to his colleague who had been taken from Budapest by the Red Army in the winter of 1945. That was the only thing known about Wallenberg's fate, and Per Anger was now enlisting the help of the world in tracing him and getting him home.

In 1943, Per Anger married Elena Wilkström. They have a daughter and two sons.

In 1944, President Árpád Göncz honoured the Swedish diplomat for his humanitarian efforts beyond the call of duty and for the readiness to risk his own life in the work he had set for himself in 1944.



REGERINGSKANSLIET

TELEFAX

Sid. 1 (1)

2000-01-21

P 2 Eu'

EC

Utrikesdepartementet

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)

Jan Lundvik

Telefon 08-405 3114

Ambassaden Riga

Dnr 41

Raoul Wallenberg: William Koreys monografi

1 bil

Ambassadören från Lundvik.

Här följer texten till William Koreys på uppdrag av AJC utarbetade monografi över Raoul Wallenberg.

Cabinet

Exp. 2000-01-21/APP

Postadress
103 39 STOCKHOLM

Telefon
08 - 405 10 00

E-post: ud@foreign.ministry.se
X.400: S=UD; O=Foreign; P=Ministry; A=SIL; C=SE

Besöksadress
Fredsgatan 6

Telefax
08 - 723 11 76

Telex
105 90 MINFOR S

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

KRYPTOFAX

Sid. 1 (19)

2000-01-24

DNR 91

Aambs Eva Tojzner Glückman

aa
P

KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000-01-24/13:53		
Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu'

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: Lundvik (EC)

Kopia: Magnusson (Riga)

MYCKET BRÅDSKANDE

Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
eni adressering/samt

UMK

BMK/

Wallenbergärendet - hänvändelser från Mesinai
(3 bil.)

Bifogas tre hänvändelser från Susan Mesinai vilka i första hand är adresserade till Hans Magnusson.

Hänvändelserna avser:

- 1) Diverse i ärendet utestående frågor, vilka dryftats i tidigare korrespondens (dec. -99)
- 2) Utestående personakter i MVDs arkiv.
- 3) Smoltsov dokumentet.

Mesinai låter hälsa att hon emotser en så snar reaktion som möjligt, i synnerhet inför morgondagens möte med MVDs företrädare, Nikisjkin.

LUTHMAN

ANTAL SIDOR001

January 23, 2000

II
5 Page letter
8 Page BackUp.

FACSIMILE TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson in Riga

FROM: Susan Ellen Mesinai

IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS. PLEASE STUDY CAREFULLY

RE: PRISONER FILES MVD AND PRISON DEPARTMENT MVD
THE FILE OF PIETRO STEPANO ALADJAN-ALADYANI
(For Meeting with Mr. Nikishkin at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, Tuesday
January 25, 2000 at 4:00 PM)

As mentioned in my previous facsimile of today, I will be meeting with Mr. Vinogradov and Mr. Razboyev, at their request, tomorrow Monday at the FSB Archives Reading Room to discuss how to proceed with the MVD problem. There I intend to go through the 'Compilation List' report which I prepared for Jan Lundvik's meeting with Jan Eliasson, see attached, and hand them a list of those interrogation schedules I need or other items of information which I think can be taken from the Criminal Files while we await fuller cooperation from the MVD:

I should emphasize that, at this point, the completion of my work with FSB is of the highest priority and I also feel that it could be possible to extract specific data of a personal file nature from some of the criminal files. Therefore I am still optimistic of being able to prepare for you a substantive report which will have done much to reconstruct -- and add hitherto unknown data -- for the time period up to July 1947.

However, unless satisfactory substantiation is provided by the Russian side to the death date of July 17, 1947, we are left with the problem of how to follow the trail if Wallenberg 'disappeared' -- whether as an 'internee' (never sentenced) or as a convicted criminal. One of our problems in this regard has been that we have been tossed about between MGB and MVD. For example, if Wallenberg was sent to Vladimir as a numbered prisoner, was he still under the jurisdiction of the MGB?

Thursday, upon arrival, I went to the FSB archives and asked to continue working on the file of Aladjan-Aladjani (there are various spellings and combinations of this name). Andrey Allakhverdov served as my translator. Aladjani was a highly educated Armenian priest, with Italian citizenship, actually a resident of the Vatican and a Jesuit who served as a chaplain in the medical corps for the Italian army. He was arrested as military personnel and held in POW and internee camp for some time before being called to Moscow Internal Prison on January 17, 1945. While in camps he was known by his name. In Moscow he immediately became a numbered prisoner, although I believe the personnel were equally aware of his name. (The secrecy was not as stringent as we have seen in documents related to numbered prisoners at Vladimir and Ivanova.)

A-A was sent to Lefortovo Prison in 1946, but returned to Internal in February 1947, then back to Lefortovo. He was sentenced by OSO in July 1947 for ten years starting the date when he was transferred back to Internal Prison (February X, 1947) rather than the date he was first arrested, some years prior. In an unmailed letter to his family which is in his file, he states that both his Italian citizenship and the fact that he was a chaplain (and therefore of some quasi neutral status) were noted in the course of his sentencing. (I consider the former important because, while the Soviets could have described him as 'stateless' as they did in the case of the Georgian born Pataridze, who also lived abroad extensively, they did not. The fact that he was Italian meant that at some useful point his name could be submitted on a list to the Italians/the Vatican for an exchange. The mention by him of his quasi-neutral status is even more interesting to me, but I will get to that later.) In other words, Aladjan-Aladjani was to have been released in February 1957.

A-A who was prisoner number 30 in Moscow prisons was sent to Vladimir from Lefortovo after his sentence and renumbered there as Prisoner Number 15. He was sentenced on the 25th of July 1947. He arrived in Vladimir on August 3, 1947. The instructions regarding him are VERY IMPORTANT: "To put in solitary cell and keep under Number.....*All the registration records for prisoner Aladjan-Aladjani to be removed from the kartotekhas of the Prison -- administrative, transfer, corpus -- and to be sent to the Prison Department of the MVD of the USSR. Personal file of the above mentioned prisoner should be kept by you personally.*"

On this form, the name Aladjan-Aladjani is handwritten in purple wherever identification of the prisoner is required. There are only two copies of this letter -- one to the addressee, who is the Head of Vladimir Prison, and the other for the prisoner's file. Further reading an instant later would show that all documents related to this prisoner and all decisions related to his reading material, eating rations, possessions, walks, bathing, kartser, anything were forwarded to The Center (i.e. Moscow Central) along with the registration cards mentioned above.

All references to him in Vladimir are to Number 15.

As Aladjan-Aladjani was under the jurisdiction of the Investigative Unit of the Especially Important Matters Division (OBD in Russian) throughout his detention in Moscow, that is under the MGB, the emphasis on the jurisdiction of the Prison Department of MVD/Moscow Center post-sentencing would indicate that this numbered prisoner was no longer a MGB concern as of his departure to Vladimir. Rather he was under the watch of Kuznetsov in Moscow and the warden and deputy warden of Vladimir Prison.

The reference to removal of all material from the various kartotekhas (and now we know that there were three -- I already knew, here and there, of the existence of the corpus kartotekha but transfer adds a third dimension)-- of all references to a numbered prisoner to be forwarded to Moscow **TELLS US WHERE WE HAVE TO GO.** The Prison Department of the MVD, all materials related to Numbered Prisoners at Vladimir and elsewhere, and their movements as coordinated by that department and its subsidiaries. (It is also very necessary to do this to

supplement the work of Marvin Makinen, who obviously does not have a full deck of cards. This will not prevent him from identifying the movements of an unknown prisoner but it will be necessary to go further and identify that prisoner through the records of the Prison Department MVD or, in some cases, regionally.

In addition to this, we have been told by Dr. Karpov of the Ministry of Health that he cannot help us because the information we seek is in the hands of the Medical Department or Special Medical Department of the Prison Department MVD: This, as I mentioned before, has been confirmed by my closer look at the file of Tibor Clement where indeed these two departments handle all correspondence and decisions as to whether to release him from the MVD system, as earlier decisions related to his diagnoses in various hospitals.

This brings us to the records of the Prison Department NKVD and MVD which are held in GARF which I have asked to see. We have been told that many of these materials are classified and will require special permission. We need to overcome that classification problem immediately. This should be an important, but very positive goal of our forthcoming meeting with Tchuin (rather than getting stuck on the perpetually unresolved issue of the missing prisoner files, although some resolution should be forthcoming there also). Needless to say, if we can identify Wallenberg from the Prison Department records as, say, Number 14 for period X, etc. and this leads directly into a paper trail, we may not need to see all of the eyewitness files on the list. We should hold this in reserve of course.

It is therefore my intention, with your permission, to thank Nikishkin for the Aladjan-Aladjani file (definite proof that 'something is better than nothing'), and point to these various entries and state outright that if we have hit a roadblock in terms of the various personal prisoner files.....WHILE WE ARE WAITING....the step that would help us close the gap and prove MVD cooperation would be to enable us to study these various records.

I would also like to point out that the A-A case may prove a very significant model for our purposes. First of all, as you know, I have been researching for some time the report that RW arrived "the same time" as Shulgin who, however, arrived in a general open convoy with Volkov and Kutevov on July 22-25, 1947 (depends upon which record you use). The possibility remains that Wallenberg arrived on that day, or at that approximate time, in an enforced convoy under isolation. A-A was transported in such a manner, presumably alone as there are no instructions to separate him from another numbered prisoner. If there is some truth to RW arriving immediately after July 17, 1947 (bear in mind that little white space in Marvin's famous graph based on my studies in the Vladimir kartotecha for 1947) then we stand a reasonable chance that RW, if numbered was Number 13, 14, or 16, 17 for the year 1947 depending upon how accurate the third-hand witness report was.

A distinction has to be drawn here, by the way, between those numbered prisoners present in Vladimir in 1947 and those like the three Merkises, the two Munters, the

two Laidoners, Urbshis and many others who arrived and were re-numbered in Vladimir from their Ivanovo numbers in 1952.

In short, we are ready to embark on a more microscopic study of numbered prisoners for which we require FULL COOPERATION FROM THE MVD. As the MVD is also in charge of files from Vladimir, we cannot get around our dependence on them (this would include Munters file which we clearly need as well). And they in turn cannot fail us, unless they want this to go on forever.

One mystery which I am mulling over is why there are a few cards for numbered prisoners in the administrative kartotecha, as copied by Guy et al in 1990 and Marvin and Ari in 1997. It is particularly odd, if not miraculous, that Prisoner Number One's card is there. It is to me logical that those cards which we are seeing there are of prisoners who were released to another known institution, or repatriated. I can imagine no other condition which would encourage them or result in permission for some form of registration card to remain in the kartotecha, given the conditions set by Kuznetsov in the case above. This applies to Menshagin, Vadillo, the Merkis, etc.

The bottom line is that the Vladimir kartotecha DOES NOT in any way accurately represent the arrival and departure of Numbered Prisoners/Vladimir during the period which is of concern to us. This would have to be reconstructed, year by year, bearing in mind that when a numbered prisoner goes out, someone else comes in to take their number in good time.

However, our first order of business would be to check the numbered prisoner records/Vladimir for 1947, for 1948 (both are reported by reliable sources) and keep on going. These records are to be found in the archives of the Prison Department MVD:

Along those lines, I would like to point out that there is a reasonable possibility that RW -- as a Swedish neutral -- could also have been sentenced by OSO in 1947 and given a ten year sentence for Counter-Revolutionary activities, although in his case it would mean that the numbering would begin at the time of the sentencing instead of all along. (I base this only on the fact that Wallenberg's name appears in the Interrogation registries that we have seen. It is of course possible that he was numbered any time after March 11, 1947).


If this is the case, and if Wallenberg was sentenced and sent away instead of being killed in July 1947, and if his case were to closely conform with that of A-A (an innocent person, not open to recruitment, useful for a possible exchange) then he too may have been sentenced as of his return from Lefortovo to Internal Prison, that is March 1, 1947. This being the case, his term would have expired March 1, 1957.

This is also an extremely important consideration which has never come our way before. All this time, we have dealt with the Gromyko Memorandum in terms of the Russian Government's response to the Swedish P.M.'s demanding clarification of Wallenberg's fate. **But in fact a genuine crisis would emerge in the apparatus when Wallenberg's term was about to expire. It would be at this point, and this**

point only, that a real decision would have to be made from within whether to repatriate him, send him deeper into the system or execute him. This crisis we have seen already three times in this study -- with the possible repatriation of Oggins, of Jankowski, and of Konoye. (We do not know why Konoye's repatriation was imminent as this contradicts his sentence, but we see evidence that he was on his way home, then recalled by Moscow Central and essentially the problem was removed through his death). Until I studied A-A's file, I had projected this point to 1970, based on a 25 year sentence for espionage with a starting point of 1945 and with the Soviets forwarding him to Mordov as of 70 as a way of putting him in semi-permanent exile-deep freeze. But, in fact, the model of A-A offers a very strong alternative.

(I will deal more with this issue in my study of Sentencing as part of the report, to follow my study of interrogations -- which awaits the cooperation of the FSB archivist.) Please note that we have not yet finished with the A-A file so more surprises are possible. As it is, I have noted over eight different important parallels, not all of which I will deal with at this time. The one thing I would point out is that Counter-Revolutionary activities in the case of A-A meant belonging to the Jesuit order. The same would or could conceivably be applicable in relation to the Zionist network, as to certain nationalist movements.

Sincerely yours,



Susan Ellen Mesinai

LATEST REPORT ON THE COMPOSITE
PRISONER FILE LIST
Raoul Wallenberg Case. January 10, 2000

On December 22, 1999, prior to our meeting with the FSB and MVD representatives in the office of Mr. Tuchnin of MID as Chairman of the Russian Side of the Working Group, Yuri Michaelovitch Razboyev (FSB Archivist) and I, with the help of Andrey Allahkverdov, reviewed the Composite Prisoner File List of October 25, 1999 in an effort to ascertain what further contributions could be made by FSB toward the completion of our data gathering.

As the files of all prisoners who have been in camps, prisoners who were at Vladimir and significant others such as Istvan Bethlen fall under the jurisdiction of MVD, our goal was to try to find an alternative procedure in certain cases through the criminal files which remain in the hands of FSB. As it is our understanding through Mr. Tuchnin that Y.M. Razboyev is to serve as my counterpart, and as Mr. Razboyev only acts under orders, I will assume that this discussion -- which lasted for several hours -- was an authorized one. I emphasize this because the tone at the meeting with MID was slightly different, reflecting among other things the Russians' concern as to the public reaction to my report, even given its classified aspects, which seemed to impact on their willingness to turn over further materials.

On December 23, where I was shown one new file in the FSB Reading Room, Mr. Nikishkin informed me that the letter responding to our Prisoner File Requests (that is the list of October 25, 1999) would be sent to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow the following week. The same promise was offered by Mr. Nikishkin to Eva Tozjner-Gluckman. That letter never arrived so we are in the dark about the decision to have been made by Mr. Vinogradov, as FSB representative, Mr. Nikishkin as MVD representative on the basis of Mr. Razboyev's briefing of them.

My concern, as I have expressed both to Chairman Hans Magnusson, Mats Foyer and Eva Tozjner-Gluckman is that now -- because of difficulties that rest with the MVD in turning over files -- we will also lose momentum with the FSB, where indeed information from the criminal files could provide the data needed in certain cases. I have therefore given you the breakdown of our discussion as I remember it, since these lists are locked up at the Embassy in Moscow. Where there is uncertainty, I have left it blank.

It should be noted also that a number of names on the list have now been deleted.

ABAKUMOV, Victor. I have explained in fine detail why I need his interrogation schedule. As in such cases the schedule is usually already compiled and typed in the file, it is only a matter of allowing me to copy the pages. This seems hopeful and is truly important.

ALTER, Viktor. Delete from list. Y.M. Razboyev had already done thorough work on this criminal file for a scholarly book and it is agreed that my researcher will scan the book. If there is anything which is particularly relevant to Wallenberg, I will go back to them – but I am not expecting that.

ANGELIS, Maxmillan. The archivist will attempt to get the particulars. Do not know if FSB or MVD, but probably the latter.

ADELMANN, Rudiger. Deleted because answers were given to me in the Lefortovo Registry I was shown earlier that day.

ALAJANI, Pietro Stefan. File is now under review thanks to the MVD. One-third complete per December 23, 1999.

ASKHINIS, Antanas. MVD

BAJ, Boguslav. This file was promised us by Nikishkin who apologized to me on December 23, 1999 saying that he had confused it with another file. Baj's file cannot be shown because he was a 'Soviet citizen.' This will be a problem because his is the lead testimony of the Bratsk Polish witnesses. One of the files of one of the other Polish witnesses has at least provided us with the date of the transport when he says RW left. We need to see this file to verify Baj's statements and cross reference it with the other Poles who so far have proven accurate at least in relation to their own circumstances. Also, I think Baj would greatly protest being called a 'Soviet citizen.'

BAYER, Frederick. MVD. Important to verify his report and that of a highly significant witness. Simple facts required.

BECHER, Kurt. While it is understood that this file is not in Moscow because Becher was interrogated in Budapest, the fact that either Kartashov or one of his special investigators went to Budapest to carry out these interrogations gives us further means of tracking this down. We agreed to check the correspondence files and registries for that period from that particular department or others appropriate to these interrogations. Becher, it should be noted, stated that he was interrogated about RW. FSB

BENTIVEGNI, Franz. Have requested his interrogation schedule. Will be requesting his medical file.

BERGER, Lazar. Could be MVD as Vladimir was his prison or could be in the Ukraine.

BETHLEN, Istvan. MVD. Must have this to follow his movements and whereabouts and to verify counter-reports as to the place of Bethlen's death as these could have direct bearing on RW's whereabouts at that time. **Have requested interrogation schedule through his criminal file.**

BOGDANOS, Antonas. MVD for the early period. Medical. Will check the criminal file for information on his whereabouts, etc. as he was convicted as a Fascist.

BRAUN, Charles Clifford. (also known as Charles Clifford Brown). Fortunately this name was on the October 25, 1999 composite list because, in examining the Lefortovo registries on December 22, 1999 it was established that the order of interrogations by Kopelyansky on July 17, 1946 was as follows: Wallenberg, Langfelder, Braun, van der Waals. All four of these have Allied connections. Also Braun would seem to have been sent on the same route as Wallenberg, if there is any truth to the Verchne Uralsk reports. Not certain if MVD or FSB, but must get as much information on this case as we can.

DEMESCO, Michael. The FSB Archivist was under the impression that Demesco had claimed to have been with Wallenberg. This is not the case. He was an indirect witness to Wallenberg through another source, although he was held in Moscow prisons at about the same time. In addition to this, he was held in camps not only with Makinen but other witnesses who claim to have seen Wallenberg after Makinen's departure. Therefore, Demesco's file -- which covers five different incarcerations -- is vitally important to unraveling a number of the eyewitness reports. In addition to this he was sent to an asylum and this would be helpful for acquainting myself with those procedures for the Medical/Internat phase of work. (File exists in Kursk where it has been studied by a journalist).

FRIDMAN, Samuel. Will look among criminal files. Presume MVD. Otherwise file is missing.

GARCIA, Manuel. MVD. Prisoner of both Vladimir and camps whose story intertwines with several others from the early 70s.

GERRUM, Kurt. Believed to be Vladimir, therefore MVD. May have died there. FSB may provide interrogation schedule from criminal file.

GOTTLIEB, Roland. FSB to provide missing interrogation schedule from the criminal file.

HAMMERSCHMIDT, Franz. MVD and Medical. File is in Leningrad and should be forwarded to us. This request has been outstanding for over a year.

HJELD, Harold. MVD.

HORST MULLE, Theodor. Vladimir detention only part that is relevant. MVD.

KRAFFT, Ernst. As he was one of Langfelder's first cellmates, I am requesting his file. As he died in Vladimir, it should be there.

KRUMINSH, Zigurds E. Latvian Vladimir Prisoner. Originally they said it was in his homeland. Hans Magnusson has checked there, but the file is not to be found. This is a

very critical file and we are requesting it again. There is another route possible which will require real influence and trust, but could give us everything we want in relation to this case. It should be noted also that Dr. Makinen's file, which I understand has been requested through Kiev, is also to help us sort out Kruminsh's claim of direct knowledge of Wallenberg.

CUMISH, Wilfred. Vladimir. MVD.

KUPRIANOV, Gennadi. Soviet General. Will probably NOT see this file but have asked for very fine tuning of his whereabouts, transports, etc. For example what prisons was he in, where and when. In terms of Vladimir, we will need to check medical records which should be permissible.

LANDWEHR von PRAGENAU. Vladimir. MVD.

LEUVENHAUPT, Karl Moritz. Checking both FSB and MVD.

LIALIKOV, Nikolai. MVD has given over certain information as reported on the list. Have asked for medical and other forms of follow up, primarily as it relates to Katyn and there is some value in checking out to where Katyn witnesses disappeared.

LUKASZ, Bela. Camps. MVD. Repatriated early. Even if we get the details from Hungary, we need verification from Moscow.

JAKOBSON, Rafael S. MVD

KALINSKI, Abram. Have requested entire interrogation schedule and also breakdown of his movements. However, I think it is very important to see this file because Kalinski provided an entire network of reports which made press in the West, and – it would seem – had actual contact with some but not all of the witnesses he cites. It is very important to know exactly what part of his testimonies are valid, rather than 'throwing out the baby with the bathwater.' I have made the point also that a number of the files which are missing are those cited in Kalinski's open letter to Andropov. I consider it important to press for all these files, as they may be kept together with material that is of major value to us. They must be found.

KAPLAN, Jan. According to the archivist, the Russians turned over to the Swedish side – I believe in the late 80s – a statement by Jan Kaplan, witnessed, that he had never seen or been with Raoul Wallenberg. If the Swedish side has such material it would be helpful to include it in our overall study as this may indeed eliminate this witness.

KATONA, Alexander (Sandor). His file seems to have gone the way of that of Langfelder, that is missing. The Russians have given next to no information. However, it is possible to reconstruct his interrogations where it involves known registries and this should be done. Also, two or three Katonas were repatriated – one of them much later

than any of the others. All were held in camps. Therefore these files must be with the MVD.

KLEIST, Ewald. Interrogation schedule from FSB. Medical file needed. **This file should be at Vladimir as he died there. MVD.**

MAREK, Ferdinand. Interrogation schedule to be compiled from his criminal file. Otherwise, his file is MVD.

MARKUCZEWSKI, Josef. MVD.

MAYER, Josef. Vladimir. MVD

MELTZER, Menachem. MVD.

MENSHAGIN, Boris G. I have stated that we must see this file, which should be filed at his place of death. In the meantime it is possible to reconstruct his interrogation schedule from his criminal file. (This is an important witness to Katyn who was held on Corpus II approximately the same time as the reported sightings of RW.)

MERKIS, Anton and Natalie. Vladimir. MVD. Requesting in meantime interrogation schedule and chart of whereabouts in order to understand movement trends and sentencing of numbered prisoners.

MUNTERS, Vilhelm. I have stated that we must see this file as it cross references with a number of different sightings of RW in a number of different places. Meanwhile am requesting his interrogation schedule and breakdown of whereabouts as in the case of Merkis above. Please note: Have also asked Hans Magnusson to try and get as much information as possible about Munters whereabouts at different stages in the Gulag so we may compare them.

OKULICKI, Leopold. My requests here are very simple but they are generating a great deal of unnecessary discussion. I need to copy the typed sheet of his interrogation schedule because I didn't do it before, due to a time pressure. I also need to see if the Smoltsov document re Okulicki's suitability for labor IS or IS NOT in his personal file. If in his investigative file, it would be important to know what other kinds of information which should be in his personal file has been transferred there.

PANNWITZ, Heinz. Because of his role in overseeing networks in the Balkans and his overlap with a number of prisoners of interest -- Rado, Bentivegni, Kalinski, Richter, Sanitzer, Gfrorener, Loyda, Hoffstetter and others -- **I have asked to see this personal file.** Please note that I turned over to Mr. Vinogradov a volume of materials from the National Archives in Washington of Pannwitz' debriefing upon his return to Germany. This shows how closely he is linked with a number of our important, if not prime

witnesses. At the very minimum, I have requested his interrogation schedule as drawn from the personal file, but I think that the full file would be in order here.

PELKONEN, Eno. **His interrogation schedule to be reconstructed from his criminal file.** His **medical records** are of great importance, particularly dealing with those in Butyrka Medical Services.

RADO, Sandor. His interrogation schedule from this Criminal File. Outline of his whereabouts until release.

REHEKAMPE, Guenther. Vladimir. MVD.

RIVO, Zoltan. Interrogation schedule from his criminal file. Attempt to reconstruct with as much precision as possible his whereabouts in Moscow prisons. Ideally we should see his Moscow prison file as we saw only his file in exile. I have asked for his protocol of interrogation for July 22, 1947.

RODDE, Wilhelm. Because he also claims to have been interrogated about Wallenberg/Langfelder around July 22, 1947, I have asked to see this file.

RODE, Gunnar Oskarovich. MVD.

ROEDL, Willi. I have asked for his interrogation schedule to be reconstructed from the registries and from his criminal file, although I recall that Vinogradov commented he was never charged, which may mean 'technically' there is no criminal file on him.

SHTEINBERG, Matus O. Vladimir. MVD.

STEINBERG, Paul. - Gestapo. Prisoner at Vladimir. Ergo MVD. Will check for criminal file.

SHTEINBERGS, Voldemar Latvian. Vladimir. MVD.

SHIMKEVICH, Andre. I have asked to see this file. Minimally breakdown of locations in Moscow prisons, where and when.

SCHMIDT-DURMOND. The proper date of birth has now been given to the authorities and they will look for his file. Schmidt-Durmond died while incarcerated. Important file because of his role in the Balkans.

STAHEL, ...(1892). I have asked to see this file.

SCHMIDT. They will check further on all four names given as Schmidt through the MVD.

SCHNEIDER, Helmut. We have located the right Schneider but do not have information as to his interrogations in Moscow. They will try to give this information through the

Criminal File. Our true objective however is not only to determine the date of those interrogations but his cell occupancy during that period.

SUPPRIAN Karl. I have asked to see this personal file.

SZAKACS, Janos. I have asked to see this personal file or minimally to obtain his interrogation schedule.

TERELYA, Josef. Must be addressed through the Ukraine. I have asked however to study his medical file.

UEBEL, Adam. Vladimir. MVD.

UISASSY, Istvan. Interrogation schedule.

VADILLO, Martinez. Numbered Vladimir Prisoner with mental health problems who sat with primary witnesses in Vladimir. Would like to see file, personal and medical.

VENDROVSKY, David. I have asked to see this file.

VOLKOV. Interrogation schedule and medical only.

VON DUFVING, Theodor. MVD

VON RICHTHOFEN, Herbert. I have asked to see this file.

VON SCHWAB. I have given over other names under which this file possibly may be found. MVD. Trying for interrogation schedules but essential factors would be his location and transfers, times etc. to verify his report of being with Wallenberg.

VOROBEL, Vasily F. Said to be a primary Wallenberg witness. Would like them to check with his last known place, i.e. the internat in Mordov, for his file. Have asked for cooperation in following up to determine how, and from what place, he was sent to the internat – also important is his role in the camp which cross references with a number of different Wallenberg sightings.

VOSS, Hans E. I renewed my request for Voss' interrogation schedule and that FSB confirm that Voss was moved directly from Internal Prison to Butyrka in August 1948 – after which he never left Butyrka to return to Internal Prison or Lefortovo or any prisons or camps until he was brought to Vladimir in 1952. Also to check with MVD.

WOLFIN, Isaac Markovitch. Even though Wolfin was an NKVD or GRU Soviet agent we absolutely need to study his personal file. Besides the fact that his Vladimir card describes him as a 'Swedish spy' and the fact that Wolfin sat with all the non-primary witnesses to Wallenberg in Vladimir (See my Preliminary Report One), since the Russians were so kind as to provide his interrogation schedule, it is now

clear that his earlier movements paralleled Wallenberg's closely, down to the fact that he was called for interrogation on July 17, 1947 around midnight. I am of the opinion that Wolfen is a strong candidate to have sat with Wallenberg after the latter was moved to Internal Prison in March of 1947 —that is between May and July 1947. There is also new information which would indicate that Wolfen was used by the Vladimir authorities to accompany special prisoners coming in, say from Alexandrovsk, which could apply to both Wallenberg (as recounted by Kalinski) or Konoye.

WYNNE, Greville. Need arrivals and departures from Internal Prison —Moscow, the nature of his regime and approximation of his exercise program to check sighting.

YAOSHA, Shun. I have specified that we are looking for the high ranking Japanese prisoner said to have sat with Roedl and Loyda in Lubyanka Prison. May be prisoner whose ashes are mixed with that of prominent Hungarian. Interrogation schedule and specifics of location if possible.

.....

Please note that in addition to the Prisoner Files above, there are a number of collections we have asked to review in GARF related to the activities of the Prison Department, NKVD or MVD; the identification and processing and handling of Numbered Prisoners by the Prison Department; the activities of the Special Medical Department MVD in handling of special prisoners in psychiatric facilities. We are also requesting the reports from the MGB to the MVD for forwarding to higher instanzas on key interrogations, 1945 and following.: These volumes are also said to include things like correspondence from prisoners to Stalin and etc, which would apply in the cases of Okulicki and Wallenberg.

We are also awaiting information related to the processing and sending of numbered prisoners to Ivanovo starting in April/May 1947.

Finally, where the medical files are concerned, we will require the full cooperation of both the MVD Special Medical Department and the Ministry of Justice. The same may prove a factor with our requests to MVD above.

Thank you for your attention in these matters.

Sincerely yours,


Susan Ellen Mesinai

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January 23, 2000

FACSIMILE TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson
Swedish Embassy in Riga

FROM: Susan Ellen Mesina in Moscow

RE: Smoltsov Document

Dear Hans:

This is just to emphasize a point I made in a previous fax of today regarding the Smoltsov document.

We have July 17, 1947 with two memorandum from Abakumov, one to Molotov in the Council of Ministry registry and, according to SB via the Volkogornov collection in Washington, one from Abakumov to Stalin regarding spies, terrorists and resistance * (whose registry we have not seen nor the document itself, although we requested that Vinogradov follow up on this at our last meeting). Furthermore, we have interrogations of Richter (regarding Roedl as Abwehrstelle Chief-Bucharest, according to FSB) and of Wolfin, NKVD agent, around midnight, the latter in Internal Prison.

And we have the handwritten Smoltsov note which was presented as part of the Gromyko Memorandum of February 1957.

I would like to point out that we have no time order to the above. This is particularly important in the case of the Smoltsov Document. Was the doctor describing an incident that took place in the very early hours of July 17, 1947, thus justifying the hint that the subsequent document to Molotov contained information as to RW's demise? Or, did this event described by Smoltsov, if genuine, take place in the late evening on July 17th in which case the note to Molotov may have described an intention, a recommendation but it did not as yet state the fact of RW's death. And, in fact, could refer to many many other things and not the death matter at all.

I would further like to note that it is extremely ODD that the Smoltsov note does not record the time of death. The Soviets would do nothing without recording the time, sometimes down to the second -- no move, no search, no interrogation, no bath, no kartser in and out, no co-signing of documents by the prisoner, no report of when the prisoner was misbehaving. The Medical Department is admittedly lax when it comes to things like giving inoculations or prescribing for a sore throat, but to report on a death without the hour and minute.....I cannot remember ever having seen that. (This is in addition to other oddities like the fact that there are no other witnesses, or that neither Mironov nor Kartashov were informed, according to the instructions on this note, bypassing the competent authority for such an event in Internal Prison and to a prisoner of the 4th Department.) I think this is a major flaw in that document.

In any case, we would need that information to order the tools at our disposal.

Best,
Susan

* - You might want to relate this to my comments on Aladjan - Aladjan as a "Counter-Revolutionary" sentenced July 25, 1947

ANTAL SIDOR018

January 23, 2000

FACSIMILE TO: Hans Magnusson, Swedish Embassy in Riga
FROM: Susan Mesinai in Moscow

RE: Your Fax of December 27, 1999 responding to mine of December 22, 1999.

Dear Hans:

I do not have immediate access to my memorandum marked "Important Considerations" because there was a party in the Embassy last night and all the extra chairs are piled high in my office, around my office and I cannot get to my papers. So I will respond from memory, still slightly tinged by fever, to correct a few confusions I seem to have caused.

1. YOU ARE CORRECT. TWO INTERROGATIONS BY KOPELYANSKY, July 17 and August 30, 1946. The confusion was caused by something which Yuri Michaelovitch said to me regarding the 'error' re the Wolfen/Wallenberg same day interrogations. But when I saw the registry, I saw that it was both days and both Kopelyansky and I do remember very well making a beeline to the Embassy to inform you of this. What was INCORRECT was that when the Russians handed over their graphics, they mislabeled the entry for the Wolfen/Wallenberg same day interrogation as being July 17, 1946. Since Wolfen had not been arrested at that time, I figured the probability was higher that he was arrested when they said he was arrested (approximately one week later) and that someone had made a mistake in the labeling of the registry -- which was indeed the case.

2. I will answer the question about the transport number 620 when I can get back to my office, but I do believe it is May 1945 where this is Wallenberg's number, while for Roedel it states 'Returned.' (Meaning he had been in Lefortovo before). Again, I refer to my letter I wrote you just after seeing these registries, where I also make it clear that Yuri Michaelovitch showed me that the number 620 is NOT the Lefortovo registration number. This must be discussed further.

3. Regarding reports, maybe we should remain 'fluid' about this until you and I have had a chance to talk. In any case, there has been no written response from Nikishkin or FSB. As you probably know, I have been called to Kuznetsky Most on Monday (tomorrow) at 10:00 AM for a special meeting with Vinogradov and Razbojev to discuss what to do about the MVD problem. I am also scheduled on Tuesday at 4:00 to meet with Nikishkin here (also at his request) with Mats and Eva attending. I assume the latter will be productive if only because I will have met with the FSB side already, at their request, and because I can thank Nikishkin because the ONE FILE he did give has proven -- as he promised -- most helpful. I will further amplify on this in a separate fax attached re the Prison Department of MVD:

4. Thank you for your insights on the matter of Kaplan. I will wait until after I have gone through the kartotecha in Stockholm and seen what materials from the past thirty

years need to be reviewed. As Kaplan is a later sighting, I am not going to get involved in wrangling with them over that right this minute when a great deal of productive work could be done within the 1945-57 period. In any case it is a MVD file and it falls in with the rest of them in terms of being able to see them.

5. Regarding young energetic Russian speaking person in Stockholm, other than Stefan Gulgren of course. I have recommended many times to Jan Lundvik and most recently to Lage Olson that Claes Ericson, who was the former 'nachalnik' of the guards here who has security clearance, who has helped me in the past with translations and who is particularly eager to continue with this work if his schedule allows (he is at the Stockholm school of economics or business, the same where Stefan's wife is or was attending) be permitted to take on tasks related to the kartotecha in Stockholm. This would be, I believe, an extension of that...if you approve. And he would have to be paid.

In terms by the way of maintaining the confidentiality, materials could be pouched to here and kept upstairs for me to review them if need be. The same was done with the materials you sent me on Interrogators...it is not in my hands.

6. Nikishkin. See attached document.
Regarding Abakumov and Serov, I agree with you completely regarding Abakumov being in charge of the case at least until July 17, 1947 (or earlier, if RW was handed over to another directorate after his March 11, 1947 interrogation. The fact however that it still has 3rd Main Directorate written there would suggest that he was still under his jurisdiction until that point.) My interest in Serov was to document where, if at all, the Wallenberg case would intersect with his activities. These potential intersections begin in Budapest (with the RW documenting of atrocities not only in Hungary but surrounding nations) and re-occur starting in April 1947 if RW went to a special camp for the POW and interned, if he was sentenced and sent out under MVD jurisdiction, if he had a psychiatric transfer as a numbered prisoner from Vladimir (late 40s and into the 50s), in addition to the issue of where the files went after Abakumov's arrest. I think the chances are very strong in terms of his having his hands on the files and making decisions about its removal or destruction. I believe we discussed this personally.

One might also consider the possibility that Abakumov's memorandum to Molotov of July 17, 1947 (and we need a time for that, as we need a time for the Smoltsov document) is informing him that Wallenberg has been sentenced and sent to place X, or has been turned over to either Serov (under a variety of hats) or Pitovranov (Second Directorate) or, like Roedl, has been sent to camp.

Finally, of course, there is the obvious Serov-Molotov involvement in preparing the answer to the Swedish side in the 50s, resulting in the Gromyko Memorandum.

7. I am answering this from memory, without my previous letter in front of me. I believe in this case **I am asking that the Possessions Registry of Internal Prison for 1947 showing that Wallenberg arrived on March 1, 1947 with certain possessions (the actual line is blotted out) be forensically studied so that we can**

know exactly what possessions he came with. I also was asking you if this forensic work **HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE**, as it has in the case of Langfelder whose belongings are itemized for his arrival on July 22, 1947. The difference between the sizes of the blots would suggest that Langfelder was arriving with his full possessions, itemized, while Wallenberg was not.

This is a very critical question as it gives also an indication of how long they intended for RW to stay. It is further important to establish if these were documents related to his identity since, were he to become an indexed or numbered prisoner at some point in the ensuing months, this particular type of possession (real identity documents) would not follow him. For this reason, I brought up his passport etc as being among the possessions returned in 1989. If those returned are exactly the same as those registered in 1947, then it is not so mystical where they got them from. If those returned contain a mixture of possessions, some recorded in the 1947 Internal Prison Registry and others not listed there -- then we are dealing with a far more complicated situation than a man who went into Internal Prison and died there shortly afterwards.

It should be further known, however, that the fact that these 'possessions' were not confiscated by the State within a few years of his death is not at all normal. Inquiries would have been made by the various entities, such as the Financial Department where the money is concerned, and some answer would have had to been given -- even if it was 'Do not ask any further or any more.' If we were to go by the norm, then one might project -- as I believe was mentioned by Roginsky -- that Wallenberg had died just prior to the return of the possessions. That IS protocol -- to either confiscate them or turn them over to the family.

I would like a copy of the list of Wallenberg possessions handed over by the Russians in 1989 to make these various comparisons.

While I agree the question of what Wallenberg had on him when arrested in Budapest is a very hard nut to crack, and not the object of my present probing, it is not that impossible. Langfelder's list -- forensically done -- from his possessions brought over in 1947 should correspond more or less to the possessions he brought with him to Lefortovo in 1945. Whatever was confiscated before that I do not know. Wallenberg's receipts or receipt numbers should be traceable. There are plenty of records. It's just that the documents he was supposedly carrying of a business nature (and the specifics of that, including for example photographs) will be a very hard nut to crack in both our opinions. But we shall try at the right time and in the right context.

PLEASE READ ON.

8. There IS a strong possibility that Wolfen sat with Raoul Wallenberg EITHER in Lefortovo in those few days that Wallenberg was held back and Roedl sent ahead (February 1947) , or between May and July 1947 in Internal Prison, the most likely time when they were trying to recruit Raoul, or both. I give it 60-80% and were it not for my January mobile phone bill and the fact that it is not professional , I would be willing to wager you 100 USD to that effect. I am not fully prepared to show you the basis for this yet (by the 14th, yes) but I would like to say that Wolfen is the one of the strongest connectors we've got.....although there are others... and that it is absolutely imperative that I work out some method whereby I can see the personal file or address queries to it, while in the same room (in another words, some ongoing dialogue with the archivist while he has the file before him would be necessary. This is a matter of critical cooperation).

Please remind those in Sweden that we need as much information as we can get to give us some indication of why the Soviets considered him a 'Swedish spy' or what connections, if any, existed through his work in Stockholm with related matters -- Wallenberg family activities, rescue missions, industrial matters or trade which intersected with Wallenberg's private initiatives. Anything.

Thank you for your New Year greetings. I wish you the same. And may we finish this soon, although I am worried about the April data deadline, for obvious reasons.

All the best,

Susan Mesina
Susan Ellen Mesina

4



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

KRYPTOFAX

Sid. 1 (5)

2000-01-24

Dnr 32 ✓

Gezelius/Tojzner-Gluckman

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enl adressering/samt

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UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: Lundvik (EC)

Kopia: Magnusson (Riga) ✓

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Raoul Wallenberg - Möte på FSB:s arkiv

Härmed översändes resultaten av Susan Mesinais möte
idag på FSB:s arkiv med Vinogradov och Razbojev.

LUTHMAN

January 24, 2000

FACSIMILE TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson
Swedish Embassy in Riga

FROM: Susan Mesinai in Moscow

RE: RESULTS OF MEETING IN FSB ARCHIVE WITH
V.C. VINOGRADOV AND Y.M. RAZBOYEV

As promised, this is to inform you of the nature of the conversations which were held today in the FSB Archive on Kuznetzky Most. My translator, Andrey Allakhverdov, and I had been called to this meeting to discuss how to deal with the 'problem' of files that have yet to be turned over to us by the MVD:

Interrogation Schedules: Breaking Down of Lists

In preparation of this meeting, I had taken the compiled list and broken it down into groups of (1) those prisoners where I require only their interrogation schedule and (2) those where I am in need of their prisoner file. In certain cases, I have noted in the second category those where I would welcome receiving their interrogation schedules in the meantime, but still will need their personal files. Thirdly, there was a short group of five names where the requests are either medical or very specific -- for example to see what documents exist in Kartashov's section referring to their interrogations of Becher in Budapest.

Andrey is now translating these lists (name only) for the interrogation schedules. I have told Y.M. Razboyev that if he could get these to me as soon as possible, then I would be able to process the information through the computer and get down to the in-depth analysis. I would be very happy to have as much as possible before the meeting with even more being forwarded to me along the way, so I can input it into my laptop. In this manner the compilation could take place in late February in the States as I discussed in my e mail.

Interrogation Schedules and the MVD.

Vinogradov warned that some of the interrogation schedules cannot be reconstructed from the criminal files or registries because they were not recorded there. We therefore are not "out of the woods" yet where it comes to our dependency on Nikishkin. We still need a number of personal files to get the information we need, even where those schedules are concerned.'

Okulicki: The Question of the Smoltsov Document & Its Location

Y.M. Razboyev was on the ball about a number of things. He showed me the Smoltsov slip from Okulicki's investigative file, Page number in its appropriate place, and that was the end of that. I emphasized to Vinogradov how easy this could be, if we just did what was required, and I think he was impressed. -- meaning that I really meant business and was trying to get things in order in order to produce a result.

Jan Kaplan Continued

They also brought me the handwritten documents from Jan Kaplan and his wife, written in 1979. The statement that he was not then in Butyrka is of course true, as we now know he was in Khalmer-Yu (and in fact the camp address appears on one of Kaplan's statements in response to query from the KGB official.) One must of course bear in mind the date, and the pressure on the couple due to the fact that he was still in prison. Vinogradov asked if now we could cut Kaplan from the list. I said we would discuss this when you came in February. I recommend, since it was a medically related sighting, that we pursue it under that umbrella later on -- if need be.

The Question of Penza

Most interestingly, Y.M. Razboyev read to me from the Russian version of Sudhaplatov's book where Sudhaplatov claims that Oggins died from injection and that he (S) and Eitinger were responsible for ordering this execution. This led into a very thick discussion about the Oggins analogy and Penza. What emerged -- independent of the Sudhaplatov claim -- from Y.M. Razboyev's lips was that Oggins was executed in the SUMMER of 1947 (the memorandum related to this matter was in May 1947) and was BURIED IN THE JEWISH CEMETERY IN PENZA.

This of course makes our work much easier because we are not dealing with execution by shooting (presumably), special troops, etc.. It took a great deal of effort, repetition, persuasive argument, pleading, everything to get them to understand the value of -- as I put it -- scratching the surface a bit more. My point was that you had two men in Internal Prison at the same time where there was, to our knowledge, in both cases a problem about their repatriation -- for whatever reason. We have a decision in May (the recommendation to execute and fake a medical history) which may not have been carried out until months later. Why wait?

Is it not possible that if Wallenberg also died by injection, this took place at approximately the same time and both bodies were sent to Penza. And both may have been buried there, possibly even in the same grave?. Here I cited the example of Jankowski who died at the same time as Prisoner Number Eleven, they were buried at the same time and in the same grave, and neither death was registered with OAGS. There is another example along these lines, but it slips my mind right now.

Vinogradov started showing the difference in the cases -- for example that Oggins was a Russian citizen while Wallenberg was not. I raised the argument that you have two extreme cases where it would appear that the same method was used in both. Would it not be the safest, most secretive solution to keep them quiet by handing them once and together -- rather than having one event here and another there, either of which could draw attention to the situation. They agreed that, theoretically, that would be the most obvious thing to do.

"Assuming this theory, i.e. your 'logic' is right, what should we do?" I told them the first step was to determine the real date of Oggins death, the means and when and how the body was transported to Penza. The second was to see if there was another body that went with it, or another body coming from Moscow at approximately the same

4 (57)

time or anything odd which would suggest a second body. (Penza is far. I am assuming some economy is in order here). The third was to consult the registries of the Jewish cemetery to see what was the case, which can be done at the appropriate time.

Bearing in mind that I am strongly interested in the Disappearance Trail and the possibility that Wallenberg lived past 1947, I would like to say that there could be a certain poetic justice, if not divine mercy, at work here, were this to prove to be true. While emphasizing that forensics would be necessary to confirm that any body found was indeed Raoul Wallenberg, I pointed out to them that the discovery of a body of one who died more or less when they said, in one of the ways they have claimed of late, buried all this time in a Jewish cemetery would do a great deal to put this matter to rest. In any case, they were the ones who brought up Oggins as a possible parallel. I felt it behooved them to close the gap, especially when it could yield such a possible positive result to their own claims

After Vinogradov had left, Y.M. Razboyev and I talked about this more -- that is I was terribly persistent. He asked "who knew that Wallenberg was Jewish" to bury him there (a good question). I said, It's not that he was Jewish but that he saved thousands of Jews. And, along those lines, Abakumov knew. This satisfied him so now we wait.

As an aside, in the course of our discussions Vinogradov emphasized that just because Wallenberg's name does not appear at Domskey does not mean he wasn't cremated there -- that those who were executed by shooting (or, he implied, by injection) were never registered so the Domskey disclaimer means nothing. It could still be true a la Smoltsov Document. This seemed to go along with his emphasis on the point that Oggins was a 'Soviet citizen' (American, Communist) while Wallenberg was a foreigner (ergo Domskey along with a number of other known cases).

However, they have agreed to take the necessary first steps and then we shall talk again. I told them, I'm not asking you to pick up a spade and dig...only to look deeper in the highly secret Oggins file to find out, if you can, exactly when and how Oggins died. (Vinogradov also emphasized that Sudhaplatov was prone to exaggeration, especially when it could help sell a book. So, on that score, he puts no more faith in Sudhaplatov's statements about Oggins than he does about his statements on Wallenberg. "Good," I said. "Then we can get past secondary sources and go straight to the real documents and see what we find." Anyway the point has been taken and I am expecting cooperation.

Aladjan-Aladjanjani and One Possible Partial Way Around the MYD Problem

As Vinogradov came late (by two hours), Andrey and I continued working with this file. Actually we began doing an analysis of when exactly he became a numbered prisoner, when exactly he went from the 1st Division MGB (Foreign Intelligence, probably under Fitin)'s jurisdiction to that of the OBD and a number of other subtleties.

When Vinogradov arrived, I commented that Nikishkin had provided us with at least

5(5)

one good file. He said, cynically perhaps "One!" Then when he looked at the cover of the file, he commented that this was not an MVD file but from the Military and had been given to us by the woman who attended the Working Group meeting in October. He recommended that I, as soon as possible, as I had requested, send her the complete list -- take whatever files she had--"Go to her directly" he said because what's happening is that the files you are getting, Nikishkin is getting from her. In other words, MVD has given us even LESS than we thought.

Eva Tojzner-Gluckman has the list and will look up this woman's name, obtain her address and get our request to her as soon as possible.

After this (help from the Military) , he commented, we must deal not only with MVD but the Ministry of Justice in our efforts to locate the remaining files. We will have to deal with them in terms of the Medical also so we will take all at once and together.

SUMMARY DISCUSSION.

While the discussion was not as precise as I would have liked, I felt -- particularly after the Penza debate -- that we were getting somewhere -- not because I am 'putting all my eggs in the Penza basket' but I saw quite clearly a very interesting report within reach. That is, as I mentioned in my FACSIMILE II of yesterday, through our work with FSB (and agreeing with what you said about the role of Abakumov up until July 1947) we can present July 1947 as the clear cut crossroads where, for the present we have a very finite number of 'fates' all of which can be discussed in depth, i.e. put under the microscope. The first is of course the Smoltsov, as is, the second the Oggins parallel and the question of how close in time, method and detail it goes; the third the Aladjan-Aladjanjani model which gets more interesting every day (and which may give us a tool by which to begin dealing with the issue of recruitment); the fourth the possibility that Wallenberg was kept on in Internal and Lefortovo for some time, (with Ivanovo, or camps as interim possible places of detention) as an internee to be sentenced later, according to several different testimonies in 1948 and by my 'logical' calculations probably in 1951.

But I repeat: once sentencing takes place, and even when dealing with special camps for POWs and the Interned. or Camps and Corrective Colonies, we cannot escape our need for information from the MVD. Also for psychiatric facilities.

Stay tuned. All the best.

Susan Mesnai
Susan Ellen Mesnai



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

KRYPTOFAX

Sid 1 (1)

2000-01-24

AVG. AMB. RIGA		
D.Nr. 578		
2000-01-24		
AVD. R	GR. 18	MÅL Wallenberg

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr 8

Till: Endast för EC (Lundvik)
Kopia: ambassaden London (Odlander)

M .

Kryfax 18A London 2000-01-21

Tack för besked. Jag följer förslaget och översänder
med kurir brev till M

MAGNUSSON

Exp. 2000-01-24

M.

Adress

Telefon

Telefax

Telex



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

K R Y P T O F A X

Sid 1 (3)

2000-01-25

R18W-berg

Delgivning från
Kryptospeditionen
om adressering/samt

UNK

UNK/

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr 9

Till: EC (Lundvik) ✓
Kopia: ambassaden Moskva

KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000 -01- 25 08 ⁰⁹		
Avd. P	Grupp 2	Mål Eu ¹

M Y C K E T B R Å D S K A N D E

Wallenbergärendet - hänvändelser från Mesinai.
Kryfax 31A Moskva 2000-01-24

Jag besvarar nedan de tre hänvändelserna från Susan Mesinai. På några punkter kan kompletterande synpunkter/information behövas från Stockholm (som Jan Lundvik säkert uppmärksammar).

Vid mötet med Nikisjkin är det givetvis viktigt att utnyttja de argument jag tidigare framfört (bl a arbetsgruppsmötet hösten 1997) men det kan, som Mesinai säger, vara än viktigare att framföra de önskemål om NKVD- och MVD-arkiven i GARF (som enligt tidigare ryska besked visserligen har gått igenom, men det kan nu finnas nya mer precisa utgångspunkter).

Dear Ms Mesinai,

This is a quick, and therefore far from perfect, response to your three letters faxed to me. On a few points I hope you will get additional information from Stockholm.

I. The letter starting with the two interrogations by Kopelyansky.

Question no 6 concerning Abakumov and Serov. I think your reasoning concerning potential intersection of Serov and RW is of a very loose character. Even if RW

T E L E F A X Sid 2 (3)

was sent somewhere after July 1947, the role of MGB would still have to be the overriding. Before possibly proceeding on this we should have the exact curriculum vitae for Serov from 1945 up to 1956; this the Russians could offer from his personal, administrative file.

Question no 7. The entry on the possessions in the registry for RW has been forensically studied, but due to mechanical destruction more text can not be retrieved. Of course, we could ask to have this finally confirmed.

Question no 8. During this investigative phase we can have all sorts of theories and hypotheses which can be pursued. The closer we come to the finalization of our work, the need for stringency, for argumenting hypotheses on a stronger factual basis and for narrowing matters down increases. I still fail to see any fact, other than purely coincidental, supporting the theory that Wolfen sat with RW in Lefortovo or Lubyanka and I don't understand how you can quantify this possibility. Nonetheless, I agree it is important to study his file.

II Letter concerning the prisoner files and Aladjan-Aladyani(also dated January 23, 2000).

You say that A-A in an unmailed letter to his family states that the fact that he was a chaplain(and therefore of some quasi neutral status) were noted in the course of his sentencing. Did A-A himself use the words within parenthesis about quasi neutral status or is that your addition?

What you write about the instructions (in Vladimir?) is very interesting. From Moscow prison registries we know that his name was painted over - his case was one of four unique cases as far as such a practice is concerned.

I agree with what you write on the records of the prison department in GARF and your proposed line of action.

Your reasoning in the final part of the letter, that it would be much more logical to execute RW in 1956 is subject to objections. I do not rule out such a hypothesis, was RW still alive at that time, but it would probably have been easier and more satisfying, but still embarrassing of course, for the Russians to hand him over alive, once they had admitted that he had been kept in prison in the USSR. On the other

T E L E F A X Sid 3 (3)

hand, in 1947, considering the nature and habits of Stalin's regime, a decision to execute would not have been that difficult, considering the enormous embarrassment resulting from a release, after which RW would of course reveal that he had been sitting in central Moscow all the time. For A-A there was no public pressure to release him.

III. Letter concerning the Smoltsov document.

We have no information on the time of the day for the Smoltsov report, the time of the supposed death or for Abakumov's letter to Molotov. The Smoltsov document is a mystery not only in this regard as you know. Still it is clear that Smoltsov, if his report has some basis in fact, referred to the preceding night (that is the night between 16 and 17 July - "segodnya nochu"). On the basis of that, as Smoltsov reported directly to Abakumov, the latter could easily the same day have sent a report to Molotov.

Yours sincerely

Hans Magnusson

PS I will be back with more comments during the week.

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

K R Y P T O F A X

Sid 1 (3)

2000-01-25

R18W-berg

Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
enl adressering/samt

UMK

BMK/al

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KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000 -01- 25 1535		
Avd.	Grupp	Mål
EC	P	2 Eu ²

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr 11 ✓

Till: EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: amb Moskva (Foyer/Tojzner-Glückman)

B R Å D S K A N D ERaoul Wallenberg - möte på FSB:s arkiv.

Kryfax 32A Moskva 2000-01-24 samt 35A Moskva 2000-01-25

(1 bil.)

I bifogade brev kommenteras Mesinais rapport från mötet på FSB:s arkiv den 24 januari. Dessutom kommenteras kryfax inkommet idag, dock först en halvtimme efter det att ambassadens möte med Nikisjkin inletts.

MAGNUSSON

M 11

TELEFAX

Sid 2 (3)

BILAGA

Dear Ms Mesinai,

To your report on the meeting with FSB on January 24 I have the following comments.

-Interrogation schedules and the MVD.

You no doubt know that criminal files and personal files are two names for the same thing.

-The Question of Penza

While I have nothing against checking the Penza thread I would once again caution against hoping too much from it. Despite the approximate coincidence in time between RW and Oggins and the involvement of the highest authorities in both cases there is really no reason why RW should have been buried in Penza. Such a logic simply does not exist, or at least there is only a very remote possibility for it. Involving arguments of economy etc is not very serious. It is much more probable, as the Russians believe, that his remains would be in the Donskoy cemetery.

-Aladjan-Aladjani...

I agree on the need to approach the lady from the military archives and also the Ministry of Justice, the sooner the better. Let's discuss how it should be done if you can't figure it out with the help of the embassy.

On other points I have no comments for the time being.

Just after writing this I received you facsimile of today (too late to give any further instructions; I hope that what you have already received was sufficient. Basically I think we have a strong case to continue insisting on access to the personal files, but you are free to nuance this demand as you deem helpful for the investigation as a whole.

1/Abakumov/Serov. I now recall what you wrote earlier concerning Serov. Still, we should remember the supreme role of Stalin in those days and the responsibilities of MGB also within the MVD system. I

TELEFAX

Sid 3 (3)

fail to see any link between Serov, who was dismissed in 1957 or 1958, and his "industrial interest" on the one hand and the Svingel-Wennerström affair in the late sixties on the other.

2/ Aladjan-Aladyani. Yes, the painted-over names were those four you mention.

3/Regarding 1956 death dates etc. No I don't consider everything you write as a conclusion. The only thing I want to see is caution and precision(which does not exclude imagination).

4/ What you write in paragraph 1 on page 3("The first major step...going on") is OK.

5/Some working procedure comments. I trust Jan Lundvik will react to this, as he will also be reading it(and also to the request concerning Wolfin). I will,as before, be your main counterpart as chairman of the working group, but Jan L will certainly have important input as the man in charge in Stockholm and responsible to the minister.

6/ Your drafting of reports can be discussed when we meet, but you are welcome share your finds with me all the time, as before.

Yours sincerely

Hans Magnussn

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

KRYPTOFAX

Sid. 1 (8)

2000-01-25

Dnr

100
35 ✓

Aamb's Eva Tojzner Glückman

A g
PDelgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
enl adressering/samt

UMK

BMK/

NE

L

För: Lundvik (EC)

Kopia: Magnusson (Riga) (EC)

O M E D E L B A R T

KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000 -01- 25		
Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eul

Wallenbergärendet - begäran om instruktion inför
möte med MVD mmKryfax 9A Riga 2000-01-25
(3 bil.)

Översänder Mesinais reaktion på morgonens kryfax
från Magnusson avseende utestående frågor. Om tiden
medger efterfrågar Mesinai instruktioner inför
mötet med Nikiskjin, idag kl 16.00 Moskvatid.

Bifogar vidare utkast till brev från Mesinai till
Tutjnin avseende Abakumov dokumenten, samt
synpunkter från Mesinai avseende tre person-
dossierer vilka finns i förvar i Ukraina.

LUTHMAN

Postadress
Ulitsa Mosfilmovskaja 60
119 590 MOSKVABesöksadress
Ulitsa Mosfilmovskaja 60Telefon
(095) 937 92 00
(503) 937 92 00Telefax
(095) 937 92 02
(095) 937 92 03 (viseringsavd)
(095) 937 92 04 (handelsavd)Telex
64-413 410

January 25, 2000

FACSIMILE TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson, Swedish Embassy - Riga
FROM: Susan Mesinai in Moscow

RE: Your Facsimile of this morning

CLASSIFIED

Dear Hans:

If you have a chance to give some instructions for our meeting with MVD in the next few hours, this would be most helpful.

In answer to your fax,

1) The Abakumov/Serov controversy is in effect the same as the Death/Disappearance Dilemma inasmuch as Abakumov had control over MGB but, I repeat, if Wallenberg was sentenced, if he was turned over to the special camps of Camp and Corrective Colonies, if he was put in the special camps of POW and the Interned, and if he was numbered he went under MVD, Prison Department jurisdiction and, as we have seen from documents or learned from BBC, he signed off on important documents related to these prisoners being sent from Vladimir to psychiatric facilities from the late 40s until the end of the 50s.

I definitely am in favor of getting a curriculum vitae from the Russian side, but I would like to point out to you that Nikita Petrov wrote an extensive article which I have quoted in my report to the Swedish side submitted January 6, 1999 which covers the chief points, including Serov's interest in air technology. Petrov has done extensive research in this area and I would expect his c.v. on Serov to be more detailed than the one we would receive officially. Petrov has also written books on the apparatus administration and there you can also see Serov's competency among others. He has corrected me on the issue of fronts, for example, in response to Baj's testimony that Wallenberg was going to meet Serov.....we have discussed the possibility of that, how it could work. In any case, I did the c.v. ---not only for Serov but several others -- in 1998 in an effort to see whose competency would bring him most close to this case over the fullest range of time. This, by these criteria, is the man although Abakumov's involvement is documented in certain precise ways.

I agree with you about 'loose character' in terms of tightening the knot, but from my point of view -- having done this before -- the c.v. alone won't do it. That is one of the reasons why it is urgent to get into the Prison Department NKVD/MVD classified archives at GARF. It is also very important by the way to bear in mind Serov's longstanding rivalry with Abakumov and vice versa with Stalin no doubt making use of this competitive spirit in both for his own ends. The point is, in terms of the implications of the Gromyko Memorandum/Smoltsov Document, he is also the most likely candidate to enjoy, if not benefit from, pinning the rap on Abakumov.

And finally, he has an industrial interest which would make him involved in the need for collateral for Wennerstrom -- if issues such as the Svingel exchange prove to be true. This is, as I understand it, not a dead issue.

In any case, I welcome your up close criticism and I wasn't intending to write a report that pins everything on Serov as a kind of sensational solution to the whole thing. These things take time, if true. However, to produce a rabbit from a hat at a late hour, having not given you step by step insights would I think be much too unbelievable. I submit it to you as something to 'watch out for', not as the 'final solution.'

Question Number 7. Because this line is so narrow and does not indicate a large number of possessions, etc. and because this line is used to establish that Raoul Wallenberg went in to Lubyanka on March 1, 1947 and did not come out, I think this is extremely important and we should try again. Find a better expert no matter how backed up the Russians get about it.

Question Number 8. As long as you will support me in seeing the file of Wolfen, there's no point in speculation. The file itself will give what is needed -- or not. But here too you are dealing with someone whose presence in connection with the case covers a long span. His relevance to the many witnesses at Vladimir has already been noted in detail in my First Preliminary Report. This has increased since the Kalinski report to Hirdman, then Ambassador in Israel. What we are now seeing in the case of Wolfen -- in addition to the fact we learned in Vladimir that he was a 'Swedish spy' -- is that he is appearing also on same date interrogations with Wallenberg in 1946 although not under the same interrogator. And that he is moved over to Internal in May 1947. He is fluent in Swedish. They were trying to recruit Wallenberg during that time and recruitment is considered an important element in this puzzle. Wolfen was formerly an NKVD (or GRU) agent trying to work his way back into favor. He was Jewish. He knows Stockholm by working on a special project for Kollontay at the Soviet Embassy in Sweden. He was interrogated on the night of July 17, 1947. But, yes, as it stands now this is all, technically speaking, 'coincidence.' Fear not, I am painfully aware of that fact.

But as I said I appreciate your support in this matter because it won't be easy. And please prevail upon Stockholm to do its part. This question has been going on for YEARS -- on both sides. MVD has also failed to give the date he turned in his internal passport when he supposedly emigrated to America.

11. Aladjan-Aladyani. For the time being, please settle for the answer that 'quasi' is my word, 'neutral' was definitely mentioned by him. My notes are at home but I will copy out the relevant documents and others of interest and send them to you once this file is done (end of the week I think -- we may have to do some more analysis.)

REGARDING THE PAINTING OVER OF A-A'S NAME IN THE MOSCOW REGISTRIES. I thank you for this information. Am I then correct in understanding that the other three are 1) Wallenberg, 2) Langfelder and 3) Katona?

Also, I think I should warn you that judging from leafing through the file yesterday, the date of January 17, 1945 -- although so recorded in the file -- is, I think, an error from the carry over of the year. It should be 1946. Also, he was not numbered immediately upon arrival in Moscow. (He was however held a long time in Internal Prison without being properly processed -- i.e. investigated, charged -- resulting in a complaint from Mironov, comparable to the situation in Lefortovo with Schandl).

This is why A. Allahkverdov and I are trying to do an analysis. It looks like numbering MIGHT correspond to the shift from the 1st Dept. (Foreign or External Intelligence) to the Especially Important Cases jurisdiction, but it also looks like there are a number of pages missing. Tabulations will be required a la Konoye or Schlitter.

Regarding 1956 death dates etc.

Understand me, I am not giving answers, only watching the piles heap up at this point or making projections on the basis of concentrated information. And ultimately, we will discuss this when we work together, I do not intend to push answers that cannot be pushed. The most I can do is put out the possibilities that exist objectively and to carry the work as solidly and fully forward as I can. I am beginning to think that everything I write these days is being considered a conclusion, and various sensitivities are developing from that. Not that you shouldn't tell me very openly what you think about what I write, but here it's a problem I feel of distance and expectations.

But, to get to the REAL question, and this IS an opinion.

1. The first major step is to put 1947 death date under the microscope and, at the same time, to document as fully as possible the disappearance trail as it existed at that time to enable us to see if Raoul Wallenberg was on it. Hence, Penza, MGB follow up on the Ivanova document, back to the Vladimir kartotecha (particularly since the A-A file), into the Prison File MVD to study all the records of numbered prisoners starting in the mid-40s and going on.

2. Two other death dates must be explored post 1947. The first comes from a number of eyewitness reports, all of which show RW as sick at approximately the same time in the early 50s, but in different parts of the country. These must be researched through medical records and certain files. The second is the 1956 issue which is very ugly, but I would not be doing my job if I didn't point it out as it has emerged from the files and the documents we have. (It was never in my mind prior to beginning this work, but it stands strong as a tragic possibility). As we know Konoye's fate, it is all the more critical that this possibility be faced squarely -- but confidentially. This is certainly nothing to talk about publicly, but the Russians I am sure know exactly where this is heading. And in the words of a certain KGB official who wishes to remain nameless, Khrushchev killed every bit as many people as did Stalin.

It goes without saying that nobody would be inclined to own up to such a thing, but in hard reality it could explain why everything was put on Abakumov and Smoltsov

(both already dead). And I repeat my point, of some importance, that there would be a REAL CRISIS if Wallenberg had been sentenced like A-A and was to be released, say, March 1, 1957. The system itself would demand that a decision be made PLUS we have the problem of the primary eyewitness sightings which demand a rewrite of the Vishinsky Memorandum. And, quite frankly, the precedent -- horrible as it is -- already exists in a number of cases, starting with Oggins and perhaps others whose medical histories and death certificates were doctored, but that is not our business.

You are correct that there was no public pressure to release A-A. From what I can see he was not that big a fish, which probably saved his life. What he was was a Jesuit and, as in the case of the priest who was exchanged out with Marvin Makinen, such persons are valuable for an eventual exchange. It would be helpful to know if he left early because he was exchanged, or in general what actions the Vatican had taken on his behalf or what political liaisons were being set up at that time (post-death of Stalin efforts to smooth relations, for example). We do have the unresolved matter of their description of him as a 'British spy' even though they did not charge him with espionage.

III. On the Smoltsov Document. Thank you for the information that if legitimate it referred to the night between the 16th and the 17th, i.e. early morning of the 17th.

SOME WORKING PROCEDURE COMMENTS:

First, I have heard nothing from Jan Lundvik about anything -- not by pouch, not by e mail. I am therefore assuming that I am working exclusively with you and that you reflect a merged opinion of how to proceed because I can't hold back forever waiting for him to comment on things.

He has however requested indirectly clarification of the matter on Wallenberg's registration card. This is being prepared by Andrey Allahkverdov and will be forwarded to you shortly with a cover note from me regarding all the different questions I have placed regarding this term, the use of the term and the way it appears on the card.

I think, given your recent memorandum, that it would be a very good idea if we find the time somewhere to define my forthcoming report. I think that if we lay out the scope more clearly, it will relieve you of a number of anxieties and will help me a great deal in terms of narrowing expectations. It's very important also that we size up which way things are heading and make some decisions based on that.

We know the deadline is before us and we know we want it to work. It would greatly reduce anxiety for you, I think, if speculation could be limited on my part. I will not write a speculative report -- there's no point. People will say 'You paid all that money for guessing!' and that will prove detrimental. I repeat, I will be lining out objectively all the elements in a logical manner, with as much reconstruction of the facts as possible and where we reach a crossroads, with as much real information as possible for evaluating the few strong possibilities that exist. The fact of the matter is we do have a clear cut system, highly visible patterns and the eyewitness sightings can be

placed in such a context. More importantly, what I am seeing from the system itself first is being echoed by the eyewitness reports. My projections are very well grounded in that respect, but it's easier for me. I have done years of work every day, many many hours a day.

We also have the question of whether this report is completely classified or if a generic one will be written which is open to the public. Again, you must recognize that I say things to you -- whether as fact or hypothesis which is building up strength-- openly, not expecting them to fly all over the place. If this is a problem in terms of the future readership, then we must find another better working method where a product will emerge that proves its worth.

I think actually the biggest problem we have is that this is what is known as a 'dirty business' (quote Kopelyansky) and therefore it is extremely difficult to be perfect in the face of it. Professionally there is a demand to present a perfect face...to have answers or to only put forth answers. If this could have been done in the Wallenberg case, it would have been done long ago and my involvement would be un-necessary. This cannot be done yet but I have every intention of being objective, factual in the report, although there will be an argument of some real grounding -- yes.

The question is, with whom am I to share these finds in the in-between or go through the thinking process? If it's only with the independents, it's totally unfair to you who have put so much work into this overall and are relying on me.

So I need your feedback on this. Although, the real proof is "in the pudding" -- namely the report -- and I have offered to work closely with you on this, including coming to Riga to work together from time to time. The question will come down to "What do we do about a difference of opinion where the Swedish Government is involved." Hopefully, there will be enough substance laid forth that this will not prove a conflict.

Sincerely yours,

Susan Ellen Mesinai
Susan Ellen Mesinai

DRAFT
for HM

January 25, 2000

Mr. Vyacheslav Tuchnin
Chief of Section, Finland and Sweden
Second European Department
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation
32/34 Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square
Moscow 121200 Federation of Russia

Dear Mr. Tuchnin:

At the Working Group meeting of October 18, 1999, Ambassador Hans Magnusson and Susanne Berger raised the issue of a memorandum sent by Abakumov to Stalin on July 17, 1947. This document was entitled "Report from Abakumov to Stalin: On Procedures for Conducting Investigations of Spies, Terrorists and Members of the anti-Soviet Underground"

This document is listed in the Russian Finding Aid of the Volkogornov collection at the Library of Congress in Washington as Papki 44-45, under the collection of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. It is unclear whether these coordinates refer to Volkogornov's own collection or the Presidential archive which has since been broken down and is in the process of declassification.

In any case, Mr. Vinogradov was going to pursue this matter in an effort to get hold of the actual document, since the present Volkogornov collection includes only this reference. I submit this information as a helpful reminder to him.

While we are on the subject, it would be helpful to know if there are any other Abakumov documents for that date -- for example to Beria or to MVD. It would also be helpful to understand the order in which they were done -- if there exists any time notations or if one could judge from the sequence.

I thank you for forwarding this message to FSB.

Sincerely yours,

Susan Ellen Mesinai

Dear Hans.

There are three important files which we are needing from the Ukraine.
per discussions with Y.M. Razboyev.


Lazar Berger (said to be direct witness)
Marvin Makinen (sat with three 'direct witnesses')
Josef Terelya (said to be direct witness).

How is Kiev doing on MM's file and could we please add the other two.
I do not see any others on the list who would qualify.

The only other issue is to try and locate Major Demshenko in
Dnepropotsk (spelled?) and to repeat efforts to find the mother of
Budilov (who died in the 90s in a psychiatric facility after sending
two letters regarding RW and another missing person to the U.S.
Embassy.)

Upon second thought, I will not send this by e mail.

Best,


Susan Mesina

FAX TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson - Riga
FROM: Susan Mesina in Moscow
January 25, 2000

ANTAL SIDOR008



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

K R Y P T O F A X

Sid 1 (2)

2000-01-26

R18W-berg

KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000 -01- 26		
Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu'

Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
enl adressering/samt

UMK

BMK/

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr

Till: EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: kabs, amb Moskva

Raoul Wallenberg - samarbetet med ryska sidan.

Ett problem vi åtminstone tidvis haft med ryska sidan i arbetsgruppen är ordförandens bristande mandat och förmåga att fatta och genomdriva beslut som äger giltighet för alla berörda ryska myndigheter. Med detta påstående vill jag dock inte ifrågasätta den nuvarande medordförandens goda vilja och försök att sätta press på den ena eller andra myndigheten.

Den senaste yttringen av det problem jag tar upp är Vinogradovs uppmaning till Mesinai att gå direkt på representanten för det militära arkivet resp företrädaren för justitieministeriet för att få gehör för våra önskemål om olika akter och undersökningar. Tidigare har vi ofta upplevt att förfrågningar till ordföranden, som vidarebefordrats till en myndighet, besvarats endast på de punkter denna myndighet ansvarar för, medan andra frågor besvarats med hänvisning till annan myndighet, i stället för att ordföranden tagit på sig att förse oss med ett komplett svar.

Denna komplicerande faktor blir förstås särskilt besvärlig och akut när vi nu närmar oss slutskedet av undersökningen. Alltför mycket tid och kraft går åt att bearbeta de olika ryska myndigheterna (MVD är det främsta exemplet härpå) resp åt att omdirigera förfrågningar.

Jag vill därför resa frågan om vi inte bör begära antingen att det t ex i premiärministerns kansli utses en person som får mandat att fatta snabba beslut resp

Adress

Telefon

Telefax

Telex

T E L E F A X Sid 2 (2)

att "skära igenom" alla byråkratier, alternativt att Tutjnin förses med denna fullmakt. Jag är övertygad att detta skulle underlätta för båda sidor, främst den svenska.

Det vore intressant höra Moskvaambassadens reaktion på denna idé.

MAGNUSSON

ANTAL SIDOR002

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
MOSKVA

KRYPTOFAX

Sid. 1

2000-01-27

ONR 39 ✓

Foyer/Tojzner Glückman

aa
P

KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000 -01- 27/13:50		
Avd.	Grupp	Mål
P	2	Eu'

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET

För: EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: Amb Riga (Magnusson)

Wallenbergärendet - möte med Nikisjkin

(3 bil.)

PRIMO

Resultatet av tisdagen möte Nikisjkin sammanfattas i det följande.

Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
enl adressering/samt
UMK
BMK /

- Utestående personakter; Mesinai överlämnade en kompletterande förteckning över de personakter från den ursprungligen överlämnade listan som är av prioriterad karaktär (bifogas). Med fetstil har där markerats de personakter som enligt Mesinai är allra mest angelägna. Därtill markerade Mesinai under mötet de personakter vilka enligt hennes uppfattning avser Vladimir (förbockade). Nikisjkin lovade att mot slutet av innevarande vecka ge oss de tidigare utlovade skriftliga kommentarerna till listan över personakter. (Den kompletterande förteckningen innehåller inga namn utöver dem som återfinns i den ursprungliga listan.)

- NKVD- och MVD-arkiven i GARF (fängelseavdelningen MVD och nummerfångar, samt medicinska avdelningen MVD); Nikisjkin gav oss rådet att skicka en hänvändelse till MID (Tutjnin) med önskemål om deras assistans att kontakta GARF (Mironenko) i syfte att lokalisera det aktuella materialet, och i förkommande fall få MVDs och FSBs tillstånd till detta. Nikisjkin förutsåg inte att sekretessen skulle medföra problem med att få ta del av den efterfrågade dokumentationen.

SECUNDO

För eventuella synpunkter översändes Mesinais utkast till brev till Zanina (arkivare på Ross-Archiv) avseende hennes möjligheter att bistå i framtagandet av några ännu utestående personakter.

HIRDMAN

January 26, 2000

FACSIMILE TO: Ambassador Hans Magnusson - Swedish Embassy, Riga
FROM: Susan Mesina in Moscow

RE: Yesterday's Meeting with C. S. Nikishkin re Prisoner Files & Related Matters

Preparations:

Mats Foyer, Eva Tojzner-Gluckman and I spent about an hour preparing for this meeting with the help of your instructions in Swedish. It was very hard to devise a strategy when all of the materials outstanding were important to the completion of our work. Plus I am too far ahead in my detailed knowledge of the material to quite be able to hand Mats and Eva a capsule solution, and -- given the history of the problem - - I doubt there is a capsule solution. Still these rehearsals, I felt, were very helpful. They were prepared and I do think we got down to the point and did some real work to resolve it.

The Meeting

Nikishkin came an hour and fifteen minutes late, but very relaxed. He greeted me warmly and we did our pleasantries, while gathering together as a group. As anticipated, he explained at great length his work with the elections, all the problems, the fact that they had 200 criminals, wanted or people under suspicion running for election and -- he was pleased to report -- only two made it through. Now they face new elections. Plus there was....and he enumerated a number of other equally consuming projects. At the end of which I said: " And at the top of Mr. Nikishkin's very hard working and important pyramid sits Raoul Wallenberg and our April deadline." So here we began.

He got out the list and wanted to go through it item by item, something which he should have done already by now with FSB twice and so on. I asked if he had been informed of my meeting on Monday with Vinogradov and Razboyev....He said No, he'd had only three hours sleep in the past several days, no time to talk to them. So I told him that I had broken everything down into a short list, names only, which would enable him to see what files they say are MVD (camps and Vladimir), what files I require only their interrogation lists -- but here I was up front about the fact that FSB had emphasized I was still dependent on him -- and, as he could see I had used different sizes and boldness of fonts to enable one to see what the priorities were. However, this is the information we need.

He asked to see the list, even though it was in English. Said immediately Bethlen was FSB -- they say it is MVD. He says maybe the personal file is missing. We went quickly down the list (after I had informed him that the list was not the only matter on the agenda). I checked all those files which should be in Vladimir. So, in two pages he has the 'short list' which I informed him had been extracted from the longer list in his possession. In terms of files we really needed he should go by the short list, for data regarding the prisoners he should go by the longer one.

I said again that where a file could not be seen it should be stated in writing, along with the reason and so on. Mats I believe reiterated this quite clearly in Russian. I told him that this applied ONLY TO WHAT WAS MISSING or not allowed, "for example, what you told me regarding Baj should be written down." There was no need to report where a file was being given or they were still searching. He welcomes, understandably, the need for less paper work.

I told him that I was not yet quite finished with Aladjan-Aladjani, which would be returned next week. He understands that Thursday and Fridays are my work days because of my translators schedules and promised to have new files ready then. He said we should meet more often regarding the various problems. I said, given the amount of workload he was carrying and my schedule, I would prefer that it not be during my archival research time. He himself preferred that it be at the Swedish Embassy, away from his phone, which he finds 'very peaceful.' As the three of us (Mats, Eva and Susan) all tend to work late in the evening, I suggested that he come over when appropriate at the end of the day. But that if the information, files etc. was continually coming my way there would be less and less need to meet.

We then moved on to the issue of GARF and the Prison Department MVD and Numbered Prisoner files. He was surprisingly optimistic. He said "Vladimir was very very difficult. I had to write letters all the time. This is easy. All you have to do is write a letter through MID placing your request. " I told him this had been part of my letter of March 1999 and as a result we had (Jan, you and me) met with Mironenko and his Deputy already. But that Mironenko had indicated there were classification issues to be addressed. He I believe misunderstood me and said that Tuchnin then had made a mistake -- in putting us in touch with GARF -- because clearance was required from MVD. I emphasized that there had been NO VIOLATION. Mironenko had not shown us one piece of paper from the Prison Department or related to Numbered Prisoners. (Of course BBC had already been there and we discussed the collection quite openly.) I repeated that many times because I wanted to be sure so there would be no unnecessary static between GARF and MVD as we approach the deadline.

I told him point blank that I am asking for Numbered Prisoner sensitive material. I do not want to go to GARF and spend my time seeing the declassified materials on administrative procedure just because it was declassified. I wanted to go straight into the collection of Numbered Prisoner correspondence and files and I wanted to be able to do this with a team already accepted by the Powers that Be. (If there was going to be a question of clearance, I wanted to know that now. I was prepared, if necessary, to work with a translator of their choosing, but would of course prefer to work with my known team. I touched upon the fact that Gennadi K. had been inexplicably and without warning thrown out. If G.K. cannot help me I must replace him because I have not only a deadline pressure but a manpower problem.

He seemed to think there was no problem. However, when he started addressing issues such as 'rights of privacy' and I said I didn't see why that should be a problem when the prisoners, for the time being, are numbered.....he called my bluff and pointed

out that these files are sometimes referring to the prisoners by Number, sometimes by their name, and the more central the document I can expect both. But in principle he was not surprised by the request and seemed to think No Problem.

We then moved on to Item 3, Medical. I said that I consider the Prison Dept MVD materials on numbered prisoners a priority because perhaps here directly we could identify an indexed prisoner who for various reasons might be Wallenberg. Failing this, we will have to tackle the Medical Department MVD and Special Medical Department MVD: He said to put ALL OF THESE REQUESTS in one letter to MID, particularizing everything that I would need to answer my questions and requesting GARF's help in locating this material. He said to move fast because it will take some time and that there will be some fee for the searching out of the appropriate documents, but not a costly one.

I then asked him: in addition to numbered prisoners, we have those with a changed name -- usually made Russian. Did he have any ideas where to look for those? None, he said.

This is as much as I remember at this time.

Sincerely yours,


Susan Ellen Mesinai

BREAKDOWN FOR MEETING WITH FSB
January 24, 2000 at 22 Kuznetsky Most, Moscow

ASKING TO SEE ENTIRE FILE:

(☐ Where no file is to be found, wish to have interrogation schedules in any case)

- ✓ Askhinis, Antas. MVD
- Baj, Bogulsav. MVD
- Bayer, Frederich. MVD - ☐ Interrogations in Moscow Prisons.
- Berger, Lazar. MVD or Ukraine or both.
- Bethlen, Istvan, MVD. ☐ Interrogations in the meantime..
- Bogdanos, Antonas. MVD

BRAUN, KARL CLIFFORD - Interrogated by Kopelyansky on July 17, 1946 along with Wallenberg, Langfelder & van der Waals. May be American double agent-in any case dual national. Died in Verchne Uralsk region, need both interrogations and movements. ☐ - Will accept interrogation schedule in the meantime, but need whole file.

DEMESCO, MICHAEL. For all the reasons listed, but also may have been in the same category as Braun -- i.e. OSS. ☐ - Will take interrogation schedule in the meantime from Moscow prisons.

- ✓ Fridman, Samuel. Look in criminal files for his file. Probable involvement in Jewish rescue. ☐ Interrogations for the meantime. Important to know his fate.
- Garcia, Manuel, MVD.
- ✓ Hammerschmidt, Franz. MVD Special Prison Hospital St. Petersburg. Died there.
- Hjeld, Harold. MVD
- ✓ Horst Mülle, Theodor. MVD.
- ✓ Krafft, Ernst. One of Langfelder's first cellmates. Died Vladimir. MVD.
- ✓ KRUMINSCH, Zigurds E. Vladimir. MVD.
- ✓ Curnish. MVD.
- ✓ Landwehr von Pragenau. Vladimir. MVD.

LEUVENHAUPT, Karl Moritz. (Probable spelling). ☐ - Interrogations for the meantime. Believed to be a Swede so we require all information on this prisoner which can be obtained.

- Lukacs, Bela. MVD.
- ✓ Jakobson, Rafael S. MVD
- ✓ **KALINSKI, ABRAM.** ☐ - Interrogations in the meantime.
- Kaplan, Jan. MVD
- KATONA, SANDOR MVD. (A number of Hungarians by this name returned to Hungary later on, all in camps.)
- Markuczewski, Josef. MVD.
- ✓ Mayer, Josef. Vladimir. MVD.
- Meltzer, Menachem. MVD.

✓ **MENSHAGIN, Boris. G.** □ *Will take interrogation schedule in the meantime, but need the whole file.*

✓ **MUNTERS, Vilhelm** - □ *Will take interrogation schedule in the meantime, but need the whole file.*

OKULICKI, Leopold. (To verify two facts and to copy Interrogation Schedule)

Pannwitz, Heinz. □ *Interrogations helpful in the meantime.*

✓ Rehekampf, Guenther MVD

RODDE, Wilhelm.

Rode, Oscar. MVD.

Schneider, Helmut. Tank Commander. Need Moscow prison portion.

Interrogations may be recreated from Criminal File.

✓ **Shteinberg, Matus O. Vladimir MVD.**

Steinberg, Paul. (Gestapo official, not from camps.) MVD. □ - *Interrogations helpful in the meantime.*

✓ **Shteinbergs, Voldemar. Vladimir MVD.**

SHIMKEVICH, ANDRE.

✓ **Schmidt, Hans MVD**

Schmidt, Rudolph.

Schmidt, Walter

SCHMIDT-DURMOND - □ *Interrogations helpful in the meantime.*

STAHEL, □ *Interrogations helpful in the meantime.*

SUPPRIAN, KARL.

Szakacs, Janos. □ *Interrogations helpful in the meantime.*

✓ **Uebel, Adam. Vladimir MVD.**

✓ **Vadillo, Martinez.** Numbered Prisoner at Vladimir.

✓ **VENDROVSKY, David.** Verchne Uralsk/Vladimir. MVD.

Von Dufving, Theodor. MVD.

VON RICHTHOFEN, HERBERT. Essential File.

✓ **VON SCHWAB, Rudolph Heydrich Winter** also known as Captain Alexander may be Alexander Schwab. □ *Interrogations helpful in the meantime.*

✓ **VOROBEL, Vasily F. MVD.**

✓ **WOLFIN, ISAAC MARKOVITCH.** I need to study this personal file to have a close understanding of Wolfin's movements and cell occupancy between July 1946 when he was arrested until he was sent to Vladimir in 1948. I have already received the interrogation schedule but I need to study these movements for reasons I will explain.

II. INTERROGATION SCHEDULES ONLY:

Abakumov, Viktor
Angelis, Maxmillan
Bentivegni, Franz
Bethlen, Istvan
✓Gerrum, Kurt
Gottlieb, Roland (None in personal file. Check criminal please)
Katona, Sandor - Recreated from registry, Moscow prisons.
✓Kleist, Ewald
Marek, Ferdinand
✓Merkis, Anton
✓Merkis, Natalie
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
Pelkonen, Eno - With exception of July 22, 1947, absent from Personal File
Rado, Sandor
Rivo, Zoltan - Saw only exile file.
Roedl, Willi
Uisassy, Istvan
Volkov, Constantin
✓Voss, Hans E.
Yaosha, Shun

III. OTHER REQUESTS.

BECHER, Kurt. To check out the correspondence or other records of Smersh-Kartashov's Department for information related to their interrogation of him in Budapest in late 1945, early 1946. All leads should be followed up to try to obtain copies of these protocols of interrogations or to know where they were sent.

KUPRIANOV, Gennadi. Need only very particular information about his whereabouts, dates of transports (what prisons he was in, where and when, other than Vladimir). In terms of Vladimir, we will need to check medical records.

LIALIKOV, Nikolai. This request should be pursued through Special Medical Department MVD. etc.

VOLKOV, Constantin. Information on psychiatric at Kazan and his subsequent death there should be checked out through Special Medical Dept. MVD:

WYNNE, Greville. Need only particulars of arrivals and departures from Internal Prison, assessment as to routine and to speak to an expert who could help us evaluate this sighting in terms of the 'walk' routine.

January 25, 2000

Zanina, Tatjana Ganedievna
Chief of Section, Ross Archive

Moscow, Federation of Russia

Dear Mrs. Zanina:

At the joint meeting of the Swedish-Russian Working Group on October 18, 1999, where you presented a report on your diligent efforts to respond to the Trophy request by Susanne Berger, I asked also for permission to submit to you a short list of those personal prisoner files still outstanding. These files are urgently required to complete our data gathering process by the mid-April deadline.

I have recently been studying the file of Aladjadjan, Pietro Stepanovitch also known as Aladjajan, Pytr Stepani (1894). This has proven a particularly useful file for our purposes. Yesterday, Mr. Vinogradov of FSB informed me that I have you to thank for this file. He has urged me to follow through on my request to you to review my list of needed files in hopes that some or many of them may be under your competency. In the meantime, I continue to study the Aladjadjan-Aladjajan file and will request that it be returned to you from the FSB Reading Room next week.

I should add that I am, as a professional researcher, sensitive to the issue of not retaining files beyond the point where they are required. A number of files remained for a long period at MVD, but this was due to a misunderstanding. I had ordered them to be returned but instead they were retained for close to a year. As I had no way of knowing that they had not been returned, since I generally work elsewhere, I could not help resolve the problem until they were again offered to me.

We have since instituted the procedure, when a number of files have been studied, of preparing an act so that it can be very clear which files are finished and which ones are outstanding. At the present moment, I have no more files to study after Aladjadjan-Aladjajan unless your Section is able to find others from the attached list. Alternatively, if there is a Finding Aid to the personal prisoner files at your disposal, I would welcome the opportunity to study it in case there are existing files which offer the same information needed from those files which for the present are missing.

I thank you very your help in the past, of which I was unaware but I am most grateful. And I look forward to working directly with you where possible in completing my project under the Swedish-Russian Working Group, which is the analysis of the Prisoner Files for the purpose of verifying sightings of Raoul Wallenberg and gathering data which will enable us to establish his true fate.

Sincerely yours,

Susan Ellen Mesinaï

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2000-01-27

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Ec

Enheten för Central- och Östeuropa (EC)
Jan Lundvik
Telefon 08-405 3114


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Ch EC
Magnusson, Riga
Olson, EU
Hörnberg, PLAN

Exp. 2000-01-31/AR

Raoul Wallenberg-arbetsgruppen

Arbetsgruppen med uppdrag att studera utestående frågor i efterforskningen av Raoul Wallenberg kommer under innevarande år att avsluta sin verksamhet. Det aktiva forskningsarbetet skall avslutas före påsk, och rapportskrivande, redigering och tryckning beräknas sedan ta sex månader i anspråk. Det står redan nu klart att under denna tid, i varje fall fram till tryckningen, kommer behov att föreligga av en yngre rysk-kunnig tjänsteman, som kan biträda Hans Magnusson såsom arbetsgruppens ordförande och mig själv med genomgång och sortering av arbetsgruppens mycket omfattande material rörande Raoul Wallenberg. Materialet skall naturligtvis i princip också finnas på dossier i departementets arkiv, men redan kollationering av detta utgör ett betydande arbetsbeting. En närbesläktad uppgift är slutförandet av den genomgång av arkivmaterialet i syfte att frisläppa så mycket som möjligt, som avsågs vara en väsentlig del av mina uppgifter, då jag åtog mig nuvarande uppdrag för drygt ett år sedan. Genomgången har hela tiden fått stå tillbaka för det löpande arbetet i efterforskningarna men går nu inte att skjuta på längre. För båda uppgifterna behövs ett betydligt större rum än vad jag har idag med bords- och skåpplats för ett antal dossierer samtidigt.

Avsikten är att Magnusson och jag vid en genomgång med kabinettsekreteraren den 11 februari skall söka fastlägga det återstående arbetsprogrammet. Jag vill dock redan nu peka på att dessa frågor då kommer aktualiseras


Jan Lundvik



SVERIGES AMBASSAD
TEL AVIV

2000-01-25

R 18

Ambassadör Jan Lundvik

UD EC

INK. UTRIKESDEP.		
D.Nr. 25/001		
2000-01-28		
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Dokument från AJJDC om Raoul Wallenberg

Hbr 2000-01-11 Juhlin-Dannfelt - Lundvik
(3 bilagor)

Broder,

Med hänvisning till ovan korrespondens finner Du bifogat kopior på dokument från American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee som eventuellt kan vara av intresse för RW-forskningen.

I vart fall ger dokumenten en indikation om vilken typ av handlingar som stod till mitt förfogande för granskning vid mitt besök hos JDC den 4 dennes.

Dag Juhlin-Dannfelt

SS
November 9, 1951

Stockholms Enskilda Bank A/S
Stockholm.

Dear Sirs:

Re: Raoul Wallenberg Funds

This is to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of October 24 and November 3, 1951, together with various enclosures. We have delayed replying to your letters in order to have a fuller opportunity to carefully examine the materials which you passed along to us in connection with our complete files. While the ultimate decision with respect to the Sarlo claim will rest with Mr. van Dardel and the advice which you and his legal adviser will submit to him, we naturally wish to be as helpful as possible in transmitting our views concerning the claim.

The problem, unfortunately, with receipt of more statements becomes more complicated rather than simplified, and we therefore feel it desirable to express our views of the analysis of the positive and, on the other hand, questionable elements in the material submitted to us. On the positive side the claim may be summarized in these terms:

Ever since 1945 Mr. Sarlo in one fashion or another had consistently claimed that he turned over the counter-value of Swiss Francs 50,000 to the Raoul Wallenberg action. In your letter to us of March 30, 1948, you indicated that the letter from the Swedish Legation in Budapest dated November 27, 1944, and further information concerning Sarlo's correspondence with the Swiss Bank Corporation denote together a total claim for Sw.Fr. 50,000. Further, while the documentation which would definitely support a claim and which came from the pen of Minister Danielsson only serves to prove a single transaction for Sw.Fr. 15,000, Minister Danielsson himself, though unaided in his memory in being able to provide a recollection of detailed information, nonetheless expresses the general opinion that Mr. Sarlo had several payment transactions and that the extent of his claim would probably be as characterized by Mr. Sarlo. This same attitude is reflected in the letter which Chancellor von Mezey sent on October 15, 1945, to the Schweizerische Bankverein at Zurich, though in this latter letter Chancellor von Mezey's views are vaguer than Minister Danielsson's. Further, the statement of Gess Bogdanffy dated October 9, 1947, indicates that the conversations which Mr. Sarlo had with Minister Danielsson, Raoul Wallenberg and others leading up to Sarlo's transfer deposits, envisioned a series of payments to total the equivalent of Sw.Fr. 50,000, and Mr. Bogdanffy stated that he was personally present during the payment of only/....

To: Stockholm Enskilda Bank A/B, Stockholm

9-11-1951

only one of these transactions, namely for Sw.Fr. 15,000. Both Bogdanffy's statement and Sarlo's position as reflected in the Thalberg letter to Hessay of August 31, 1951, seem to support the premise that Bogdanffy was present at the first payment, namely the one involving Sw.Fr. 15,000, which is the same transaction for which we have documentary evidence in the letters of Minister Danielsson to the Swiss bank. Sarlo himself appears to contend that he had actually made four payments, namely one for the equivalent of Sw.Fr. 15,000, a second for the equivalent of Sw.Fr. 15,000, a third for the equivalent of Sw.Fr. 5,000 and a fourth for the equivalent of Sw.Fr. 15,000. This contention of four payments is unsupported by the statement of Dr. Paul Nessmely of October 18, 1951, who undertakes to explain the source of Mr. Sarlo's Pengoe surpluses at the time of alleged payment to the Wallenberg action, and Nessmely indicates that he was responsible for bringing Sarlo into contact with Wallenberg. Nessmely also states that four payments were made and that Nessmely drove Sarlo in his car to make these payments. Nessmely also states that he was responsible for introducing Geza Lovass to the Wallenberg action.

Further, the Sarlo statement contained in the Thalberg letter of August 31, 1951, recites that Lovass was present at the second and third payment made by Sarlo at which time Lovass himself had also made payments. In the letter which you sent us on January 30, 1948, and in which you cite Minister Danielsson's statement and Mr. Ingve Ekmark's statement concerning the Lovass transaction, it would appear that Mr. Ekmark confirms that at least two payments had been made by Mr. Lovass, probably in December 1944. There is here some confirmation tending to support Sarlo's contention with respect to the second and third payments. So far as the possible fourth payment is concerned, you have already noted in your letter to us the statement of Geza Halmos whose statement of May 1950 refers to an alleged payment shortly before Xmas in 1944 in the amount of the equivalent of Sw.Fr. 15,000.

Another factor involves Mr. Paul Hegedues. His name figured in various statements, but your efforts in 1949 and ours in 1950 failed to secure any useful information from Mr. Hegedues, who now goes under the name of Dr. Pablo Holan and resides in Buenos Aires. Mr. Thalberg, acting under the impression that our failure to admit Mr. Sarlo's claim is based upon an adverse statement privately furnished us by Dr. Paul Hegedues, undertakes to explain that through a statement of Mr. Sarlo dated May 28, 1951, that some time at the end of 1949 or the beginning of 1950 Mr. Samuel Weiss, residing in Budapest and allegedly acting on behalf of Mr. Hegedues, approached Mr. Sarlo for the purpose of securing some money in consideration of Mr. Hegedues furnishing us with a favourable statement in behalf of Mr. Sarlo's claim. Mr. Sarlo states that he/...

To: Svec Holms Enskilda Bank A/S, Stockholm

9-11-1951

he refused to make such payment and therefore believes as a consequence that Hegedues sent us an unfavourable statement. Actually we received copy of a letter dated May 5, 1950 from Pablo Holan, saying that he did not find anything in his files which he has in Montevideo which would confirm Sarlo's statement, and that he still has in Europe some material concerning the Wallenberg action but is doubtful whether he would be in a position to again come into possession of this material. One cannot exclude or deny the probability of Mr. Sarlo's contentions concerning his conversations with the alleged Mr. Samuel Weiss at the end of 1949 or at the beginning of 1950, particularly in view of the fact that you have written to Dr. Paul Holan at Buenos Aires some time in February of 1949 and we in turn had followed up the search for information by writing to him in April of 1950. Both of us had received more or less evasive replies, in which Mr. Holan appeared only able to predicate his information upon an examination of his files.

Thus, it may be concluded that in the absence of more explicit and acceptable types of evidence as would ordinarily be required for the proving of a claim, but the omission of which may reasonably be understood, all of these separate facets tend to support the validity of the total claim for Sw.Fr. 50,000. Moreover, in the seven years which have almost transpired since the date of these alleged transactions, no other claimants have come forth to submit a claim for the residue of the Raoul Wallenberg funds, which in a general way equal the entirety of the Sarlo claim.

Turning then to the doubtful elements which are to be found in the collection of documents, one is faced with a series of contradictions or omissions with respect to various specific points as to invoke doubt and caution. Thus, we have some of the following:

Minister Danielsson's statements in support of the Sarlo total claim seem to rest strongly on what Ing. Bogdanffy told Minister Danielsson later and not upon Minister Danielsson's own personal recollection. On the other hand, while Bogdanffy stated that a discussion was had in 1944 by which Sarlo agreed to make payments totalling Sw. Fr. 50,000 in instalments, Sarlo actually deposited Sw.Fr.15,000 worth of Pengoes the following day at which time Bogdanffy was present, and Bogdanffy has no other personal knowledge of subsequent payments except as told to him by Sarlo. Hence, Minister Danielsson's impressions in favour of the total claim are unsupported by views expressed to him on the part of Bogdanffy, whose own views concerning the total claim were in turn conveyed to Bogdanffy by Sarlo. Concerning the absence of specific notations or records in the possession of the Royal Swedish Legation at the time of the alleged transactions, Minister Danielsson explains that at the end of 1944 the terror in Budapest was so great and diplomatic security/...

To: Stockholm Enskilda Bank A/S, Stockholm

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security so slight as to imperil the Minister, the Legation personnel and other diplomatic personnel, so that they were constantly on the move and unable to maintain normal activities. This explanation in itself would be entirely understandable were it not for the fact that the details concerning another transaction nonetheless found themselves reported somewhere in Swedish Foreign Office files. I refer to your letter of February 26, 1947, dealing with the claim of Counts Tivadar and Aurel Dessewffy, concerning which the Swedish Consul, Mr. Ingve Ekmark, was able in 1945 to furnish a somewhat comprehensive report with regard to the dealings of the Wallenberg action with the Dessewffy family, whose dealings also transpired in December of 1944.

Turning next to the statement of Dr. Paul Meszmely, the statement within itself is reasonable and plausible but serves to give rise to question when it is compared with other statements which have been furnished us. Meszmely recites that he was the person who induced both Sarlo and Lovass to make available funds to the Wallenberg action, and personally drove in Meszmely's car four separate times from the bank where Pengoes were deposited to the offices of the Wallenberg action. Notwithstanding the important and lucid role which Mr. Meszmely purports to have had in these transactions, his statement is the first time at which his name is introduced in any of the documents we have received. Sarlo himself has never mentioned the name of Meszmely, nor any of the facts concerning which Meszmely indicates to have played a role in Sarlo transactions. Meszmely speaks of his acquaintance with Mezey, Anger and Count Aurel Dessewffy among others, but nothing which we have in our files concerning these persons ever relates to Meszmely. Meszmely states that he had also been responsible for bringing Geza Lovass into these transactions, and recites that on one occasion when he drove Sarlo to the Wallenberg action offices he also brought Lovass at the same time, and that both of them had made payments of money. Lovass in his letters found in our files has never mentioned the name of Meszmely either. Further, Meszmely alleges to have taken Sarlo for at least four transactions in his car, and while this number coincides with the number of payments Sarlo claims to have made, nonetheless Meszmely speaks of only one time at which Lovass was also present, while Sarlo refers to two payments by Lovass and the Swedish Consul tends to confirm in his own recollection two payments by Lovass. Further, Meszmely places Lovass in the transaction with respect to Sarlo's last drive with Meszmely, which would be at least the fourth drive and payment, but Sarlo claims that Lovass was present during the second and third payments. Bogdanffy makes no mention of Meszmely nor does Geza Halmos.

In view of these complicated circumstances we recognize that it is ~~not~~ an extremely difficult matter to arrive at a decision supported by reasonable certainty/...

To: Stockholms Enskilda Bank A/B, Stockholm

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certainty concerning the facts. We recognize equally that the problem relates to a very abnormal situation during which men were sorely pressed to secure their own safety primarily. Indeed, under the best of circumstances it is always difficult for an honest and well-meaning witness to be able to recount events a few years old with exactitude concerning each detail. Thus, we are prepared to concur in any determination which Mr. van Dardel arrives at in his analysis of the claim. Perhaps in the light of some of our observations above you may feel the necessity of calling upon Mr. Thalberg for additional information or clarification. In any event, please feel free to submit to Mr. Thalberg any portions or all of this letter which you believe may usefully serve in developing a reasonable conclusion.

Sincerely yours,

Jerome J. Jacobson
General Counsel

JJJ/hf
cc: Mr. Beckelman
Mr. Shargo

Stockholm, den 20. Juni

Herrn

Ragnar G o t t f a r b

Advokat

S t o c k h o l m .

Sehr geehrter Herr Advokat,

ich beziehe mich auf die mit Ihnen gepflogene Rücksprache und wunschgemäss überreiche ich Ihnen mitfolgend eine eingehende Information über meine Tätigkeit bei der Königlich Schwedischen Gesandtschaft in Budapest, anlässlich der schwedischen Hilfsaktion zur Rettung des Judentums in Ungarn, welche Sie gefl. an die Leitung des amerikanischen "Joint" in Lissabon, weiterleiten möchten.

Ich zeichne mit den freundlichen Grüssen

als Ihr:

gez. Simón Margel

Ingenieur Simón Margel

dzt. Hotel Belfrage

Blasieholmstorg 9

Bilaga: 1 Information

6. 2. 1956
us
Lissabon

I n f o r m a t i o n

des Herrn Ingenieur Simón M A R G I L, sekretär und Dolmetscher der Königlich Schwedischen Gesandtschaft in Budapest, betraut mit der Leitung der argentinischen Interessenvertretung der Schutz-machtabteilung dieser Gesandtschaft.

Als im Jahre 1944 die Kgl. Schwedische Gesandtschaft in Budapest beauftragt wurde, dem ungarischen Judentum beizustehen und sie vor den Deportierungen nach Deutschland, sowie den Verfolgungen seitens der ungarischen Hakenkreuzler und der dort amtierenden deutschen Gestapo zu retten, stand ich im Dienste der Gesandtschaft, wo ich in der Schutzmachtabteilung die Interessenvertretung für Argentinien und teilweise für Sowjetrussland leitete.

Zu dieser Zeit wurde ich seitens seiner Exzellenz, des Herrn Gesandten Danielsson beauftragt, an der Seite des Herrn Legationssekretärs Raoul W a l l e n b e r g die bereits eingeleitete schwedische Hilfsaktion für die Juden grosszügig auszubauen und zu organisieren. Dieser neuen Aufgabe widmete ich meine ganze Kraft und Energie, damit es uns gelingt, rasche Hilfe den Verfolgten zu sichern. Innerhalb wenigen Wochen zeigten sich bereits die Rettungserfolge insofern günstig, als die Verfolgungen des Judentums in Budapest, sowie die Deportierungen aus der Provinz etwas nachliessen.

Um die begonnenen Deportierungen überhaupt zu verhindern, folgten wir den dazu Berechtigten "Schutzbriefe" (mit Foto versehen) aus, damit die Besitzer solcher Schutzbriefe in ihren bisherigen Wohnungen belassen und nicht in die mit gelben Sternen versehene Judenhäuser übersiedelt werden.

Nach langwierigen Verhandlungen mit den ungarischen Behörden und in Einvernahme mit dem Kgl. Schwedischen Aussenministerium, erhielten wir die amtliche Erlaubnis, an ungarische Juden insgesamt 4.500 "Schwedische Schutzpässe" auszustellen und laut Uebereinkommen durften die Inhaber eines solchen Schutzpasses nicht behelligt werden. Die früher ausgefolgten "Schutzbriefe" haben wir wieder eingezogen und diese gegen "Schutzpässe" umgetauscht. Diese Schutzpässe sind von der ungarischen Regierung, der Polizei- und Militärbehörden offiziell anerkannt worden. Dadurch, dass ich die ungarische Sprache perfekt erlernte, war es mir möglich, persönlich die Verhandlungen mit den kompetenten ungarischen Behörden, im Auftrage des Herrn Wallenberg zu führen, um weitere Erleichterungen für die verfolgten Juden zu erreichen, besonders jedoch für die Inhaber von schwedischen Schutzpässen.

Für diese Kategorie ist es uns gelungen beim Innenministerium einen bedeutenden Erfolg zu erzielen, indem die Inhaber von Schutzpässen nicht mehr als ungarische Staatsbürger betrachtet werden, sondern als unter dem Schutze der Kgl. Schw. Gesandtschaft stehende ausländische Juden, die später nach Schweden repatriiert werden sollen. Die Polizeibehörde für Fremdenkontrolle wurde seitens des ungarischen Innenministeriums in diesem Sinne instruiert mit der gleichzeitigen Veranlassung, dass die Inhaber eines Schutzpasses gültige Aufenthaltsbewilligungen erhalten, dort registriert und als Ausländer geführt werden. Hierfür richteten wir eine eigene Fremdenkontrollabteilung ein, wir nahmen die einzelnen Protokolle auf, reichten diese bei der Behörde für Fremdenkontrolle ein und erhielten tatsächlich

Für jeden einzelnen Fall die Aufenthaltsbewilligung ausgefolgt.

Für die in der Wallenberg-Abteilung arbeitenden Juden (als auch in den anderen Abteilungen, wie Schutzmacht, schwedisches Rotes Kreuz usw.) ist es uns gelungen, noch grössere Erleichterungen bei den Behörden zu erwirken, indem diese nicht zum ungarischen Arbeitsdienst einberufen werden durften.

Die Inhaber von schwedischen "Provisorischen Reisepässen" sind gleichfalls bei der Fremdenkontrolle als unter dem Schutze der Kgl.Schw.Gesandtschaft stehende schwedische Juden geführt worden.

Von insgesamt 10 ungarischen Internierungslager ist es uns gelungen viele hunderte internierte Juden auf Grund unserer Schutzpässe, die ihnen dorthin amtlich nachgeschickt wurden, zu befreien, nach Budapest zu bringen und sie unter den Schutz der Gesandtschaft zu stellen.

Mit Rücksicht darauf, dass die Bewilligung für die Erteilung schwedischer Schutzpässe beschränkt war und insgesamt nur auf 4500 lautete, so suchte ich weitere Möglichkeiten, um eine höhere Quote zu erreichen.

Auf meine Initiative und eingehender Rücksprache mit Herrn Minister Danielsson, sowie Legationssekretär Wallenberg, erhielt ich die Erlaubnis auch im Auftrage unserer Schutzmachtabteilung, der ich eigentlich angehörte, schwedische Schutzpässe an jene in Ungarn lebenden Juden auszufolgen, die in Argentinien und Ecuador Blutsverwandte haben, oder mit diesen Ländern in reger Geschäftsverbindung standen. Diese Schutzpässe hatte ich mit dem Vermerk

"betraut mit der Vertretung argentinischer Interessen in Ungarn"

bezw.

"betraut mit der Vertretung der Interessen Ecuadors in Ungarn"

zu versehen und nur an jene Bittsteller auszufolgen, die den tatsächlichen Nachweis der Blutsverwandschaft zu den in diesen Ländern lebenden Angehörigen erbringen, oder ihre Geschäftsverbindungen mit diesen Ländern beweisen konnten.-- Da ich keine Zeit verlieren durfte, so hatte ich diese Schutzpässe, ohne vorherige Genehmigung seitens dieser Regierungen einzuholen, an die bedrängten Juden ausgefolgt, jedoch mit Zustimmung des Herrn Minister Danielsson. Erst nach meiner Ankunft in Stockholm wsandte ich einen ausführlichen Bericht, durch das Kgl.Schw.Aussenamt an die beiden Regierungen.

Auf der gleichen Basis wurden auch an jene Juden Schutzpässe ausgestellt, die zu Dänemark geschäftliche Beziehungen hatten, oder Blutsverwandte von ihnen dort wohnten. Diese Schutzpässe sind dann mit dem Vermerk

"betraut mit der Vertretung der Interessen Dänemarks in Ungarn"

versehen worden.

Auf diese Weise ist es mir gelungen insgesamt ca. 600 jüdische Familien vor der sicheren Deportierung zu retten und diese unter den Schutz der Gesandtschaft zu stellen.

Der Leiter des schwedischen Roten Kreuzes, Herr Lektor Waldemar Langlet, hatte gleichfalls viele tausende "Schutzpässe" des Kgl.Schw.Roten Kreuzes an die Bedrängten und Verfolgten ausgefolgt und wenn auch dieselben nicht von allen Behörden respektiert worden sind, so hatten sie doch einen grossen moralischen Wert.

Viele ungarische Juden, die zum Militär-Arbeitsdienst einberufen wurden und ausserhalb Budapest arbeiteten, konnten wir auf Grund der ihnen durch Sonderkuriere (wir hatten eine eigene Kurierab-

teilung) zugestellten Schutzpässe nach Budapest zurückbringen und unter Leitung ungarischer Offiziere ein eigenes, schwedisches Arbeitsbataillon zusammenstellen. Diese Arbeitsdienstler standen dann unter dem Schutze der Gesandtschaft und sind auch tatsächlich zu diversen Arbeiten herangezogen worden, da wir im Laufe der Zeit grosse Lebensmittellager aufstellen mussten, um die notleidende jüdische Bevölkerung mit Lebensmitteln zu versehen.

Als die Lage der nichtgeschützten Juden trostlos wurde und die Deportation derselben wieder begann, wandte ich mich an die Geschäftsträger der portugiesischen und spanischen Gesandtschaften, dass auch sie etwas unternehmen möchten, um noch mehr Juden von der Deportation und den Verfolgungen zu retten. Hierauf wandten sich die beiden Geschäftsträger an ihre Regierungen und kurze Zeit darauf erhielten sie die Ermächtigung an jene Juden, die Blutsverwandte in diesen Ländern haben, oder geschäftliche Beziehungen dorthin hatten, "Schutzbriefe" bzw. "Provisorische Reisepässe" auszustellen und ihnen dieselben gegen Bezahlung einer Geldgebühr auszufolgen.--

Die portugiesische Gesandtschaft hatte auch an jene Juden Schutzpässe ausgefolgt, deren Blutsverwandte in Brasilien lebten, oder in Geschäftsverbindung mit diesem Lande gestanden sind. -- Die spanische Gesandtschaft hatte auf gleicher Basis, mit Relation Paraguay, Schutzpässe an Juden ausgefolgt.-- Diesen Gesandtschaften stellte ich unsere Drucksorten als Muster und die gesammelten Erfahrungen zur Verfügung, damit sie keine überflüssige Zeit verlieren und den bedrohten Juden rasche Hilfe gewähren. Auf diese Weise konnten wieder cca. 1000 jüdische Familien gerettet werden.

Die Schweizer Gesandtschaft hatte gleichfalls viele Schutzpässe ausgefolgt, dagegen viele tausende "Bescheinigungen" ausgestellt, worin bestätigt wurde, dass der Inhaber dieser Bescheinigung für die Repatriierung ungarischer Juden nach Palästina registriert und aufgenommen ist.

Auch die Nunciatur hatte begonnen auf unsere Veranlassung Schutzbriefe an die bedrängten Juden auszufolgen, die gleichfalls einen kleinen Erfolg verzeichneten.

Als jedoch am 15. Oktober 1944 die Pfeilkreuzler plötzlich die Macht über das nichtbesetzte ungarische Gebiet ergriffen hatten, begann eine furchtbare Periode für das in Budapest befindliche Judentum (in der Provinz waren keine Juden mehr vorhanden). Nach mühevollen und aufregenden Verhandlungen mit dieser Mörderbande hatten wir zwar einen grossen Sieg errungen, indem die bisher ausgestellten Schutzpässe auch weiterhin anerkannt und die Inhaber solcher Schutzpässe nicht deportiert werden durften, jedoch ist eine grosse Unsicherheit entstanden und viele Mitglieder der Pfeilkreuzlerpartei hat auf eigene Faust so manche Mordtat begangen, ohne sich um ihre Vorgesetzten zu kümmern.-- Plötzlich wurde mit der Aufstellung eines vom Christentum separierten Ghettos begonnen und ein ganzer Stadtteil mit einem Bretterzaun eingeschlossen. Als ein befristeter Erlass durch Plakatierung erschien, dass sämtliche Juden, die in den mit gelben Sternen bezeichneten Häusern oder anderswo wohnen, in das neu aufgestellte Ghetto übersiedeln müssen, hatten wir uns veranlasst gesehen, mit der Aufstellung schwedischer Schutzhäuser sofort zu beginnen (woran wir schon bisher gearbeitet hatten) und die diesbezüglichen Verhandlungen mit dem Innenministerium aufzunehmen. Nach aufregenden Verhandlungen und diplomatischen Drückungen erteilte uns das Innenministerium die Erlaubnis, separierte schwedische Schutzhäuser einzurichten. Die Bewilligung lautete, dass sämtliche Juden, die in den Besitz eines Schutzpasses sind, nicht in das Ghetto einziehen brauchen, dagegen in die von den Gesandtschaften (Schweden-Portugal-Spanien-Schweiz-Nunciatur-Schwedisches Rotes Kreuz und Internationales Rotes Kreuz)

geschützten Häuser übersiedeln müssen.-- Im Einvernehmen mit dem jüdischen Gemeinderat und der ungarischen Behörde ist es uns gelungen 40 grosse Häuser von den bisherigen Einwohnern zu entleeren und sämtliche schwedischen Schützlinge, zu dieser Zeit circa 5 - 6000 unterzubringen, welche Zahl sich später bedeutend erhöhte. Diese Häuser sind mit grossen, sichtbaren schwedischen Schutztafeln versehen und in jedem Hause ein Kommandant ernannt worden, der uns für die Ruhe und Ordnung, sowie Reinlichkeit verantwortlich war.-- Die anderen, oberwähnten Gesandtschaften und Rote Kreuze haben gleiche Häuser eingerichtet und ihre Schützlinge dort untergebracht.-- Offiziell waren ergo zwei Ghettos: das allgemeine Ghetto mit einem Bretterzaun eingeschlossen und ein Fremdenghetto, welches aus circa 80 vier- bis fünfstöckigen Häusern bestand.

Im allgemeinen Ghetto waren zu dieser Zeit circa 70.000, im Fremdenghetto (Schutzhäuser) circa 17.000 Juden untergebracht. Diese Zahlen erhöhten sich immer mehr und somit dürften am 24.XII.1944, als Budapest von den Russen gänzlich eingekreist wurde, im Zentralghetto circa 100 000 und in sämtlichen geschützten Häusern circa 50 000 Juden vorhanden gewesen sein.

Wir hatten eigene Krankenhäuser und ein Epidemiespital eingerichtet, sowie Zentralkichen für das Ghetto und die geschützten Häuser aufgestellt.

Trotz allen verzeichneten Erfolgen war es uns nicht möglich zu verhindern, dass unzählige Männer und Frauen, zusammen mit ihren Kindern und auch von ihnen getrennt, auf den Fussweg nach Deutschland deportiert wurden (über die Grenzstadt Hegyeshalom), die vorher in den Ruinen der veralterten Ziegelei in Óbuda gesammelt und misshandelt worden sind. Nun begann für uns eine furchterliche und aufreibende Hetzjagd, um möglichst viele Juden noch aus der Ziegelei in Altofen zu befreien, bevor sie den Fussweg zur Deportation antreten. Wir stellten schnell Schutzpässe für diese unglücklichen Menschen aus und es gelang uns auch viele Hunderte von ihnen freizubekommen. Für die auf dem Fusswege nach Deutschland befindlichen Juden richteten wir einen Auto-Rettungsdienst ein. Viele unserer Mitarbeiter, an der Spitze selbst Herr Wallenberg, sind in Personenautos den Wandernden nachgefahren, ihnen aus den mitfahrenden Lastautos warme und kalte Lebensmittel verteilt, auch viele Kleidungsgegenstände gegeben und jene, die in den Besitz eines Schutzpasses waren, konnten aus den marschierenden Reihen befreit werden. Herr Wallenberg selbst, als auch Herr Attaché Anger, mit einem Stab unserer Mitarbeiter, sind bis zur deutschen Grenze den Deportierten nachgefahren und in Hegyeshalom ist es uns gelungen jene Juden, die trotz Besitz eines Schutzpasses weggeschleppt wurden, aus den aufgestellten Reihen herauszuholen und diese nach Budapest in die geschützten Häuser zurückzubringen. -- Auf diese Weise war es uns möglich, viele hunderte Menschen vom sicheren Tode zu retten. Bei dieser aufreibenden Arbeit hatten uns viele anständige und menschlich-gesinnte Ungarn geholfen.

Sehr oft waren wir selbst in grosser Lebensgefahr, ich persönlich wurde eines Tages von 2 Detektiven der Budapester deutschen Gestapo in meiner Privatwohnung verhaftet und hatte ich es allein meiner Geistesgegenwart zu verdanken, wenn es ihnen nicht gelingen konnte, mich in die berühmte Gestapoburg abzuführen und auf Nimmerwiedersich verschwinden zu lassen. Mit der Ausrede, dass ich mich auf die Toilette entferne, benützte ich einen von ihnen unbeachteten Augenblick, um den anschliessenden Wohnraum abzuriegeln und nur in einer kurzen Unterhose und Bademantel bekleidet, verliess ich durch den Hofeingang meine Wohnung, lief auf die Strasse hinunter, musste eine Strecke z Fuss gehen, bis ich ein Personenauto anhalten konnte, welches mich dann in die Gesandtschaft hinaufbrachte. Später ist seitens der Gesandtschaft bei der deutschen

Gesandtschaft in Budapest ein energischer Protest gegen dieses Vorgehen eingelegt worden und nach einigen Tagen erhielten wir eine amtliche Entschuldigung, dass meine Verhaftung aus "Versehen" stattgefunden hatte. Was solches Versehen bedeutete, wussten wir sehr gut in der Praxis.-- Einige unserer Mitarbeiter (ungarische Staatsbürger) wurden in ihren Privatwohnungen von den Pfeilkreuzlern überfallen, von dort gewaltsam weggeführt und wir konnten keine Spur von ihnen finden. Diese Ereignisse wiederholten sich besonders im Monate Dezember, als die Russen sich allmählich Budapest näherten.-- Als jedoch der ungarische "Nazi-Geschäftsträger" in Stockholm, Major V O C Z K Ö N D Y von Stockholm nach Budapest zurückkehrte (er wurde von der schwedischen Regierung aufgefordert, das Land zu verlassen), begann die wahre Hölle für das Judentum in Budapest, besonders begannen jedoch die Schwierigkeiten für unsere Gesandtschaft und ihre Mitarbeiter. Als wir der Aufforderung der ungarischen Bandenregierung, mit ihr nach Westungarn abzureisen und jüdische Aktion einzustellen, nicht nachkommen wollten, veranlassten diese Banditen (auf Veranlassung des berühmten Terroristen Vöczköndy, dass sämtliche Mitglieder der schwedischen Gesandtschaft, inklusive des Herrn Minister Danielsson, verhaftet und nach Sopron gebracht werden sollen.-- Mit Rücksicht darauf, dass wir den strengsten Auftrag vom Kgl. Schwedischen Aussenministerium aus Stockholm erhalten haben, auf unserem Posten in Budapest zu bleiben und auch die Schwedenhäuser zu beschützen, so wurde die Aufforderung, die ungarische Regierung nach Westungarn zu begleiten, abgelehnt.

Am 24. Dezember 1944 überfielen die Pfeilkreuzler, schwer bewaffnet, sämtliche Gebäude der Gesandtschaft und verhafteten die dort angetroffenen Mitglieder. Sowohl der Herr Minister Danielsson als auch die Attachés und Legationssekretäre konnten sich rechtzeitig in Sicherheit bringen, ich persönlich war zu dieser Zeit in meiner Privatwohnung und als ich vom Geschehenen telephonisch benachrichtigt wurde, konnte ich aus der Wohnung mich rechtzeitig entfernen und in einen anderen Bezirk im Hause eines Freundes Unterkunft finden. Die Pfeilkreuzler drangen schwer bewaffnet auch in unsere Lebensmittellager ein und raubten diese total aus. Diese Lebensmittellager waren für die im Zentralghetto und im Fremdenghetto untergebrachten Juden, als auch für die Gesandtschaftsmitglieder und Mitarbeiter in der Aktion aufgestapelt. Wegen dieses Ereignisses und dadurch, dass wir die Gesandtschaftsobjekte nicht mehr betreten konnten (diese sind andauernd von den bewaffneten Pfeilkreuzlern bewacht worden), waren wir gezwungen, unsere offizielle Tätigkeit einzustellen, umso mehr, als am 26. XII. die Einkreisung von Budapest durch die Russen vollständig war und die Budapest zurückgebliebenen Pfeilkreuzler sich aus dem grössten Verbrechen gesindel rekrutierten und diese vor keinem Massenmord zurückgeschreckt hätten.-- Es ist uns trotzdem noch gelungen, aus unseren geheimen Wohnorten den verfolgten Juden etwas beizustehen, indem wir ihnen durch unsere wenigen ungarischen Mitarbeiter aus den noch vorhandenen geheimen Lebensmittellagern, ins Zentralghetto und ins Fremdenghetto Lebensmittel senden konnten.--

Als dann die Russen nur noch einige Kilometer von der inneren Stadt standen, beeilten sich die Pfeilkreuzler-Banditen noch einige Massenmorde im Zentralghetto zu begehen und wie ich von Augenzeugen hörte, so dürften damals circa 2000 Juden erschossen worden sein. Die geschützten Häuser (Fremdenghetto) hatten dagegen mehr Glück, da sie immo Allgemein unbehelligt geblieben sind. Einige Tage, bevor Pest von den Russen gänzlich genommen wurde, überfielen die Banditen einige geschützte Häuser, überführten von dort circa 2 - 300 Juden in das Zentralghetto und von diesen 300 sollen angeblich 60 bis 80 erschossen worden sein.--

Am 8. Januar hatten die Pfeilkreuzler eine Anzeige erfahren, wo ich mich befinde und an diesem Tage so ich auch tatsächlich abgeholt werden. Ein Mitglied der Pfeilkreuzpartei, Herr Harangi, der bei der Partei nur zum Scheine arbeitete, um uns vor jeder drohenden Gefahr rechtzeitig zu warnen, eilte schnell zu mir, teilte mir den Beschluss der Partei mit, besorgte rasch ein Militärauto und brachte mich in das Haus, wo auch er wie, wo ich in einer unterirdischen Waschküche untergebracht wurde. Dort wohnte ich bis zur Befreiung von Buda durch die Russen.--

Als ich mit den ersten russischen Truppen in Berührung kam, dann mit dem Kommando Fühlung nehmen konnte, was mir dann möglich den Minister Danielsson und einige andere Mitglieder der Gesandtschaft zu finden und mit ihnen das Weitere zu besprechen. Später war es mir auch möglich, in Begleitung eines russischen Offiziers von Buda nach Pest hinüberzukommen (mit einem Kahn, da die Brücken von den Deutschen in die Luft gesprengt wurden), wo ich mich zu meiner grössten Genugtuung persönlich davon überzeugen konnte, dass fast sämtliche Juden, die in den geschützten Häusern untergebracht waren, gerettet und am Leben sind.

Meiner Schätzung nach, dürften in ganz Budapest, als die endgültige Befreiung dieser Stadt durch die Russen erfolgte, insgesamt circa 160.000 Juden am Leben geblieben sein, da ich viele tausende Juden ausserhalb der beider Ghettos, mit falschen Papieren als Arier in verschiedenen Bezirken aufhielten, wozu auch ich sehr viel beigetragen habe, indem ich von offizieller Amtsstelle solche Papiere gegen Bezahlung aus meinem Privatvermögen beschaffte, um die verfolgten Menschen zu retten.

Im Warenhaus "Corvin" liess ich ein Notspital für erste Hilfe und Flüchtlinge einrichten, wo ich eben die mit den falschen Papieren ausgestatteten Juden, als Flüchtlinge aus der Provinz unterbringen konnte, was uns unser Gewährsmann bei den Pfeilkreuzlern durchführte. Dieses Notspital mit 150 Betten wurde anfangs Januar ds. Js. von einer Pfeilkreuzlerhorde zerstört und geplündert, jedoch konnten die dort wohnenden Schützlinge rechtzeitig in einen Kloster untergebracht werden.

Wir alle waren wegen der Hilfsaktion den Verfolgungen der Pfeilkreuzler und der deutschen Gestapo ausgesetzt und befanden uns stets in grosser Lebensgefahr. Leider Gottes ist unser liebster Leiter der jüdischen Hilfsaktion, Herr Legationssekretär Raoul Wallenberg am 17. Januar ds. Js. plötzlich verschwunden. Er wurde an diesem Tage in Begleitung eines russischen Offiziers gesehen und wollte angeblich zur ungarischen provisorischen Regierung nach Debreczen fahren. Seither wissen wir nicht, was eigentlich mit ihm geschehen ist. Wir haben alles unternommen, auch bei der russischen Regierung in Moskau, sowie bei den amerikanischen Gesandtschaften, um Positives über ihn zu erfahren.

Sämtliche Mitglieder der Gesandtschaft haben ebenso ihr Hab und Gut verloren, wie die Juden. Ich persönlich fand meine Wohnung, als ich in Begleitung eines russischen Majors dorthin zurückkehrte, vollständig ausgeplündert vor. Mein Vermögen (Bargeld und sonstige hohe Werte), welches in zwei Kassaschränken untergebracht war, habe ich ganz verloren, da diese Panzerschränke im Gebäude der Gesandtschaft gewaltsam gesprengt und der Inhalt derselben geraubt wurde. Die beiden Autos, welche gleichfalls in der Garage der Gesandtschaft standen, sind von den Pfeilkreuzlern weggeführt worden. Ich selbst, sowie die meisten Mitglieder der Gesandtschaft haben die ganze

Garderobe verloren und langte ich in einen Sportanzug in Stockholm ein und hier war ich gezwungen, mich wieder neu einzukleiden, damit ich menschlich erscheinen kann.

Dies alles war die selbstverständliche Hilfe meinerseits, bis zur Befreiung der Stadt durch die Russen, der ich mich als ganzer Mensch vollauf widmete. Nun befinden sich alle diese Juden in grösster Not und im tiefsten Elend. Seinerzeit haben ihnen die ungarischen Behörden, dann die Pfeilkreuzler das ganze Hab und Gut weggenommen, sie aus ihren Heimen vertrieben und stehen heute ohne Kleidung, ohne Nahrungsmittel und Arzneien da. Das Leben haben wir den in Ungarn verbliebenen Juden gerettet; was aber soll jetzt mit ihnen geschehen?

Es müsste sowohl in Ungarn, als auch in Polen und den anderen Ländern etwas Positives für die am Leben gebliebenen Juden unternommen werden und dazu gehören drei Sachen: viel Geld, Energie und gute Verbindungen zu den Russen.

Obwohl ich die Absicht habe, demnächst nach Argentinien abzureisen, um in Buenos Aires dem Aussenministerium einen persönlichen Bericht über die Tätigkeit in der Schutzmachtabteilung der Kgl.Schwedischen Gesandtschaft in Budapest zu erstatten, als auch Vorträge über die Ereignisse in Ungarn zu halten und in der dortigen Presse hierüber zu schreiben, so wäre ich trotzdem bereit, mich auch weiterhin der Hilfsaktion des amerikanischen "JOINT" für die in Europa am Leben gebliebenen Juden zu widmen, falls diese Institution auf meine wertvolle Mitarbeit reflektieren sollte. Ich kenne nicht nur die Verhältnisse in allen diesen Ländern, sondern beherrsche auch ihre Sprachen und zwar:

deutsch - ungarisch - polnisch - serbisch - russisch - rumänisch - spanisch - und französisch.

Es müsste in Bucarest ein mit selbständigen Vollmachten ausgestattetes Zentralbüro vom "Joint" eingerichtet werden, von wo aus die angrenzenden Länder intensiver und besser bearbeitet werden könnten, als von Lissabon oder London aus. Jedenfalls müssten ganz energische Schritte unternommen werden, denn dieser Zustand, in dem sich derzeit die seit vielen Jahren verfolgten und geplagten Juden befinden, ist einfach unhaltbar.

Die Verhandlungen über die Rückreise aller Mitglieder der Kgl.Schwedischen Gesandtschaft von Budapest nach Stockholm hatte ich persönlich, im Beisein des Herrn Minister Danielsson, mit den russischen Militärbehörden in Ungarn, später auch in Bucarest mit dem russischen Gesandten, General Pawlow geführt und die Ergebnisse waren insofern günstig, als wir eine sehr angenehme und bequeme Reise von Budapest über Bucarest - Odessa - Moskwa - Leningrad - Helsinki - Åbo nach Stockholm hatten.

Stockholm, den 20. Juni 1945

gez. Simón Margel

Ingenieur Simon Margel

C O P Y

KAROLINSKA SJUKHUSET
Stockholm 60
Överdirektören

Stockholm den 8. Januar 1946

Herrn Joseph J. Schwartz
American Joint Distribution Committee
19 rue de Teheran
P a r i s

Sehr geehrter Herr Schwartz,

Beiliegend sende ich Ihnen die Kopie meines Briefes an die Zeitung "Aufbau" in New York. Aus diesem Schreiben sehen sie die heutige Situation.

Ich wäre Ihnen sehr dankbar, wenn Sie sowohl Ihre Zentrale in New York als auch andere juedische Institutionen ueber die wirkliche Lage informieren wuerden. Es wäre auch gut, wenn Ihre New Yorker Zentrale bei Doktor Manfred George im Sinne raschen und ungekuerzten Abdruckes meiner Zuschrift intervenieren wuerde.

Mitvorzueglicher Hochachtung,

gez. Fredrik von Dardel.

C O P Y

Mr. Manfred George
"AUFBAU"
67 West 44th Street
New York City (N.Y.)

Sehr geehrter Herr Doktor George,

In der Nummer Ihrer Zeitung vom 13 Dezember 1946, die ich heute von Freunden erhielt, lese ich auf Seite 27 unter der Rubrik "Was brachte Sie nach Atlantic City?" folgendes:

"... Ich fragte Dr. Goeroeg nach dem Schicksal des schwedischen Diplomaten Raoul Wallenberg, der in der Nazi-Zeit Tausende von Juden durch seinen Mut, seine Energie und seine Geschicklichkeit zu retten vermochte. - "Wallenberg ist seit zwei Jahren spurlos verschwunden. Sein Tod ist nahezu eine Sicherheit. Die Deutschen behaupteten, die Russen haetten ihn umgebracht; die Russen sagen dasselbe von den Deutschen. Die Juden Ungarns werden jetzt darangehen, das Andenken dieses Maertyrers, der ihr Schutzengel war und fuer sie den Tod erlitt, durch ein Denkmal fuer alle Zeiten wachzuhalten. Wallenberg war uebrigens, wie jetzt enthuehlt werden kann, ein enger Mitarbeiter des Joint. Die Gelder, die er fuer sein Rettungswerk benoetigte, wurden ihm von der grossen amerikanischen Hilfsorganisation laufend zur Verfuegung gestellt."

Raoul Wallenbergs Vater starb drei Monate vor der Geburt seines Sohnes. Unterzeichneter, Oberdirektor des Karolinischen Krankenhauses in Stockholm, Fredrik von Dardel, heiratete R.W.s Mutter und wurde nach R.W.s Verschwinden zu seinem Vormund eingesetzt. Als solcher bin ich verpflichtet die Interessen Raoul Wallenbergs zu wahren, und ich muss daher die Darstellung der mir unbekannten Herrn Doktor Goeroeg richtigstellen, da durch Verbreitung solcher durch nichts gestaerkten Geruechte unsere Anstrengungen fuer R.W.s Rettung gefaehrdet werden.

Am 17. Januar 1945 hat der Sovjetische Vizeausserkommissar "ekanosof in einer offiziellen Note dem schwedischen "ussenamt ueber den schwedischen Gesandten in Moskau, Staffan Soederblom, mitgeteilt, dass die Sovjet-behoerden den Legationssekretaer Raoul Wallenberg und dessen Eigentum unter ihren Schutz genommen haben. Seit diesem Tage haben die sovjetischen Behoerden trotz wiederholter offizieller Anfragen und "emarchen Schwedens neimais die Frage nach dem Verbleiben des im Januar 1945 unter sovjetischen Schutz genommenen Raoul Wallenberg beantwortet. Wie Sie aus dem Ihnen mit gleicher Post geschickten Buch "Raoul Wallenberg" von Rudolph Philipp ersehen koennen, hat keine Sovjetbehoerde jemals behauptet, dass R.W. von Nazi ermordet worden sei. Als wir Nachricht hatten - durch einen im aktiven "ienst der neuen demokratischen ungarischen Regierung stehenden Polizeileitnant und von anderen Seiten -, dass W. sich zu bestimmten Zeiten in bestimmten russischen Gefaengnissen befand, und die schwedischen Legationen in Moskau bzw. Bukarest sich an die betreffenden Sovjetbehoerden wandten, antwortete die Gefaengnisverwaltung in Focsani in Bessarabien dass "sie nicht feststellen koenne, ob W. sich im Gefaengnis befand oder befinde" und das sovjetische Volkskommissariat fuer Krieg antwortete, dass die Frage W. in die Kompetenz der NKVD (GPU) falle. Im Juni 1946 uebernahm Stalin auf Ersuchen der schwedischen Gesandte Soederbloms die -rledigung des Problems Wallenberg. Im Oktober 1946 erlaeuerte das

sovjetische Aussenkommissariat, dass es keine weiteren Noten und Demarchen in der Sache W. entgegennehmen koenne, weil diese Sache direkt Stalin untergestellt sei, und sie koenne Stalins Kanzlei auch nicht ansie Erledigung erinnern.

In Philipps Buch, das im November 1946 erschien, wird festgestellt, dass ein Sovjetdiplomate in Gegenwart des russischen Militaer-attachees in Stockholm offen zugab, dass R.W. lebe, und dass er sich auch auf sovjetischem Boden befinde.

Vertrauensleute, die vor kurzem aus Russland zurueckkamen, stellten fest, dass sich R.W. noch im Sommer 1946 in einem ukrainischen Gefangenen lager befand, von wo er am 1. September abtransportiert wurde.

Schriftsteller Philipp ueberreichte am 22. November ein Beweismaterial der schwedischen Regierung und erhielt es am 30. November zurueck, nachdem es von der Regierung geprueft worden war. Das offizielle Telegraphenbuero TT brachte am 1. Dezember die von allen schwedischen Tageszeitungen abgedruckte Mitteilung, dass Rudolph Philipp die Behauptungen in seinem Buch durch sein Beweismaterial bestaerkt habe.

Sie muessen verstehen, sehr geehrter Herr Redakteur, dass unsere und der schwedischen Regierung Bemuehungen fuer Rettung meines Stiefsohnes und Muendels Raoul Wallenberg kontermentiert werden, wenn ein so angesehenes Blatt wie "Aufbau" das Geruecht verbreiten hilft, Raoul Wallenberg sei sicher tot. Die moeglichen Konsequenzen soleher durch nicht erhaerteten Geruechte - wenn auch natuerlich bona fide publiziert - werden durch kein Monument aufgewogen.

In der Ueberzeugung dass Sie durch Veroeffentlichung dieses Briefes zur Rettung des Mannes beitragen, der 6 Monate lang taeglich sein Leben fuer die Rettung der Juden einsetzte,

zeichne ich mit vorzueglicher Hochachtung,
gez. Oberdirektor Fredrik von Dardel

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

K R Y P T O F A X

Sid 1 (/)

2000-01-28

R18W-berg

Delgivning från
kryptoexpeditionen
enl adressering/samt
UMK
BMK / *an*

aa
*R**W*

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET nr

*(EC)**13*

KRYPTOFAX		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000 -01- 28 19 ¹⁵		
Avd.	Grupp	Mål
<i>P</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>Eu</i>

Till: EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: amb Moskva

B R Å D S K A N D E

Wallenbergärendet - möte med Nikisjkin.

Kryfax 39A Moskva 2000-01-27

Tack för rapport från mötet med Nikisjkin. Jag hoppas han tydligt påmindes om vad som sades vid arbetsgruppsmötet hösten 1997.

Nikisjkins anvisningar om hänvänelser till Tutjnin avseende GARF samt för att få MVD:s och FSB:s tillstånd etc. understryker snarast ytterligare vad jag föreslog häromdagen om behovet av någon som kan "cut through" alla myndigheter. Det är förstås viktigt att brådskan framhålls i dessa hänvänelser, och att snabbt tillmötesgående är nödvändigt om vi skall kunna hålla deadline, dvs slutet av april.

Betr brevet till Zanina har jag inga invändningar.

MAGNUSSON

SVERIGES AMBASSAD
RIGA

K R Y P T O F A X

Sid 1 (3)

2000-01-31

DELGIVNING FRÅN
KRYPTOEXPEDITIONEN
ENL. ADRESSERING *dm**UM/Carst* *M**aa*
R

KRYPTOFAK		
INKOM UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET		
2000 -01- 31 / 3 ³²		
Avd. <i>P</i>	Grupp <i>2</i>	Mål <i>Eu'</i>

UTRIKESDEPARTEMENTET TJÄNSTE

Till: EC (Lundvik)

Kopia: amb Moskva (Tojzner-Glückman)

från Hans Magnusson

Meddelande till Susan Mesinai

(1 bil.)

Jag vore tacksam om bifogade meddelande kunde
vidarebefordras till Susan Mesinai.

Adress

Telefon

Telefax

Tele

T E L E F A X Sid 2 ()

Dear Susan,

I hope my visit to Moscow can take place as planned on February 13-14. It would be good if we could meet in the evening of the 13th to discuss outstanding matters and also, if necessary, inbetween other meetings on Monday the 14th. The main meeting(s) with the Russian side I would like to have on my own this time, in order to utilize as effectively as possibly my short time in Moscow. Apart from that, I am wondering if it would not be a good idea if we jointly could meet with Roginsky and Bistritsky from Memorial, provided there is enough time. As you know, I would also like to realize my meeting with the Presidential Archive this time.

We will continue our dialogue up to this trip, and the most important matter now is the organization of your remaining work. You have yourself more or less pinpointed what will have to be done, but the key question, certainly to be discussed on the 14th, still seems to be how we can ensure a maximally efficient Russian cooperation and access. If you could try to hammer out the most practical way as you see it, it would be very helpful. What is most unclear to me is how we are to handle the psychiatric institutions. Some other questions below,

-Files of the Academy of Sciences; in particular relating to Myasnikov and his colleagues(although I suspect that any key documents would still be elsewhere).

-How much has been done in GARE? has it yielded anything?

-The time plan for Marvin's investigation. Follow-up?

-The coordination between you and Susanne, as she plans to come to Moscow in March(cf articles in the Swedish press about archive research in what must be parts of the Trophy archives undertaken by the Jewish community in Russia) .

-Follow-up of your study of the registry of the archive of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

-Anything of interest for our investigation from your archive studies in London.

-Your report(s) to the working group.

T E L E F A X Sid 3 ()

-Next working group meeting(possibly in connection with Marvin's last trip to Moscow for the computer analysis).

Will you make a draft letter to Tuchnin about access through GARF and relevant permissions to the NKVD and MVD archives in the GARF? What Nikishkin said about giving written comments to the personal files is not good enough. We still want most of them delivered.

Concerning Bethlen, I do think we were told by FSB his personal file has not been found, but I have not had the time to locate my notes about this.

As to possible death dates in the early fifties. As you say there were a number of mostly rather brief and more or less specific reports about a sick RW in various parts of the GULAG, sometime referring to the same periods. There were also one or two reports of a healthy RW. How specifically do you envisage investigating that hypothesis in medical records and certain files?

The 1956 death theory is of course intriguing and should be analyzed, but still very unlikely.

What should we do about the Butyrka registries?

Best regards

Hans Magnusson

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